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ABSTRACT 
MARKETIZATION OF SOCIAL SECTORS AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES OF 
SOCIAL ENTERPRISES 
 
TÜRKAN YOSUN 
 
Ph.D. Dissertation, July 2016 
 
Dissertation Supervisor: Prof. Dilek Çetindamar 
 
Keywords: Marketization, social enterprise strategy, social entrepreneurship, hybrid 
organizations, mission drift 
 
 
Through a qualitative study of the field of supplementary education of the disabled in Turkey, 
this research first explores the changing field dynamics after marketization. I find that the 
practices of the profit-maximizer new entrants, and the changes in the beneficiaries and the 
workforce, coupled with institutional weaknesses lead to the degeneration of the sector. 
Second, I analyze the pressures exerted on the social enterprises and present a framework 
showing the differing levels of vulnerability to those pressures based on particular 
organizational characteristics. Later, I elaborate on the strategic responses of 10 incumbent 
social enterprises through comparative case studies. The responses vary from proactive acts 
of scaling, increasing free services, increasing high-income beneficiaries, creating alternative 
resources, to reactive strategies of decreasing free services, decreasing quality investments, 
cost cuttings in expenses, reducing high-cost beneficiaries, seizing, and finally quitting the 
market. Reasons for the differing responses are vision and cohesion of the board, imprinting 
effects and legitimacy of the organization, entrepreneurial orientation, escalation of 
commitment, level of engagement, frame of reference, and pro-social values of the founders, 
as well as the socioeconomic situation of the region. A mission drift, on the other hand, 
occurred in a situation when the organization was found with equal emphasis on profit and 
social value rather than a pure social aim, when its ownership structure became fragmented, 
when exposed to pressure from small shareholders for profit coupled with a pressure on the 
main shareholder to stay in the business, and when it embedded itself in profit-maximizers’ 
network. 
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ÖZET 
SOSYAL SEKTÖRLERİN PİYASALAŞMASI VE SOSYAL İŞLETMELERİN 
VERDİKLERİ STRATEJİK TEPKİLER 
 
TÜRKAN YOSUN 
 
Doktora Tezi, Temmuz 2016 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dilek Çetindamar 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Piyasalaşma, sosyal işletme stratejisi, sosyal girişimcilik, melez 
örgütler, misyon kayması 
 
 
Türkiye’de engelli bireylerin destek eğitimi alanında gerçekleştirilen nitel bir çalışma 
vasıtasıyla, bu araştırma öncelikle alanın piyasalaması ile değişen dinamikleri 
incelemektedir. Karını maksimize etmek isteyen yeni katılımcıların uygulamaları, ve 
faydalanıcılar ve işgücünde meydana gelen değişikliklerin, kurumsal zayıflıklar ile bir araya 
geldiğinde alanın yozlaşmasına sebep olduğunu buluyorum. İkinci olarak, sosyal işletmeler 
üzerinde uygulanan baskıları inceliyor ve belirli örgütsel özelliklere dayanarak bu 
baskılardan yaralanabilme seviyesini gösteren bir çerçeve sunuyorum. Sonrasında, yerleşik 
10 sosyal işletmenin karşılaştırmalı vaka analizi ile stratejik yanıtlarını açıklıyorum. Bu 
yanıtlar, ölçekleme, ücretsiz hizmetleri arttırma, yüksek gelirli faydalanıcıları arttırma,  
değişik kaynaklar yaratma gibi proaktif stratejiler ile, ücretsiz hizmetleri azaltma, kalite 
yatırımlarını azaltma, harcamalardan tasarruf, yüksek maliyetli faydalanıcıları azaltma, 
küçülme, ve son olarak, pazardan çıkma arasında değişmektedir. Farklılaşan yanıtların 
sebepleri, yönetim kurulunun vizyon ve birliği, örgütün meşruiyeti, basımlama etkileri ve 
girişimcilik yönelimi, kurucuların artan bağlılığı, katılım seviyesi, referans çerçevesi, ve 
toplum yanlısı değerlerine ek olarak bölgenin sosyoekonomik durumudur. Misyon 
kaymasının ise, örgütün saf bir sosyal amaçtan ziyade kar ve sosyal değer üzerine eşit bir 
vurgu ile kurulduğu, ortaklık yapısının parçalara ayrıldığı, ana hissedarın üzerindeki alanda 
kalma baskının küçük hissedarların kar beklentisi ile birleştiği ve örgütün kendisini karını 
maksimize etmek isteyen öörgütlerin ağına yerleştirdiği durumda ortaya çıktığı görülmüştür. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
  Non-profit and for-profit organizations have traditionally been regarded as quite 
distinct entities; non-profits relied mainly on grants and donations in order to survive and 
achieve their missions (Hall, 2006), which set them apart from commercial enterprises. 
However, decreases in available funding opportunities and the pressure on non-profits 
towards being self-sustaining have, in part, replaced the traditional non-profits with social 
enterprises (Dees, 1998; Fowler, 2000)- business ventures pursuing a social purpose and 
aiming to create social value through engaging in commercial activity (Thompson, 2002; 
Mair and Schoen, 2007).  
In addition, mission-based organizations historically operated in the areas where 
governments failed to serve the societal needs and where for-profits did not chose to operate 
due to the limited profit opportunities- a phenomenon attributed to the market failures 
(DiMaggio and Anheier, 1990; Steinberg, 1987, Weisbrod, 1977). This fact has also been 
changing for the past few decades, such that social enterprises and profit-seeking firms 
increasingly co-exist in the same fields (Dees and Anderson, 2003). The decreasing 
involvement of governments in the economy and society has created markets attractive to 
both social and commercial enterprises (Sharir and Lerner, 2006). Coupled with the public 
management arrangements of governments which create and support market mechanisms 
(Kaboolian, 1998), more and more social sectors have been subject to marketization, whereby 
the organizations adopt market or quasi-market practices (Salamon, 1997; Hall et al.; 2012). 
As a result, several sectors formerly dominated by public and non-profit organizations are 
evolving into mixed-form markets where social enterprises and commercial enterprises 
compete (Frumkin and Andre-Clark, 2000; Marwel and McInerney, 2005). 
Enterprises established by non-profit organizations and profit-seeking organizations 
have historically co-existed in some markets, e.g., health care and education, attracting the 
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attention of welfare economists (Arrow, 1963; Hansmann, 1980), who study the phenomenon 
under the title of non-profit and for-profit competition. These scholars mainly focus on the 
impact of the market composition and the density of competition on the quality and price of 
the goods and services offered (e.g., Schlesinger et al., 1997; Mark, 1996; Hirth, 1999; 
Brown, 2005). The models they develop assume that all non-profits, as well as for-profits, 
will behave the same under particular conditions. Therefore, they denote homogeneity to all 
members of an organizational form in their intentions and actions, neglecting the 
organizational differences.  
Social enterprises are hybrid organizations bringing together two institutional logics; 
the commercial (or market) logic and the social welfare logic (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; 
Pache and Santos, 2013; Lee and Battilana, 2013). Thus, they combine the altruistic 
motivations of philanthropy with the economic motivations of business and markets (Dees 
and Anderson, 2006). As different institutional pressures create the potential for 
fragmentation, conflict, goal-ambiguity, and organizational instability (Kraatz and Block, 
2008), social enterprises need to find ways of managing several internal tensions (Smith et 
al., 2013). While there are a few empirical studies that focus on managing their hybrid nature 
(e.g., Pache and Santos, 2013; Battilana and Dorado, 2010), the attention has so far been 
limited to the structural arrangements and some practices such as site governance, branding, 
and professional affiliation. Moreover, majority of these studies use social enterprises as a 
context for contributing to the literature on institutional logics. Therefore, they focus on the 
institutional pressures and the symbolic meanings of organizations’ actions for gaining 
legitimacy from different actors associated with each logic, rather than evaluating their 
strategic reactions to market forces. What is lacking in the literature is theorizing on the 
decisions of social enterprises pertaining to e.g.; their product/service mix, quality, pricing, 
and the targeted beneficiary segments, under the economic as well as institutional pressures. 
As the commercial logic diffuses into the social enterprises to find place in their 
organizational practices, making them more ‘business-like’ (Dart 2004; Weisbrod, 1998a), 
social enterprises face the threat of a mission drift (Dees, 1998) whereby they forget the 
premises of the social welfare logic and act like their profit-seeking counterparts. Despite 
being vastly pronounced in the last decades, there is a lack of theorizing and empirical 
research on the topic except a few recent attempts (e.g.; Chambers, 2014; Garrow and 
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Hasenfeld, 2012). The ambiguity on the loosely defined concept of mission drift signals to 
be a cause for the neglect of the study of strategic management of social enterprises. More 
specifically, there is an inclination to bundle the changes regarding the product and service 
quality, price, and targeted beneficiary segments, as well as particular choices of growth 
strategies, under the concept of mission drift. Yet, there is a need to analyze the various 
pressures exerted on social enterprises and their strategic reactions, rather than simplifying 
their strategic actions to a dichotomy of mission drift vs no mission drift. In essence, this 
approach can also contribute to a clearer understanding of the phenomenon of mission drift. 
Through a longitudinal study of the field of supplementary education of the disabled in 
Turkey, this study first explores the changing field dynamics as it is exposed to marketization. 
Doing so, it explores the mechanisms operating at multiple levels as well as the particular 
pressures exerted on social enterprises. Second, it analyzes the responses of the incumbent 
social enterprises to the pressures and explains the causes of their varying reactions. While 
initially dominated by few mission-oriented organizations, this field saw the invasion of 
profit-seeking organizations after the legislative changes which brought gradual increases in 
the profit opportunities. By 2016, the special education and rehabilitation centers (SERCs) 
in the field have reached a total 1975 organizations. The comparative analysis of 10 cases 
enabled me to identify new variables and causal mechanisms for the undertheorized topics 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Siggelkow, 2007) and provided the opportunity to employ 
multiple levels of analysis (Yin, 1984). 
 The first output of this research is a model explaining changing dynamics in the field 
as a consequence of marketization, which ends with the degeneration of the social sector. I 
first describe the characteristics of incumbent organizations and the new entrants, and 
explicate the different competitive acts of the new entrants who are mainly motivated by 
profit. Later, I explain the two interesting emergent mechanisms occurring with 
marketization, other than the rise of profit-maximizers; the changes in the beneficiaries and 
the workforce. I then evaluate the macro level effects and weakening of social enterprises, 
which serve as moderators in the emergent framework. Following this, I introduce the 
emergent concept of degeneration of the social sector and summarize the mechanisms 
operating at multiple levels to cause this consequence. 
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The second output of the study is a framework exploring the multiplicity of the 
responses of social enterprises in the mixed-form market as well as the antecedents to those 
responses. I first explain the mechanisms by which the pressures arising from marketization 
effect the social enterprises; namely, the resource, time and labor constraints, and the exerted 
psychological pressures. Following this, I present a framework showing the differing levels 
of vulnerability to those pressures based on particular organizational characteristics. Later, I 
provide summaries for the 10 cases analyzed, elaborating the strategic actions taken, and 
comparing and contrasting the behaviors and characteristics of social enterprises to assess 
reasons for different reactions. The reactions vary from proactive acts of scaling, increasing 
free services, increasing high-income beneficiaries, creating alternative resources, as well as 
acts to manage risks, to reactive strategies of decreasing free services, decreasing quality 
investments, cost cuttings in expenses, reducing high-cost beneficiaries, seizing, and finally 
quitting the market. The reasons for the differing reactions are, on the other hand, vision and 
cohesion of the board, imprinting effects and legitimacy of the organization, entrepreneurial 
orientation, escalation of commitment, level of engagement, frame of reference, and pro-
social values of the founders, as well as the socioeconomic situation of the region. 
 The case summaries also elaborate the acts which are denoted as mission drift in the 
literature. Analysis reveals that, increased prices in one organization did not indicate a 
mission drift, but a deliberate strategic change in order to create more value in the new 
circumstances by becoming a model organization and creating knowledge spillovers. 
Decreases in quality, on the other hand, were not aimed at making (more) profits, but were 
the results of the financial constraints and the changes in the nature of employees after 
marketization. The only case suffering a real mission drift was an organization that eliminated 
the heavy disabled beneficiaries for cost reduction under the increased financial pressures. 
The reasons for the drift are found to be; a) its equal emphasis on profit and social value at 
its initiation, rather than pure social aim or social aim over profit as is in most of the 
organizations, b) its increasingly fragmented ownership structure including merchants in 
addition to specialists, c) pressure from small shareholders for profit coupled with a pressure 
on the main shareholder to stay in the business by his family for altruistic reasons, d) the 
organization’s attempt to discipline the profit-maximizers by taking the role of their leader 
in the region, yet embedding itself in their network leading to a change in frame of reference.
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2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 I start this chapter by explaining the rising interest on social enterprises and 
providing the conceptual definition. Next, I explicate their hybrid nature and review the 
literature related to their management.  I later provide an overview of the phenomenon of the 
marketization of social sectors and review the research on the mixed-form markets where 
social enterprises compete with their profit-seeking counterparts. I conclude the chapter by 
indicating the research gap and identifying my research questions.  
2.1 The Rise of Social Enterprises  
Starting with 1990s, social enterprises and social entrepreneurs have increasingly 
become popular phenomena across many countries in the world. The rising attention of 
individuals and the non-governmental organizations has been accompanied by the interest of 
governments in supporting the spread of social ventures as remedies to the contemporary 
societal and environmental problems. While organizations such as Ashoka and Schwab 
Foundation are working to promote social entrepreneurship across the world, more and more 
governments, particularly lead by the US and UK, are working to create new regulatory 
frameworks and funding mechanisms for the social ventures. 
This rising interest in the phenomenon has also been followed by the attention of 
academics and university administrations. Initiated by the leading institutions such as 
Harvard, MIT, Stanford, Insead, and Oxford, universities across the world are increasingly 
offering elective courses, organizing training programs and competitions, and establishing 
special centers. Moreover, some universities have founded chairs, and initiated master’s 
degree programs and even PhD tracks on the management of social ventures. While research 
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on social ventures started to find place for themselves in the established scientific journals in 
the management field, specific journals such as Journal of Social Entrepreneurship, 
International Journal of Social Entrepreneurship and Innovation, Social Enterprise Journal, 
and Social Business are also increasing in number. Similarly, while the established 
international conferences in management open tracks for research in this area, many well-
reputed universities are organizing annual conferences for the newly forming sub-field such 
as Harvard Social Enterprise Conference, Social Entrepreneurship Conference organized by 
NYU and Northeastern University, and International Social Entrepreneurship Conference of 
Insead.  
The increasing number of social enterprises and the rising attention on them can be 
explained by three main trends. First, particularly in Europe, the decline in economic growth 
followed by increased unemployment has led to a growth in the social economy (Kerlin, 
2006), which focuses on the satisfaction of human needs that cannot be adequately fulfilled 
by the for-profit enterprises, nor by the state (Moulaert and Ailenei, 2005). Meanwhile, while 
the state involvement in the economy has been decreasing in most parts of the world, paving 
the way for more free markets, many social problems stay unsolved and many needs are 
unsatisfied by the market (Nicholls, 2006) as the profit-seeking firms refrain from operating 
in the sectors where they cannot make profits (Santos, 2012).  
Second, the nature of many nonprofit organizations has been changing gradually, 
making them more ‘business-like’ (Pache and Santos, 2012). “Faced with rising costs, more 
competition for fewer donations and grants, and increased rivalry from for-profit companies 
entering the social sector, nonprofits are turning to the for-profit world to leverage or replace 
their traditional sources of funding” (Dees, 1998; pp. 55). Thus, they give up their old 
structures and ways of working to adopt business models and practices which can make them 
more sustainable in the contemporary environmental conditions. 
Third, the wave of capitalism has turned into a tsunami on which the capital holders 
surf, while many others suffer or die. Inequality in income and access to resources, both 
within and across countries, continues with a dramatic rise. In addition, those inequalities 
have been more visible given the increased communication across the globe. As neither the 
market, the state, nor the traditional NGOs have been able to solve the world’s problems, 
social enterprises have been recognized as a potentially effective socio-political and 
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economic link between government and free market enterprise (Harding, 2004; Wallace, 
1999). Therefore, many individuals and organizations are increasingly seeking 
entrepreneurial solutions to the social problems through means of business. A perfect 
example is Nobel Laureate Mohammed Yunus, the founder of Grameen Bank and the micro-
credit system, who aptly says (2006):  
   “We need to reconceptualize the business world to make sure it contributes to 
the creation of a humane society, not aggravate the problems around us. We need 
to recognize two types of businesses, not one, and offer equal opportunities to 
both. These two types of businesses are: One which is already known, business 
to make money, that is conventional business, the principle of whom is to 
maximize profit. And the other new kind, business to do good to people, or social 
business.”  
2.2 Conceptual Definition  
Given the recent rise of both practical and academic interest on social business, there 
are several emerging definitions and conceptualizations in the field, which make it necessary 
to first provide a larger picture of those studies and then clarify the conceptual definition.  
The literature on social entrepreneurship is in a pre-paradigmatic stage (Nicholls, 
2006). There are two schools of thought theorizing on social business; the social enterprise 
and social innovation schools of thought (Dees and Anderson, 2006). The newly popular, yet 
nascent, literature feeds from both of them. However, albeit the surge of articles discussing 
the meaning of social entrepreneurship, the social entrepreneur, and the social enterprise, 
there is a lack of coherent definition (Short et al., 2009). Moreover, the unit of analysis in the 
articles that are put under the umbrella term social entrepreneurship is not clearly defined; 
whether it is the organization, the individual, the society, the societal problem, or the business 
model (Santos, 2012). While some scholars focus on the characteristics of a social 
entrepreneur (Alter, 2004; Thompson, 2002); some focus on the process of social 
entrepreneurship (Martin and Osberg, 2007, Sharir and Lerner, 2006); and some on the social 
change model (Mair et al., 2012; Swanson and Zhang, 2010). In addition, there is a lack of 
conceptualization of social entrepreneurs’ economic role and logic of action (Dacin et al., 
2010).  
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One attempt to answer the need for clarification comes from Santos (2012). He 
distinguishes social entrepreneurship from commercial entrepreneurship by its focus on value 
creation to solve neglected problems in society rather than a focus on value capture, similar 
to the roles historically attributed to non-profit organizations (DiMaggio and Anheier, 1990). 
He defines its main domain as localized areas and the powerless segments of the population, 
its main goal as seeking sustainable solutions rather than sustainable advantages, and the 
logic of this solution as empowerment rather than control. As per its role, he states that “the 
process of social entrepreneurship enables the second invisible hand of the economic system, 
this one based on other-regarding rather than self-interest.” (pp. 350). This approach, along 
with other scholars conceptualizing it as a process (e.g., Mair and Schoen, 2007), sets the 
unit of analysis for social entrepreneurship studies as the innovative solution to a social 
problem and its underlying business model. A widely accepted definition is that of OECD’s 
(1999): “any private activity conducted in the public interest, organized with an 
entrepreneurial strategy but whose main purpose is not the maximization of profit but the 
attainment of certain economic and social goals, and which has a capacity of bringing 
innovative solutions to the problems of social exclusion and unemployment” (pp. 10).  
The studies building on the social enterprise school of thought, focus on the enterprise 
as the unit of analysis, rather than the entrepreneurship process, as I do throughout this 
research. Social enterprises are organizations involved in commercial activities; however, 
with the aim of accomplishing a social mission rather than profit maximization of the 
shareholders. Social enterprises are not bound to any legal form; they can be associations, 
foundations, co-operatives, corporations…etc. However, they are bound to a social form. The 
European Social Enterprise Research Network (EMES) defines an ‘ideal type’ for the social 
enterprises (Defourny, 2001). On the economic dimension of this ideal type, similar to the 
traditional commercial enterprises, social enterprises are composed by a continuous activity 
of production and sale of goods and/or services, a high degree of autonomy, a significant 
level of economic risk, and a minimum amount of paid work. However, different than 
traditional commercial enterprises, an ideal social enterprise has the following social 
dimensions; an initiative launched by a group of citizens, a decision making power not based 
on capital ownership, a participatory nature to involve the persons affected by the activity, 
limited profit distribution, and an explicit aim to benefit the community.  
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Theoretically, the main separation point between commercial and social enterprises 
is that, while the latter is also involved in commerce, it prioritizes social objectives over 
financial ones (Mair and Marti, 2006). Thus, commercial activities are means for achieving 
social objectives rather than means for an ultimate goal of profit (Dees and Anderson, 2006). 
To also clearly distinguish social enterprises from the traditional non-profits, it is beneficial 
to note that, they share the same social aims such as poverty alleviation and education of the 
disadvantaged populations (Cho, 2006; Seelos and Mair, 2007). They can also share the same 
norms of organizing, depending on how close they are to the ideal social enterprises type. 
However, different than the traditional non-profits those rely on grants and donations for their 
revenues, social enterprises rely mainly on market resources (Defourny and Nyssens, 2010). 
2.3 Hybrid Nature of Social Enterprises  
 Social enterprises create value by (1) providing the goods and services that the market 
or the state is unwilling or unable to provide, (2) developing skills, (3) creating employment 
to socially excluded individuals, (4) fostering civic involvement (Smallbone et al., 2001). 
They accomplish their social missions through a business model, rather than relying solely 
on grants and donations. Doing so, they combine the affiliative, altruistic, or expressive 
motivations common to philanthropy with the economic motivations commonly associated 
with business and markets (Dees and Anderson, 2006). For this reason, social enterprises are 
seen as hybrid organizations bringing together the commercial (or market) logic and the 
social welfare logics (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Pache and Santos, 2013; Battilana and 
Lee, 2014). 
 The concept of hybridity has its roots in institutional theory, which conceptualizes 
organizations as instruments designed to achieve specified goals, albeit being affected by the 
characteristics of their members and the institutional pressures imposed by their 
environments (Selznick, 1948). New institutional theory states that, through imposing 
restrictions on legal, moral, and cultural boundaries, and shaping the cognitive frameworks, 
institutions exert high influences on organizational characteristics and actions (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1991; Scott, 2008). In addition to material resources and technical 
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information, organizations need legitimacy for their survival; thus, they need to show that 
their actions are appropriate within the institutionalized norms, values and beliefs (Suchman, 
1995). In pursuit of legitimacy, organizations comply with the coercive, mimetic, and 
normative pressures; a process leading to isomorphism in the organizational fields, which is 
defined as the structural and strategic similarity of the organizations to each other (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983).  
One of the main tensions in organizational research throughout its history has been 
between the roles of environmental determinism versus individual agency (Astley and Van 
de Ven, 1983). Compared to the institutional perspective, the strategic choice view gave more 
room for managers’ preferences or political considerations when deciding on organizational 
actions (Child, 1972). Despite the high environmental determinism in the early version of 
new institutional theory, two later streams of it brought in the potential for agency. The first 
was the reconsideration of the possibility of active agency by the organizations, initiated by 
Oliver (1991) who asserted that organizations can respond strategically to institutional 
pressures, ranging from passive conformity to active resistance, depending on the nature and 
context of the pressures.  
Another stream of work, institutional logics, brought agency more to the front, while 
also introducing the opportunity for pluralism (rather than isomorphism) and room for change 
in the fields (Wooten and Hoffman, 2008). Institutional logics are the socially constructed, 
historical patterns of values, beliefs, rules, assumptions, and practices by which individuals 
provide meaning to social reality (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999). Contradictions of different 
institutional logics constitute the opportunity for the transformation of individual identities, 
organizations, and society (Friedland and Alford, 1991). Organizations face institutional 
pluralism when they operate in fields which are subject to multiple institutional logics. 
Different institutional pressures create the potential for fragmentation, conflict, goal-
ambiguity, and organizational instability (Kraatz and Block, 2008). Universities, professional 
arts organizations, and hospitals are some examples to organizations operating in pluralistic 
institutional environments (Denis et al., 2001; Whetten, 2006).  
Social enterprises, relentless of the sector they operate in, own a hybrid nature as they 
inherit institutionally imposed pressures of both social and market (commercial) logics 
(Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Pache and Santos, 2012). Because of this hybrid identity, they 
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face difficulties with respect to a single organizational form. First, they are more difficult for 
the audience to evaluate, thus carrying the risk of being less appealing for the actors who 
cannot fit them in one established category (Zuckerman, 1999). Moreover, the organization 
will need to devote resources to be attractive for different audiences regarding components 
of its hybrid identity (Hsu, 2006; Hsu et al., 2009). Second, they face multiple environmental 
demands (Kraatz and Block, 2008; Minkoff, 2002) from their stakeholders and key actors 
pertaining to each logic. Last but not the least, they experience the tensions between the 
constituents of social and market logics within the organization (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; 
Pache and Santos 2012; Smith et al., 2013).  
2.4 Managing Social Enterprises  
2.4.1 Managing Tensions within Social Enterprises  
Scholars have recently shown a rising interest in explaining how organizations 
manage hybridity. Pratt and Foreman (2000) posit 4 possible ways for managing multiple 
identities; deleting one of the identities, preserving multiple identities as separated from each 
other, maintaining multiple identities by creating links between them, and merging identities 
into a distinct new whole. Similarly, Kraatz and Block (2008) suggest 4 strategies for 
managing multiple institutional logics: denying the validity of external claims that are placed 
upon it, separating identities and relating independently to institutional constituencies, trying 
to balance different demands by playing constituencies against each other or seeking 
cooperative solutions, and creating durable identities of their own to emerge as institutions 
in their own right. With a more nuanced discussion of hybridity, Pache and Santos (2010), 
differentiate between the nature of institutional demands; a) the demands that include conflict 
at the goal level and b) demands that are in harmony at the goals level but lead to conflict 
over the means of achieving them. In order to make predictions on the way organizations 
respond to the competing institutional demands, the authors later integrate the moderating 
effect of the nature of the demands and the representation level of the logics within the 
organization into Oliver’s (1991) strategic reactions to institutional pressures framework. 
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Greenwood et al. (2011) also elaborate on the topic positing that their structure, ownership, 
governance, and identity affect how they experience the complexity and respond to it.  
Those frameworks, in fact, posit similar ranges of behavior; annulling one of the 
logics, letting them exist separately, or combining them.  Yet, while giving room for strategic 
reactions to institutional pressures, the basis of these frameworks is institutional theory, 
whose main argument is that organizations seek legitimacy for survival, hence they need to 
show that their elements are appropriate within the institutionalized norms, values and beliefs 
(Suchman, 1995). More specifically, its proponents assume that the organizational actions 
are motivated by a concern for legitimacy, mostly neglecting the market forces. Yet, several 
studies indicate that technical considerations of organizations may subvert institutions. An 
example is the work of Kraatz and Zajac (1996), who found that liberal art colleges changed 
their curricula to offer business degrees in response to the shifting market demand.  
In addition, the implicit assumption of these frameworks is that complying with the 
elements of both logics provides legitimacy for the organization in the eyes of different key 
actors. While this may be the case for particular combinations of logics, this argument may 
not find strong support in the case of social vs market logics. The market logic is regarded as 
illegitimate by the majority of actors in the inherently social fields such as the education of 
disabled people; yet, the market mechanism may be technically necessary in some situations. 
Thus, while the organizations may consider making changes in accordance with the market 
logic, their main concern cannot be legitimacy, but particular market forces. It is therefore 
important to reveal what those forces are and how they operate, and elaborate on the strategic 
reactions of social enterprises given those market forces. 
Besharov and Smith (2014) state that, when the multiple logics are core to the 
organizational functioning, and when they provide contradictory prescriptions for action, this 
makes the organizations contested, causing extensive conflict. Social enterprises can be 
considered as contested organizations due to incompatibility of the social and market logics 
in terms of both goals and means. With their hybrid and potentially contested nature as 
combiners of commercial and social welfare logics, social enterprises have increasingly 
become an attractive organizational form for the scholars who study the tensions between 
different logics within organizations (e.g.; Pache and Santos, 2012; Battilana and Dorado, 
2010).  
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Building their discussion on social enterprises, Battilana and Lee (2014) develop the 
concept of hybrid organizing, defined as “the activities, structures, processes, and meanings 
by which organizations make sense of and combine aspects of multiple organizational 
forms.” They posit that hybrid organizing is at play in five areas: core organizational 
activities, workforce composition, organizational design, inter-organizational relationships, 
and organizational culture. Smith et al. (2013) conceptualize the social-business tensions in 
social enterprises in 4 groups: performing, organizing, belonging, and learning. The 
organizing and belonging tensions pertain to the structural arrangements and adoption of 
practices prescribed by different logics, as mentioned in the frameworks I summarized in the 
above paragraphs. Performing and learning tensions, on the other hand, are related to the 
tensions in goals (whether concerning a broad eco-system of stakeholders or a narrow group 
of shareholders), performance metrics (social vs financial), definition of success (long-term 
social impact vs short term gains), and growth (the risk of value violations during scaling). 
Dees (2012) elaborates the compatibility of two cultures embedded in social 
enterprises, charity and problem solving cultures, and lists the potential tensions that social 
entrepreneurs and social enterprises face: spontaneous caritas versus reasoning, sacrifice 
versus investment, giving versus markets, relieving suffering versus solving problems, and 
caring people versus empowering them. He later states that the aim should be to channel the 
charitable impulse toward more effective problem solving while also minimizing norms of 
charity which decrease effectiveness.  
There are also empirical studies performed on social enterprises on managing internal 
hybridity tensions. Mair et al. (2015) examine how social organizations establish their 
governance structures and practices. Building on surveys conducted on 70 social enterprises, 
they identify two types: conforming hybrids those prioritize a single logic and dissenting 
hybrids those use defiance, selective coupling and innovation to combine and balance the 
prescriptions of different logics. To shed more light to the management of conflicting 
institutional demands, Pache and Santos (2012) performed a comparative case study of four 
work integration organizations in France. They focus on the adoption and implementation of 
organizational practices for which social welfare and commercial logics provide different 
prescriptions. For example, the social welfare logic requires designing and controlling 
practices at the local sites, while the commercial logic entails centrally designed standard 
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procedures and central monitoring. Authors find that all four organizations enacted both 
logics in the organizing practices by selectively coupling from a pool of competing 
alternatives in order to satisfy symbolic concerns. Interestingly, the two enterprises founded 
by business actors in a for-profit legal form, adopted practices offered by the social welfare 
logic (even more than the other two organizations founded by individuals with social sector 
origin in non-profit form did) claiming that they needed to do so as they lacked legitimacy, a 
strategy named as “Trojan horse” by the authors.  
Pache and Santos’s (2012) study provides empirical evidence for the “blurring 
boundaries” (Dees and Anderson, 2003) between for-profits and nonprofits and indicates that 
social enterprises are embracing business-like practices (Dart, 2004) in an increasingly 
commercializing social sector. Yet, it focuses on the symbolic meaning of adopting particular 
practices such as governance, branding, and professional affiliation with an eye on 
legitimacy, rather than their impact on the social welfare created. While the word strategy 
vastly exists in the summarized frameworks and empirical studies, it pertains to the strategy 
of denying, complying with, or blending the practices and structures prescribed by particular 
institutional logics. Therefore, those frameworks focus on the organizing aspect of hybrid 
organizations, rather than their strategic management per se. In fact, structure can follow 
strategy (Chandler, 1962), and, if we take Pache and Santos’s study (2012), for example, the 
local management of the sites in some work integration organizations may be a reflection of 
their strategic decisions for enabling superior service by better understanding local needs, 
rather than signaling more like a social organization. Yet, while the authors may be aware of 
this fact, they are not interested in this aspect as those articles are targeting at contributing to 
the institutional logics literature by using social enterprises as a fruitful context. 
Similarly, a social enterprise may adapt some practices in line with the market logic, 
such as establishing a sales and marketing department. While the frameworks built in the last 
decade denote these structural arrangements to legitimacy concerns, it is much likely that 
social enterprises may be establishing a sales team in order to increase their customer base, 
thus increasing their social impact and/or survival chances through increasing the provision 
of services. Yet, as hybrid organizations, they may then face corresponding internal tensions; 
e.g., the need to integrate the social welfare logic into the sales team. A striking example is 
the case of micro-credits in India. The media has recently covered stories of women 
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committing suicide because of their accumulated loans which they cannot pay back, as they 
did not use the money for starting a business. In order to realize their performance targets, 
sales teams of some micro-credit organizations had provided loans to those women, despite 
knowing they would not start a business, and wanted them to pretend as if they are doing 
business if their boss had checked. Tapping into this issue, Battilana and Dorado (2010) 
explore how two microfinance organizations develop and maintain their hybrid nature 
through hiring and socialization processes. While one organization only hired new graduates 
with blank templates and made them focus on operational excellence, the other organization 
mixed experienced employees with backgrounds in development and banking logics. The 
authors comment that, while both strategies have unique pros and cons, the former approach 
may potentially be more suitable for abandoning internal tensions. Yet, the field needs more 
studies on the management of internal tensions with implications on the welfare created.  
2.4.2 Strategic Management of Social Enterprises  
 The mainstream strategy literature is not readily applicable to social enterprises, as it 
is based on the notion of wealth creation and capture. For example, through his Five Forces 
Model, Porter (1980) outlines a framework for assessing an industry’s attractiveness. The 
suggestions for the firms are selecting a profitable industry and then seeking a competitive 
advantage with strategies such as low cost leadership, differentiation, and focus for coping 
with the competitors (1980, 1985). Resource-based view (RBV) of the firm (Barney, 1991), 
similarly problematizes how firms can make more profits via competitive advantages. It, 
however, focuses on achieving sustainable advantages through a value-creating strategy that 
cannot be duplicated by others through assessing valuable, rare, non-imitable, and non-
substitutable resources.  
 The aim of social enterprises, on the other hand, is maximizing their social impact, 
rather than profits. Thus, while they have a will to survive in order to achieve their missions, 
and thus need to compete with others for resources, the other enterprises in the sector are not 
necessarily rivals to beat but are actors who can potentially serve to create a larger social 
impact. Yet, the profitability of the industry is not relevant to the social enterprises, nor 
capturing more profits than that of others. Moreover, the notions of sustained competitive 
advantage and acquiring non-imitable resources posed by the RBV, if applied by social 
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enterprises, may decrease the social impact they create by abandoning the spillovers of social 
innovations for solving societal or environmental problems as well as limiting the transfer of 
best practices for better serving the disadvantaged populations.  
The nascent literature on social enterprises lacks a substantive theory for their 
strategic management combining the market mechanisms with their social goals. Particularly, 
there is a need for theorizing on their product/service mix, quality, and pricing, as well as 
their targeted beneficiaries considering both the market forces and the social value created. 
In the following paragraphs, I first review the main studies on the strategic management of 
traditional non-profits and later provide an account of the newly emergent theory building 
attempts on the strategic management of social enterprises. 
2.4.2.1 Studies on traditional non-profits  
Salamon (1987) states that, in their pure form, nonprofits typically have insufficient 
resources, inadequate levels of professionalization, tend to focus on narrow communities, 
and may embrace paternalistic attitudes toward beneficiaries. When deciding on their 
strategic actions, non-profit organizations need to make two calculations: they should be sure 
that they are producing the value defined by their mission and their financial performance 
should ensure their survival, hence their future value-creating capacity (Moore, 2000).  
While the scholars of non-profit organizations have also paid attention to strategy, 
they historically had a narrow focus on the adoption and use of formal strategic planning 
rather than broader questions of strategic management regarding decision-making processes 
and competition (See Stone et al., 1999, for a review). The few early studies on content of 
strategy, on the other hand, typically focused on the ability of nonprofits to raise funds and 
survive in different environments, e.g., through legitimacy gaining strategy (Bielefeld, 1992, 
1994; York and Zychlinski, 1996), and cost-cutting strategy (Palmer, 1997). The interest was 
then shifted to the application of some established constructs in the for-profit management 
literature to non-profits and testing the proposed relationships, e.g., market orientation and 
performance (Shoham et al., 2006).  
A recent interest of scholars of non-profit management was finally the analysis of 
their competitive strategies. Through the case study of United Way, an established fund 
raising organization in the U.S., Barman (2002) states that, when its monopoly position was 
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challenged by other nonprofits, the organization attempted to differentiate itself from the 
competitors in order to be able to raise more funds. While focusing on the impact of 
competition, this study is, still, on the ability of securing resources in a nonprofit competition, 
rather than a focus on strategic positioning.  
Chew and Osborn 2009 analyze the key factors influencing positioning strategy in 
British charitable organizations with 53 surveys followed by analysis of 4 selected cases. 
They find that, strategic positioning of charities is influenced mainly by a) organizational 
factors including mission, corporate plan, assets and capabilities (including organizational 
culture), b) external factors including governmental influence, economic conditions and 
technological and sociodemographic changes, and competitor influence (the increasing 
competition for both financial and other resources). In addition, internal stakeholders (Board 
and CEO) and external stakeholders (government agencies and volunteers) influenced the 
strategic positioning. Internal stakeholders’ level of impact was parallel to their knowledge 
of charity’s operations and to their support in their management, while the impact of external 
stakeholders was parallel to the degree to which the organization was dependent to them on 
resources such as funding. Lastly, they note that unanticipated external or internal events 
(‘critical trigger events’) such as a major change in organizational leadership, a sudden shift 
in governmental policy, or changes in the legal framework for the provision of services could 
cause changes in the organization’s positioning. 
Some studies, on the other hand, sought the applicability of mainstream firm 
strategies to social enterprises. Brown and Iverson (2004) applies to the nonprofits Miles and 
Snow’s (1978) organizational strategy typologies based on the level of aggressiveness: 
prospector, defender, analyzer, and reactor. There is no distinction on traditional nonprofits 
and the ones engaged in commercial operations in this study, and the aim was to assess the 
relationship between board structure and strategy, finding that prospectors have broader and 
more inclusive structures than defenders. 
2.4.2.2 Studies on social enterprises  
Some scholars have tested marketing orientation -generation of market intelligence, 
disseminating across departments, and being responsiveness to it (Kohli and Jaworski, 1990)- 
and entrepreneurial orientation- organizational decision-making tendency favoring 
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entrepreneurial activities (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996)- on the social and economic 
performance of social enterprises, finding positive relationships. For example, on their study 
on 237 top hospital administrators, Wood et al. (2000) have found a strong relationship with 
market orientation and performance, measured by the perception of managers on 
improvement of quality of care, increase in revenues, improvement in financial position, and 
improvement of patient satisfaction. In their research on 534 British and Japanese social 
enterprises, Liu et al. (2012) show the positive significant impacts of market and 
entrepreneurial orientations on social and economic performance, mediated by market 
effectiveness and consumer satisfaction. 
Weerawardena and Mort (2012) explore competitive strategy in “socially 
entrepreneurial nonprofit organizations.” In nine case studies on enduring and successful 
organizations, authors state that all nine organizations saw their environments as turbulent 
and pursued a product differentiation strategy (Porter, 1980), and smaller organizations made 
incremental innovations while medium and large-sized ones made more incremental 
innovations. This study suffers from selection bias as well as subjectivity; authors focus on 
already successful organizations which are likely to be innovative and do not use objective 
indicators for assessing innovation. Moreover, the organizations are from different sectors 
making a within sector comparison with other organizations impossible. Chew (2010) 
examines 4 community interest companies (a legal form for social enterprises in the UK) 
founded by charities, stating that they had weakly defined strategic positions and unspecified 
positioning with respect to their parent charities. Yet, he notes that this may be due to their 
young age as all were established during the past two years  
Young et al. (2010) build a framework for pricing decisions of social enterprises. 
Building on James (1983) and Weisbrod (1998b), they distinguish between the services that 
directly impact the mission, and the ones that the organization engages in to generate profits 
for subsidizing mission-related activities and services. While social enterprises do not 
encounter pricing tensions in the latter, pricing the services related to the missions inherits a 
choice among the target beneficiary groups. The authors suggest that SEs can embrace a 
mission emphasis on the services with below-cost prices subsidized by revenues from other 
sources, or they can have a mixed mission/market emphasis with a break-even target where 
the enterprise makes no losses from commercial operations. In both options, a sliding scale 
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strategy can be used, in which rich customers are charged higher prices for the same service 
or are offered extra paid-services, so that the lower-paying poor customers can be cross-
subsidized with those revenues. 
Santos et al. (2015) create a typology of social enterprises by a 2X2 matrix to classify 
them as market, blending, bridging, and coupling hybrids. The first dimension distinguishes 
between transactions that create value spillovers automatically (e.g., selling a green product) 
or contingently (e.g., for women to truly benefit from micro-loans, social enterprises need to 
give them trainings). And the second dimension distinguishes between transactions where 
clients are beneficiaries and where clients are other parties. The authors state that, when the 
clients are beneficiaries, social enterprises can face 3 main transaction obstacles: inability to 
pay, difficulty of access, and unwillingness to pay. They later suggest specific remedies such 
as re-designing the production value chain to reduce costs, giving micro-franchises by 
involving customers in the process, and bundling together products that customers want with 
the ones they need but cannot perceive the value. In addition, they provide prescriptions for 
the management of the 4 types of social enterprises. Regarding the market type, which is the 
most common form, they suggest the employing staff with business expertise and use of 
operational key performance indicators as well as regular checks by the Board on the focused 
client segments and the social impact created for avoiding mission drift.  
The last two articles take steps to build frameworks for the strategic management of 
social enterprises with a consideration of price, quality, the targeted segments, and some key 
resources and capabilities. Yet, they do not integrate a competitive lens; thereby making the 
viability of those strategies within a mixed-form market where social enterprises operate with 
profit-maximizing firms questionable. In fact, the lack of substantial theorizing and empirical 
studies on the strategic management of social enterprises can be traced to the inclination of 
scholars to reduce it to the phenomenon of mission drift, which will be covered next.  
2.4.3 Mission Drift  
Dees (1998) argues that “the drive to become more businesslike holds many dangers 
for nonprofits. In the best of circumstances, nonprofits face operational and cultural 
challenges in the pursuit of commercial funding. In the worst, commercial operations can 
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undercut an organization's social mission” (pp.56). Similarly, Weisbrod (1988) states that, 
the motive for profit challenges nonprofits with losing sight of their social goals. 
Furthermore, Eikenberry et al. (2004) posit that civil society may be at risk, because of the 
marketization of the nonprofit sector.  
As combiners of social and economic objectives, social enterprises must maintain a 
balance between the two in order to avoid mission drift, “a focus on profits to the detriment 
of the social good,” which may cause them to charge higher prices or target wealthier and 
more profitable segments (Battilana et al., 2012). While scholars have long been claiming 
about this threat to the core mission, there is a clear lack of theorizing on and empirical 
investigation of the causes of the mission drift.  
Main discussions on mission drift have evolved around microfinance industry, which 
was traditionally dominated by NGOs funded with government grants along, donations and 
client fees, but later saw a conversion of many NGOs to private enterprises and also attracted 
the interest of funders with a “private sector ethos” (Epstein and Yuthas, 2010). Wagenaar 
(2012) finds that, microfinance institutions those transformed from non-profit status to for-
profit status have significantly higher average loan sizes and a lower percentage of female 
borrowers than non-profits, while Mersland and Strøm (2008) had found no such evidence. 
Some researchers question whether there is mission drift in microfinance institutions in the 
sector by checking the average loan sizes and beneficiary segments across years (e.g., 
Mersland and Strøm, 2010), yet do not tap on the organizational level differences. Based on 
field experience relating to microfinance institutions, Epstein and Yuthas (2010) assert that 
mission drift arises from commercialization and conversion activities of those organizations 
aimed at increasing their ratings in the eyes of investors and achieving scale. However, 
authors do not substantiate the propositions with empirical analysis. In a following article, 
Epstein and Yuthas (2011) repeats these propositions and advices the microfinance 
organizations to clarify their mission along with effective corporate governance and 
performance management systems, and a research function to develop new products and 
processes. Yet, again, this article remains limited to generic advice without substantiated 
empirical analysis, similar to the work of Copestake (2007) which suggests improved social 
performance management through goal setting and strategic planning, routine monitoring of 
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the poverty status of clients, and follow-up research into the reasons behind observed 
changes. 
There is also a rising interest by organizational theorists for explaining mission drift. 
Following a theoretical discussion, Ebrahim et al. (2014) stress the importance of 
accountability and the role of governance for assessing whether activities are reaching the 
right beneficiary segments for avoiding mission drift. Ramus and Vaccaro (2014) performed 
case studies on two work integration enterprises which suffered mission drift as result of 
increased competition in the sector and efficiency pressures by funders, such that they could 
not employ the marginalized people anymore. The study finds that, Beta organization which 
tried to overcome mission drift only through social accounting was not successful. The 
continuing market pressures and short-term commercial objectives did not leave space to 
increase social performance. The Alpha organization, on the other hand, combined social 
accounting with a strategy of engaging external stakeholders. As a result, they were able to 
initiate new projects by partnering with other nonprofit organizations and socially oriented 
ventures, made their employees realize the core objectives and gain new skills; thus, 
reintroducing the socially oriented motivations.  
Jaquette (2013) analyzed the transition from a liberal arts college to a university, with 
a 1972-2010 panel dataset of all liberal arts colleagues in the US, defining this divergent 
change as mission drift. He finds that declining freshmen enrollments, prior adoption of 
curricula associated with the university model, and the network contacts those previously 
became universities increase the likelihood of the colleges to become universities, whereas 
organizational age and strong market position lowered its probability. Garrow and Hasenfeld 
(2012) performed research on 12 work integration enterprises concluding that those 
organizations face mission drift when they commodify their clients by selecting the ones 
which will create them more revenue rather than the more disadvantaged ones. They assert 
that, commodification is determined by being embedded in a market logic, indicated by the 
share of commercial revenue compared to donations. This statement, however, does not entail 
new information as it is evident from the conceptualization that the risk of mission drift 
increases with the growing share of commercial operations, arising from the definition.  
In an attempt to explain the deeper organizational characteristics and mechanisms 
lead to mission drift, Chambers (2014) develops the concept of the hybrid identity hierarchy 
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(HIH) of normative and utilitarian identities in social enterprises. Through an investigation 
of 10 organizations, he asserts that the more stable the HIH, the less susceptible to mission 
drift. He operationalizes the HIH by the ration of relative discourse in verbal protocol analysis 
and mission drift by a grouping of the growth strategies of those organizations, and its 
stability as consistence of managers’ answers in different sessions. He denotes the growth 
strategies of organic growth, strategic alliances and partnerships, franchising, licensing or 
acquisitions/sell-outs as organizational growth strategies, whereas coding the strategies of 
dissemination and open-source change-making, branching and replication, affiliation and 
smart-networks, lobbying and advocacy as impact scaling strategies. This operationalization 
of mission drift is, however, quite problematic as it supposes that a social enterprise that 
increases its beneficiary base through organic growth without a branching strategy suffers 
mission drift, which is necessarily not the case. Similarly, social enterprises may engage in 
alliances to increase their resources and to reach new beneficiaries, rather than a profit motive 
to the detriment of social good.  
Another recent study, by Stevens et al. (2015) may also provide insight for developing 
theory on mission drift, although the authors chose to speak to the attention allocation 
literature. The study analyzes allocation of attention to social and economic goals in social 
enterprises with surveys conducted on 148 social entrepreneurs, measuring attention 
allocation with a forced choice scale on social/economic/legal/ethical orientations. The 
authors find that, the level of other-regarding values of CEO and level of slack resources 
increase attention to social goals- the relationship strengthened when financial performance 
is higher. In addition, a higher utilitarian identity decreases attention to social goals- an effect 
fostered when financial performance is lower. The study has several methodological pitfalls 
such as common method bias, common source bias, and social desirability bias. Yet, it 
empirically shows the proposed relationships. 
2.5 Marketization of Social Sectors  
 In his discussion of the changes in the welfare regimes in advanced western capitalist 
states, Jesson (1999) posits a restructuring of what he terms as Keynesian Welfare National 
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State (in 1950s-1970s) into a Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime. He claims four 
main shifts; (1) from Keynesian aims and modes of intervention to Schumpeterian ones, (2) 
from a ‘welfarist’ mode of reproduction of labor power to a ‘workfarist’ mode; (3) from the 
primacy of the national scale to a post national framework in which no scale is predominant; 
(4) from the primacy of the state in compensating for market failures to an emphasis on 
networked, partnership based economic, political and social governance mechanisms. The 
fourth shift regarding the governance of welfare indicates a decreased direct involvement of 
the state in the provision of public services, and resulted in their marketization, which is 
defined as “the adoption of market or quasi-market practices with the aim of generating 
greater efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness of public services.” (Hall et al.; 2012, 
pp.734).  
 Marketization indicates existence of private and non-profit providers in a mixed 
economy of welfare provision (Powell, 2007) and market-type relationships gradually 
penetrating a country’s welfare system (Eikenberry and Kluver, 2004). In the US, the “new 
public management” ideology starting in 1980s included cuts in federal funding for non-
profits and supported the market mechanisms through making payments to both non-profits 
and for-profit private firms based on particular performance criteria and compliance with 
administrative standards. This approach was characterized by two assumptions: 1) markets 
are efficient and competition improves organizational performance, 2) private-sector 
practices are superior and management is a generic practice (Kaboolian,1998). However, the 
viability of those assumptions in the social sectors as well the effects of marketization on the 
welfare created has been a controversial issue.  
2.5.1 Impacts of Marketization   
Marketization of education has been a long debated phenomenon across scholars of 
welfare governance and management of education. The field saw a worldwide rise of for-
profit charter schools and private universities, as well as experiencing states’ cuts from the 
budgets of the public universities pushing them to be more cost-efficient and organize in a 
liberal way through targets, indicators and evaluations to increase their competitiveness (Ball, 
2003; Kwiek, 2010). In their critical paper, Lawrence and Sharma (2002) discuss the new 
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managerialism entering the universities; the new practices such as the total quality 
management (TQM) and the balanced scorecard (BSC), as well as the pressure upon unit cost 
reinforced by the quasi-market funding mechanisms. They posit that, although the state 
supposes such applications to be promoting efficiency and effectiveness, they jeopardize the 
essence of education and result in the commodification of students and academic labor, thus 
causing a degradation of universities’ function in society. 
 Wilmott (1995) argues that, the pressures exerted by the dynamics of capitalism lead 
to the commodification of work of academics by favoring its exchange value over the use 
value. Education is claimed to have transformed from a space of knowledge and identity 
formation to a commodity bought and sold through the rules of the market (Klees, 2008; 
Robertson, 2009), also giving rise to increasingly segregated societies (Balarin, 2014; Barlett 
et al, 2002) as well as decreasing the ability of students on abstract and critical thinking 
(Natale and Doran, 2012). In addition, there is evidence that the apparent increases in student 
achievements were secured by the educational organizations through skimming 
underachieving and poor students (Arreman and Holm, 2011; Gorard, 2009; Lim and Tan, 
1999). In their study on liberal arts colleges, Kraatz et al. (2010) examined the adoption of 
enrollment management ofﬁces by those organizations. Authors posit that enrollment 
management ofﬁces disrupt organizational values because core processes such as admissions 
and ﬁnancial aid are rearranged so as to increase enrollments from high income, high 
achieving students. 
In his comparative study of 19 for-profit charter schools and 8 public schools at 
secondary level in Sweden, Fredriksson (2009) finds that employment with a for-profit 
charter school influences teachers’ behavior with regard to market orientation; making them 
perform on the basis of the mission of the school, the guidelines from the principal, and with 
the aim of increasing the reputation of the school among students and parents. While the 
study does not tap onto the implication of this emergent orientation, it notes that the years of 
experience and education level of the teachers at charter schools were lower than those of 
public schools, which, if considered as proxies for quality, indicate that for-profit charter 
schools do not provide stronger incentives than public schools for increasing quality. 
Despite being led by the developed countries, marketization of social services also 
became widespread in the developing countries, albeit with poorer results. Balarin (2014) 
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explores that, in Peru, the institutional weaknesses (the lack of proper accreditation and 
control mechanisms on the private education providers as well as the lack of information and 
solid criteria provided to families) coupled with the inadequate training of local officials 
paved the way to the increasing supply of private education with low quality. In addition, it 
fostered the corrupt tendencies in the use of public resources. 
Institutionalists theorists have also devoted attention to the phenomenon of 
marketization with an interest on to the diffusion of market (commercial) logic in the fields 
originally dominated by other institutional logics such as health care and education (D'Aunno 
et al., 1991, Kraatz et al., 2010; Murray, 2010; Thornton, 2002), as well as the occurrence 
and persistence of the hybrid organizational forms and identities (Can, 2013; Glynn, 2000, 
Pratt and Foreman, 2000). Yet, the concern of these camp of scholars is to explain the 
likelihood that practices of a new logic will be adapted despite the institutionalized templates, 
and whether the practices of different logics co-exist or replace each other, sometimes 
accompanied by an interest on the effects of hybridity on organizations’ survival. While some 
studies note the treat of those practices to value realization, e.g. through the decreased 
centrality and power of key actors (Kraatz et al., 2010; Scott, 2000), they do not aim at 
explaining the effects of those changes on the social value created.  
For example, in their study on 631 U.S. liberal arts colleagues, Kraatz and Zajac 
(1996) found that, despite operating in a highly institutionalized environment, liberal art 
colleges realized divergent changes in their curricula (e.g., offering business degrees) in 
response to the shifting market demand. Murray’s (2010) study on the adoption of patenting 
practices by academic geneticists shows that those practices, originally part of the market 
logic, were incorporated into scientific practices in ways that preserved the distinctive 
institutions, rather than replacing or removing them. Reay and Hinings (2009) investigate the 
rivalry of competing institutional logics in the field of health care in Canada, wherein the 
physicians defended their medical professionalism logic against the business-like health care 
logic imposed by the government. They find that, while the Regional Health Authorities 
formed by the government were formerly a “mouthpiece to its agenda,” they in time 
developed a separate identity and collaborated with the physicians to achieve collective goals, 
despite still belonging to the business-like health care logic. In addition to the neglect of the 
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social welfare created, those studies also do not focus on the competition among the 
organizations with different dominant institutional logics. 
2.5.2 Competition in Mixed-Form Markets  
While decreases in available funding opportunities pushed non-profits towards being 
self-sustaining and replaced many traditional non-profits with social enterprises (Dees, 1998; 
Fowler, 2000; Frumkin and Andre-Clark, 2000), the decreasing involvement of governments 
in the economy has created markets attractive to both social and commercial enterprises 
(Sharir and Lerner, 2006). Added on to these, governments supported market mechanisms in 
the social sectors through new legislations and regulations (Jesson, 1999; Powell, 2007). As 
a result, many formerly non-profit dominated social sectors are facing the coexistence of 
social enterprises and commercial enterprises (Dees and Anderson, 2003), giving rise to 
mixed-form markets (Frumkin and Andre-Clark, 2000; Marwel and McInerney, 2005).  
Several scholars argue that the increasing for-profit competition and the emphasis of 
funders on performance measurement, cause the non-profits to neglect less quantifiable 
accomplishments such as advocacy work while also pushing them away from the more 
difficult clients on whom it is harder achieve or to demonstrate effective performance (Gray 
and Schlesinger, 2002; Smith, 2002; Stewart et al., 2002). Through a survey on the nonprofit 
human service agencies in Arizona, McMurtry et al. (1991) find evidence for declining 
revenues, increased competition with other agencies, and a rising demand for their services 
from clients who cannot pay. The organizations responded to the pressures with strategies 
ranging from small-scale productivity improvements to complete restructuring, as well as 
cutbacks in client services.  
On a survey on 124 non-profits in Ohio, Alexander (1999) found that marketization of 
the social sector created several pressures on nonprofits such as decreased revenues, 
increased administrative load, and loss of the key staff to private firms that paid higher 
salaries. They were forced to make mission-related compromises such as raising prices, 
eliminating some services, and reducing emphasis on research and advocacy. In addition, 
they faced the dilemma of serving the neediest or shifting to the better-off client segments 
where they could create more revenues and increase their funding by showing the 
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government a more effective performance. The author notes that the most cited strategies to 
cope with the pressures were reduction in staff levels, increased reliance on volunteers, 
engaging in management reforms, mergers or consolidations among a set of choices provided 
to them in the survey. In a follow up paper, Alexander (2000) documents nonprofits’ possible 
adaptation strategies to marketization through focus group studies with a total of 56 
participants. Main adaptation strategies included: expansion of services and client bases, 
networking to acquire and stabilize revenue streams and resources, increased use of business 
techniques and technology, and using the income generated from revenue-generating 
programs and expanded client base for serving to the lower-paying customers. Yet, those 
focus groups were aimed at identifying best potential strategies through discussing pros and 
cons of available options, independent of whether the organizations actually employed them. 
Grohs, S. (2014) analyzes the introduction of quasimarket principles in the mid-1990s 
in Germany, in youth welfare and old-age care fields. He compares the number of private 
and non-profit organizations by years to conclude that the old-age care market has seen more 
entrance by for-profits, as it is centrally regulated with quality standards and accountability 
measures. (A strong alternative explanation, the shrinking of the youth-care market despite 
the fast growing old-age care market is not considered). Without empirical analysis, he makes 
some predictions such as, in the youth care market, which experienced the quasi market 
reforms under a decentralized regulation, the private firms may have had disadvantages as 
they did not have ties to local managers. The author lastly states that the non-profits in the 
centrally regulated market were dehybridized by putting the market logic in front of the social 
logic, because some of them formed accounting departments. In fact, this is only an indication 
to increased bureaucracy, not a decrease in value orientation, as the author wrongly asserts.  
While some of the mentioned studies explore the general effects of marketization in the 
social sector, they focus only on the nonprofits, excluding the social enterprises in firm status. 
Moreover, they mostly rely on surveys and secondary data sources, and do not clearly explain 
the mechanisms functioning in the field. Lastly, they do not elaborate which kinds of 
organizations are more prone to the market pressures and what factors affect their responses.  
In a mixed-form market, social enterprises may have unique advantages and 
disadvantages brought in by their nature. Frumkin and Andre-Clark (2000) state that, non-
profit human service organizations generally lack large scale information technology and 
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management experience, the ability to raise capital from the market, recruiting and retaining 
best professionals, and political influence, as well as being bounded by missions in 
commercial actions. Following this, they suggest that, rather than getting into an efficiency 
battle with the for-profits, which they are likely to lose, non-profits must focus on their unique 
resources: their ability to raise funds by charity and a better understanding of social needs. 
They urge them to shift to a niche for a specific group’s needs, where the social problem is 
more complex, the clients are more disadvantaged compared to others and where for-profits 
will avoid operating because of their economic incentives. The authors also add that, while a 
narrow efficiency competition with the for-profits may be disastrous for non-profits, it should 
remain as a goal for all organizations and that non-profits should put more emphasis to 
tracking their performance. However, “rather than abandon the values that lie at the heart of 
their operations in pursuit of a new bottom-line approach, nonprofits may need to focus even 
more clearly on their distinctive missions.” (pp. 157) Building on Porter’s (1980) Five 
Competitive Forces, Tuckman (1998) suggests that, in a mixed-form market non-profits 
better focus on reputation for high-quality, favorable cost structures, economies of scale, 
and/or product differentiation. He also adds that they can form joint-ventures, may acquire a 
for-profit subsidiary, or may partner with direct competitors.  
The applicability of these normative advices is, however, questionable for several 
reason. First, the suggested strategies bring the social enterprises back to the beginning of the 
problem; the resource constraint. Second, as, I mentioned at the beginning of this section, 
applying the mainstream strategy frameworks such as 5 Forces, may not be feasible and/or 
may not work to generate the maximum social value in the sector. Even more importantly, 
we need to go beyond normative advice and theorize on their behavior considering their 
actual environments and the strategies they come up with when faced with for-profits in the 
sector. We need research for building theory; “what is actually happening, how and why?” 
Marwell and McInerney (2005) have analyzed dynamics of two mixed-form markets; 
community development and technology assistance to non-profits. In the former sector, the 
nonprofit based initiator of the sector was pushed to a smaller segment where it focused on 
protecting the rights of the most disadvantaged tenants, when the for-profits entered the field. 
However, in its last project, it was not able to keep its promise that most of the houses would 
go to the low income local Latinos, signaling a shift from its mission for its survival. In the 
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second market, the nonprofits lost their bigger customers to the large for-profit firms such as 
Accenture and McKinsey and continued serving for smaller customers where they competed 
with smaller for-profits. Yet, the entrance of for-profits to this market was quite recent at the 
time of the study, making it hard to make strong inferences. In addition, authors do not 
speculate on any organizational responses, other than nonprofits’ loss of big customers. In 
the conclusion part, they claim that three kinds of market structure may occur after the 
entrance of for-profits to the social need markets: 1) a stratified market where nonprofits and 
for-profits coexist, but nonprofits focus on poorer customers 2) a displaced market where 
nonprofits are pushed out, 3) a defended market whereby nonprofits fight back the incursion 
of for-profits. They later state that “identifying which of these three potential pathways a 
mixed-form social needs market takes requires attention to the multiple dimensions of its 
changing environment and the distinctive capacities of NPOs and FPOs to respond.” (pp. 24). 
And, they make a call for future studies to track the development of a mixed-form market by 
collecting data on historical changes in the environment and the responses of nonprofit and 
for-profit providers over time. 
The dynamics of competition between social and commercial enterprises also taken 
the attention of welfare economists, who study the phenomenon under the topic of for-profit 
and non-profit competition (what they refer to as nonprofit is a social enterprise founded by 
a nonprofit organization). Their main focus has been the impact of the market composition 
on the social welfare created, which is a function of the quality and price of the goods and 
services offered. Nonprofit organizations are deemed to have advantage over for-profits 
when there is high information asymmetry between customer and service provider, such as 
in health care sector, the nonprofit status signals a higher quality for the customer, thus giving 
it an advantage (Arrow, 1963; Hansmann, 1980). Hirth (1999) models this uncertainty 
problem stating that a larger market shares of nonprofits in the sector forces for-profits to 
deliver the promised quality. Several other studies model the impact of nonprofits’ assumed 
quality and pricing levels in a mixed-form market on the total welfare created (e.g., Brown, 
2005; Kopel and Brand, 2012), under specific environmental conditions. While some note 
the possibility of differing intentions for value creation and capture across organizations, the 
theories they develop rely mostly on abstract models with unique assumptions which treat a 
particular organizational form as uniform in their intentions and actions. 
30 
 
Suda and Guo (2011) show that, among the organizations providing long-term care 
in Japan, non-profits accept seniors with the most serious need levels whereas for-profits 
focus on people who allow them to be more cost-effective. Nonprofits are also found to be 
providing more uncompensated care than for-profits (Kuttner, 2006); however, when 
competition increases, the difference between nonprofits and for-profits decrease 
(Schlesinger et al., 1997). Mark (1996) found that they are increasing the quality as 
competition increases while for-profits are decreasing it. The evidence is mixed though; as 
some studies find no significant quality differences between for-profit and private not-for-
profit hospitals, albeit noting that profit-seekers may do shortcuts on the beneficial but hard 
to measure outcomes (e.g.; Sloan et al. 2001). Overall, these empirical studies, denote a 
homogenous behavior to all nonprofits in the market, reflecting a main difference between 
economics and management field; they are “neglecting the intricacies of organizations” (Nag 
et al., 2007).  
2.6 The Research Gap and the Aim of the Study  
A comprehensive review of the literature indicates that, despite the surge of attention 
on the organizing aspect of social enterprises, their strategic management has been under-
researched and under-theorized. The conceptual and empirical articles on social enterprises 
mostly focus on social enterprises as an interesting context for studying organizational 
hybridity. While a few studies problematize the effective management of their internal 
tensions, most of the studies on hybridity analyze the adoption of particular practices 
prescribed by the market and social welfare logics. While focusing on the institutional 
pressures to the neglect of the market forces, those works also load a symbolic meaning to 
organizational strategies with an assumption that they mainly act to increase their legitimacy 
in the eyes of different actors.  In order to explain the behavior of social enterprises, which 
try to reach social ends through commercial means, we need to 1) consider the market forces, 
rather than sticking to the institutional pressures 2) analyze their strategic actions aimed at 
creating value and generating revenue, rather than the symbolic meaning of organizational 
arrangements. 
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The conventional theories of strategic management, on the other hand, are not directly 
applicable to social enterprises, as they assume value capture as the main motivation in 
organizational behavior. The literature on the management of conventional non-profit 
organizations, does not also to provide a strong base for the strategic management of social 
enterprises due to their limited consideration of strategic positioning, competition and 
revenue generation. A substantial theory on the management of social enterprises should be 
pertaining to the social value created, as well as considering the market dynamics. While 
there are recent attempts to build theory on the management of social enterprises considering 
both their commercial operations and value creating motivation (e.g.; Santos et al., 2015), 
they focus on the enterprise in isolation from its environment, neglecting the competition. 
Given the fact that social enterprises do not operate in isolated circumstances, but 
increasingly compete with other organizations, there is a need to analyze their behavior in 
mixed-form markets. The studies of welfare economists on the competition between the 
commercial enterprises established by non-profit and for-profit organizations, on the other 
hand, denotes the same behavior to the members of an organization form; thus, they neglect 
the firm level differences. In addition, while the phenomenon of marketization has been 
subject to analysis by welfare governance scholars, most of these articles are critical 
elaborations of the issue pertaining potentially negative outcomes based on personal thoughts 
and observations. The few empirical studies, do not explicitly analyze the changing dynamics 
in the sectors, but make shortcuts to most visible outcomes.   
Given these gaps in the literature, it is necessary to first reveal the mechanisms 
operating in the social sectors as they are subject to marketization through in-depth grounded 
analyses. An account of the emergent mechanisms will reveal the pressures exerted on social 
enterprises, and enable a better understanding of the process of marketization and the 
dynamics of competition in the mixed-form market.  Second, there is also an evident gap in 
the literature regarding the strategic management of social enterprises under competitive 
environments. Analyzing their actions and reactions in an increasingly pressing environment 
of marketization can both inform theory about the effects of marketization, as well as 
contributing to theory on strategic management of social enterprises.   
In a mixed-form market where profit-seeking enterprises join the social sector, there 
are several, potentially conflicting demands operating on the social enterprises. After 
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revealing those pressures, the following questions to answer are: “What are the differing 
responses to marketization among different social enterprises, and what are the causes for the 
differences in their reactions?” An analysis of the potential changes in their behaviors can 
also shed more light to the concept of mission drift. “As they embrace some commercial 
practices or change their strategic positions, do they perform those to the detriment of the 
social value they create?” And, “Which kinds of organizations are more prone to this treat of 
mission drift?” Moreover, a review of the literature indicates that the concept of mission drift 
is quite loosely operationalized in the few related empirical papers. For example, a rise in the 
prices of products and services of social enterprises is regarded as mission drift without 
further examination and consideration. Therefore, an in-depth analysis of the changing 
strategic behaviors under particular pressures can also inform theory on mission drift. 
Some strategic responses to choose from may be: acting as direct competitors versus 
shifting to niche markets, focusing on the less disadvantaged beneficiaries or differentiating 
by high quality, offering lower prices or higher quality with higher prices, defending the 
market by several strategies or welcome for-profits or become similar to them. Some 
enterprises may also quit the market when they can no longer achieve their missions in the 
new circumstances, or they may be pushed out of the market under particular pressures. How 
they strategically respond to the market pressures given their hybrid identity, which preserves 
a social welfare logic, can also contribute to the literature on hybrid forms of organizations 
by extending the focus from institutional pressures to broader mechanisms in the field. 
The consequences of their strategic choices will be reflected to their strategic 
positions in the sector including product and service mix, target scope of beneficiaries, and 
the prices and quality of products and services. Those will, in turn, affect the social welfare 
created in the sector, both directly through the focal organization’s organizational outputs 
and (potentially) indirectly through their effects on other actors in the sector. Therefore, 
without a sufficient understanding of the internal and external mechanisms leading to the 
particular choices of the nonprofits among alternative organizational actions, one cannot also 
adequately speculate on the impact of nonprofit and for-profit competition on the social 
welfare created. In this regard, it is necessary to have a deeper understanding of the process, 
and come up with a theory capable of explaining their actions, rather than building models 
relying on several assumptions.  
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In sum, this dissertation attempts to contribute to these gaps in the literature through 
in-depth analysis grounded at two levels (Figure 1). First, how does the nature of the field 
change with marketization, and what kinds of pressures operate on the social enterprises in 
the sector? Second, how do the social enterprises respond to marketization, including a 
potential for mission drift, and which factors affect their reactions?  
 
Figure 1 Research objective and questions 
 
 
Through a qualitative study of the field of supplementary education of the disabled in 
Turkey, I first explore the changing dynamics as the field is exposed to marketization. I 
explain the several pressures exerted by key actors including the state, competitors, 
beneficiaries, and the workforce in the field. I later illustrate the dynamics resulting from the 
interactions of those pressures and the hybrid nature of the incumbent social enterprises with 
the case studies of 10 organizations. Finally, I explicate their differing strategic responses 
together with their anteceding factors. 
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3 
METHODS 
Given my interest in theory-building, and answering research questions with “how” 
and “why” in unexplored research areas, case studies would be a proper method (Edmondson 
& Mc Manus, 2007). Case studies are “in-depth investigations of some particular social 
setting with a focus on the events that occur in and over time in that arena” (Van Maanen, 
1999, pp 28). They enable the researcher to identify new variables and causal mechanisms as 
the detailed examination of cases provides an opportunity to come across concepts that are 
not obvious in the first place (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Therefore, case study 
methodology is deemed as a suitable method when there is a lack of plausible existing theory 
on the topic and an insufficient background for making propositions based on existing 
theorizing (Siggelkow, 2007).  
While theory can be induced from single cases, comparative case studies provide 
stronger base for theory building. First, the embeddedness in varied empirical data makes 
building theory from comparative cases more likely to produce theory that is robust, 
interesting, and testable (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Glaser and Strauss, 1967). This is 
because they provide more accurate definitions of the constructs and the relationships among 
them with appropriate levels of abstraction (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Second, 
comparative cases let the theory emerge from patterns of relationships among constructs 
within and across cases with their underlying logics (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007), hence 
allowing the researcher clarify whether an emergent finding is idiosyncratic to a single case 
or replicated in several cases (Eisenhardt, 1991). Yin (1994) states that multiple cases can be 
considered like a series of related lab experiments, which serve as replications, contrasts, and 
extensions to the emerging theory. Moreover, while the lab studies isolate the phenomena 
from their context, thus decreasing the construct validity and generalizability to real world 
settings, case studies provide the rich, real-world context.  
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Another advantage of using case study methodology for my research questions was 
that, cases can employ multiple levels of analysis within one study (Yin, 1984). For the aims 
of my research, I first needed to open the black box of marketization to find out the field level 
changes revealing at various actors and explain the pressures they exert on the social 
enterprises. I also needed to gather information on the organizational level changes and link 
them to their potential antecedents at the sectoral, organizational and individual levels. 
Therefore, the mobility brought with the case study methodology would help me achieve my 
research objectives. 
Eisenhardt (1989) suggests a framework for building theories from case studies by 
synthesizing Glaser and Strauss’s (1967) grounded theory principles such as emergence of 
theoretical categories from evidence, constant comparison of data, theoretical sampling and 
theoretical saturation with Yin’s (1981, 1984) replication logic in multiple case analysis to 
increase validity and reliability of case study research design, and Miles and Huberman’s 
(1984) strategies to manage and present qualitative data. I adopt this framework outlined by 
Eisenhardt, also combining the strategies outlined by Strauss and Corbin (1998), Charmaz 
(2006), and Saldana (2009) on qualitative analysis and coding.  
 Glaser and Strauss (1967) urge the scholars to start their research with a broad research 
question and to forget their prior knowledge of the literature as much as possible, as this can 
force the researcher into preexisting conceptualizations. Suddaby (2006), however, states 
that, grounded theory approach has an inherent limitation as the interpretive work is always 
a function of the researcher’s background and interests, and that here is no real solution 
except being aware of this limitation. This viewpoint provides support to Eisenhardt (1989), 
who advocates the early identification of the research question and possible constructs 
informed by the existing literature, as this eases the work of the researcher throughout the 
process.  
 To sum up, with the aim of creating a theoretical framework to answer my research 
questions, I performed an inductive study through multiple comparative case studies. To 
control for extraneous variation, I decided to focus on a specific sector, supplementary 
education of the disabled in Turkey. In the following section, I provide an overview of the 
context and explain why I chose this context for my research. Next, I describe the methods 
and processes I employed in order to gain a better understanding of the context, select the 
36 
 
cases, and collect data. In the third section, I explain the data analysis procedures. I lastly 
discuss the validity and reliability concerns of the employed methods and the techniques I 
used for addressing them. 
3.1 Research Context  
 The Disability Survey in Turkey (2002) carried out by The State Institute of Statistics, 
The State Planning Organization and The Presidency of Administration on Disabled People 
shows that, 12.29% of the population of Turkey is disabled. 2.58 % of this ratio are the 
orthopedically, seeing, hearing, speaking and mentally disabled people, whereas 9.70 % are 
the people with chronic illnesses who are in need of constant care and treatment. My focus 
of interest in this study is the education of the orthopedically, seeing, hearing, speaking and 
mentally disabled people, which constitute 1.25%, 0.60%, 0.37%, 0.38%, and 0.48% of the 
total population consequently. Within this focus group, workforce participation rate is 21.7% 
(32.2% for men and 6.7% for women), and the illiteracy rate is 36.4% (25.6% for men and 
51.3% for women). 
 
Table 1- Education level of orthopedically, seeing, hearing, speaking and mentally disabled 
population (The disability survey in Turkey, 2002) 
 
% 
Illiterate Literate Literate but 
not finished 
a school 
Elementary 
school 
Secondary 
school  
High 
school  
Higher 
education 
Turkey 36.37 63.62 7.69 40.97 5.64 6.90 2.42 
Rural 27.40 72.58 6.85 42.75 8.00 10.62 4.36 
Urban 45.36 54.64 8.54 39.17 3.31 3.16 0.47 
Men 25.75 74.22 7.95 47.21 6.98 8.98 3.10 
Women 51.26 48.74 7.32 32.22 3.78 3.97 1.45 
 
 The education of the disabled in this geography started in 1889 with special classes for 
the visual and hearing impaired in Ticaret Mektebi, which were then turned into a separate 
school and survived until 1919 (Enç, 1972). In 1921, a new school for the visual and hearing 
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impaired was opened in Izmir, and was tied to the Ministry of Health and Social Aid in 1924, 
after the establishment of the republic (Akçamete and Kaner, 1999). In 1950, the planning 
and execution of special education was transferred from the Ministry of Health and Social 
Aid to the Ministry of Education. In addition to opening a number of new schools for the 
education of the visual and hearing impaired in the following years, Ministry of Education 
also opened a research center and started special classes for the mentally disabled in two 
elementary schools in Ankara, in 1955 (Özsoy, 1990).  
The following years saw the rise of the gradually more inclusive laws and bylaws on 
the education of the disabled. In 1957, “Korunmaya Muhtaç Çocuklar Hakkında Kanun” 
(numbered 6972) guaranteed that Ministry of Education takes necessary actions for the 
education of the disabled children among the children in need of care. In 1961, “İlköğretim 
ve Eğitim Kanunu” (numbered 222) stated that all disabled children at the age of mandatory 
education should be able to take education services. In 1983, “Özel Eğitime Muhtaç Çocuklar 
Kanunu” (numbered 2916) defined the terms and conditions for the detection of the children 
in need of special education, their placement and monitoring. Starting in 1952 with Gazi 
University, departments to raise teachers for the disabled were opened in universities across 
Turkey (Enç et al., 1987).  
In 1960s, the Ministry of Education opened a few special classes for the disabled in 
public schools. There was no opportunity for the education of the disabled except those few 
classes. In addition, the children with an IQ level below 50 were regarded as uneducable and 
the methods to educate were not developed until Makbule Ölçen, herself a mother of mentally 
disabled, initiated it in 1970s within Öğretilebilir Çocukları Koruma Derneği in Ankara. She 
later founded Zihinsel Yetersiz Çocukları Koruma ve Geliştirme Vakfı (ZİÇEV) in 1982. In 
a similar vein, by 1972, there was no education and rehabilitation opportunity for the 
individuals with cerebral palsy other than a small number of therapists in a few hospitals. 
This situation alerted Prof. Dr. Hıfzı Özcan to found an association named Turkiye Spastik 
Çocuklar Derneği (converted to a foundation in 1989) for providing therapies to more kids 
as well as informing and rehabilitating their families.  
 These initial attempts to start the education of the disabled individuals were later 
followed by the opening of other associations and foundations as well as a few social 
enterprises founded by the specialists in this area. Some of the foundations and associations 
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were running special education schools with a public-nonprofit partnership while some 
operated on their own. Those education centers were initially accredited by the Institute of 
Social Services and Protection of Children, later also having the option to be accredited by 
the Ministry of Education (MoE) -with some differences in permission requirements). As 
consistently declared by the informants I interviewed, the dominant norm on payments for 
services was based on the availability of the family. The foundations and associations 
charged them based on family income providing free service if they are poor. Similarly, the 
social enterprises in the form of a firm had price lists those were flexible according to the 
income of the family and generous quotas for free services to the poor families. In 1990s, a 
bank started paying for the education of their employees’ disabled kids at SERCs, followed 
by other big corporations.  
 Meanwhile, the rising pressures by the NGOs for increased education opportunities for 
the disabled, later coupled with the requirements of the European Union and the financial 
support of international organizations to Turkey for this aim, motivated the state to take 
gradual steps. However, rather than increasing the number of few public schools for the 
education of disabled and the special classes for the disabled in regular public schools and 
increasing the education quality1 at state’s schools, its move was towards paying for some 
limited hours of services of SERCs. (See Figure 3 for the process of special education and 
rehabilitation in Turkey) 
 In 1996, state payments started for the disabled kids of citizens with social security, 
giving rise to the opening of more SERCs, reaching around five hundred2 by 2005. While 
this first wave of marketization increased the number SERCs to some extent, the portion 
belonging to associations and foundations was still non-negligible. In addition, as declared 
by various informants of this research (discussed in detail in findings section), the founders 
of many SERCs were people connected to the field either by heart or by profession. Thus, 
even some of them could also seek profit, they had the motivation or knowledge to provide 
proper education. However, the ratio of these socially minded and capable actors in the sector 
                                                     
1 By November 2013, half of the required capacity for teachers of mentally disabled are still empty in public schools as a 
consequence of the limited capacity at the universities for this department (Noted by a government official in the Engelsiz 
Türkiye İçin Yolun Neresindeyiz Conference held by Sabancı University) 
2 There are 45 still-operating SERCS accredited by the Ministry of Education by 2005 in the list I gathered from the ministry. 
And as seen in the list in the answer to the written question in Turkish Grand National Assembly, the number of SERCs 
accredited by SCHEK by Aug 2004 was 472.) 
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gradually declined as others started to see a profit opportunity. Later, on the first of July, 
2005, came a stronger wave of marketization, through a new law (law number 5378) which 
ruled out the contingency of parents’ having social security in order for the state to pay for 
their children’s’ education at the SERCs. This new development paved the way for the 
opening of numerous SERCs (1975 by March 2016), mostly by merchants unrelated to the 
field who were excited about the profit potential. Below quotation indicates the reaction of 
Makbule Ölçen (2005), founder of ZİÇEV, to this situation: 
 “Our state promotes and supports the organizations which are established 
with profit aim - in fact making trade over disability and increasing like fungi, 
and it does not inspect the education level they provide. Doing so, it makes 
disability open to exploitation. Mental disability should not turn into commercial 
profit. No country in the West has gone through such a wrong way” 
 
In addition to the quoted concern of Makbule Ölçen on the ethical aspect and the quality 
of education, another facet of the marketization of the sector reflected in the media, has been 
the corruption scandals both on part of the SERC owners and the state officials (which in fact 
continue to date, see; e.g. http://goo.gl/3Mypxc , http://goo.gl/40SJU5 ). Due to space 
concerns, I am not excerpting any articles from newspaper archives; however, excerpting 
part of the State Supervisory Council Audit Report dated 27.08.2009 (pp 203) to provide a 
summary of the occasions: 
    “In order to reach more customers, some of the private special education 
schools and special education and rehabilitation centers serving the disabled 
even use the way of providing interest to officials in relevant agencies and 
organizations in order to obtain the identity and address of the disabled. In 
addition, they also try to offer some benefits to the families of disabled people. 
This has become a "promotion race" among some organizations. This situation, 
described as "disabled hunt" by interested persons and families, raises the 
security of data on persons with disabilities as a sensitive case…. Some 
organizations, on the other hand, are trying to get an unearned gain from the 
state with some unrealistic statements. On the spread of such abuse in the 
special education and rehabilitation center providing education to people with 
disabilities, inspections were conducted in 2008 by the Ministry of Education 
Supervisory Board and it has been detected that a large number of centers are 
obtaining an unearned gain…. According to the findings in the reports prepared 
by the inspectors; it has been found that a total of 86,325,952 TL unwarranted 
amount was received from the state for reasons such as; making repeated 
student registration, arranging false report, the use of invalid reports, teachers 
shown as employed in multiple organizations at the same dates, unauthorized 
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teachers' entering the lessons/sessions, making records out of the program, 
employing fewer staff then is stipulated by the legislation. Part of this amount 
has been repaid by those organizations before the conclusion of the court 
process, while the judicial process continues for crimes related to the 
announcement.” 
 
There are several reasons for selecting this context for answering the proposed research 
questions. First, it is a large sector with 1975 organizations in the country (by March 2016) 
and 330 organizations only in the city of Istanbul (numbers retrieved from 
http://ookgm.meb.gov.tr/). The kinds of services offered in the sector are similar and the legal 
framework is the same for all organizations making them more comparable to each other. 
Focusing on the organizations operating in a particular sector eliminates environmental 
variation (Eisenhardt, 1989), thus enabling the researcher to induce more robust theory.  
Although there is a shared the legal framework for those organizations, there is also 
room for variance across them, creating the opportunity to generate rich theoretical insights. 
First, the regulations are concerned with some physical characteristics of SERCs and the 
existence of some key personnel; the actual quality of education provided by those centers is 
not measured nor inspected by the state. In addition, while the centers invoice the state for 
hours of education provided (for maximum 8 hours of individual + 4 hours of group classes) 
according to the need of the disabled people on the Guidance and Research Center (GRC) 
report, these centers can offer the beneficiaries additional class hours for which themselves 
set the price3. Moreover, the facilities of the centers differ from each other above the basic 
legal requirements; e.g., some have gardens while some do not, some have swimming pools 
for physical therapy, some have sports rooms or even sports halls, some have music rooms 
etc. 
Similar to the differences in facilities, the SERCs provide some complementary 
services, either paid or non-paid, in differing levels such as theatre groups, dance sessions, 
music hours, sports teams, and even yoga sessions. Likewise, they differ in their level of 
adoption on different (extra) therapies such as sensory integration and space therapy. The 
centers also vary in terms of the in-service training they provide for their personnel, and/or
                                                     
3 I had confirmed this variation in prices via phone calls to several SERCs before I decide on this sector. Similarly, I had 
detected other several ways they can differ through the analysis of the web pages of some organizations and reading 
discussions on forums. 
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Figure 2 The process of special education and rehabilitation in Turkey 
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the expertise of the teachers, as well as the family education sessions or conferences they 
organize. Moreover, some (not only SERCs of foundations but also ones in firm status) go 
much beyond the legal requirements to engage in awareness raising activities such as 
preparing and delivering booklets on preventing sexual abuse to the disabled people, or 
online education kits for families. 
Added on the above mentioned differences, one key variance is on their organizational 
forms; there are SERCs run by both firms with for-profit legal status as well as the nonprofits, 
which both fit into the definition of social enterprise as long as they pursue social aims while 
having none or limited profit distribution. The characteristics of the founders of the 
organizations in this context also vary such that there are SERCs opened by the families of 
the disabled people, by physiotherapists or teachers of disabled, by social service specialists 
or psychologists, but also by the actors quite irrelevant to the field such as contractors. In 
fact, many of the interviewees complained that “even butchers” or “even greengrocers” can 
open a SERC as there is no legal limitation on the characteristics of the founder. 
Last but not the least, in addition to the invasion of actors pursuing profit aims and the 
pressures brought along, the competitive and financial pressures on the focal enterprises have 
increased even further with the state’s decreasing the payments per class hours (through 
making raises less than the inflation rate and also increasing the individual hours from 6 to 8 
in year 2008 while leaving the total amount of payment nearly unchanged4). 
The findings of this research in this particular context are expected to be relevant in 
other sectors which were traditionally dominated by public or non-governmental 
organizations but increasingly turning into mixed-form markets such as, education, health-
care, disabled care and elderly care. In essence, the implications of this study are relevant to 
any social enterprise pursuing social aims through engaging in commercial activities, and has 
to compete with profit-seeking enterprises. Examples to those enterprises can be some green 
enterprises, elderly care organizations, women-cooperatives selling traditional products… 
etc.   
                                                     
4 Payment per hour: 41 TL in 2006, 43 TL in 2012. 
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3.2 Data Collection and Procedures  
3.2.1 Gaining Access to and Knowledge on the Field  
 In the initial phase of the research process, my aim was to gaining access to the field 
and gathering more information on its dynamics; specifically, learning the regulations and 
processes, identifying key actors who can serve as gate keepers, and obtaining knowledge on 
the kinds of organizations and a deeper understanding of the variations in practices. With 
these purposes, I made participative observations and built ties in the field by finding contacts 
and communicating my aim efficiently so that they gave importance to my research (Lofland 
and Lofland, 1995).  
3.2.1.1 Participative observations 
 I did one-week participatory observations at two SERCs, which were chosen to vary 
by size. During those periods, I observed the physical conditions, registration and education 
processes and analyzed the documents provided such as example disabled reports of the 
hospitals and the reports of the Guidance and Research Centers (GRC). I also joined some 
classes when the teachers contended that the particular student would not be adversely 
affected by my presence and the family was there to give their consent. In addition, I visited 
various administrative departments such as accounting, public relations and evaluation to 
learn about their tasks and roles. I had the lunch and tea breaks with the employees, and after 
building rapport, I talked to them on their daily work, the kinds of organizations in the field, 
and how they differed from each other. I also talked to some parents who were waiting during 
their kids’ class hour to better understand the process. and observed their behaviors and 
interactions with the teachers.  
3.2.1.2 Expert interviews and archival resources  
 I interviewed several actors in the field including two teachers, the managers of two 
SERCs (one was also a former state official in the field), and the founders of two other 
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SERCs, which were not later included in the sample. During the expert interviews, I asked 
questions about the evolution of the field, the special education process (from the diagnosis 
phase to the evaluation of the progress in the students), the main actors and their roles, and 
the general differences among the organizations in the field. Later, as two of the founders in 
my sample organizations had held managerial positions in the associations of SERCs, I was 
also able to benefit from their wider views on the evolution and state of the field and utilized 
the documents such as presentations and their speech texts in some meetings, which they 
kindly provided. 
 In addition to those actors, I conducted 4 interviews with the academics at the special 
education departments of two universities, one located in Istanbul, the other in Eskişehir. 
Those academics regularly collaborate with the SERCs for their research on the education of 
the disabled people, send their students to those organizations as interns, serve as experts to 
the courts for legal cases, and prepare reports on the state of the field in collaboration with 
the officials in the associated ministries. Other than their comments on the transformation of 
the field, those academics also acknowledged me of the potential quality indicators for the 
SERCs, which I used for triangulating parts of the interview data. Following the interviews 
with academics, I participated in the conferences on the education of the disabled organized 
in Ankara and Istanbul, where I was able to gain more field knowledge, observe main 
discussion points and interactions of actors, and meet other key contacts including employees 
of the ministries, who suggested several readings and sources of data regarding the evolution 
and dynamics of the field.  
 I also read several reports and other archival documents such as newspaper archives on 
the web and discussion forums, as well as skimming the dissertations written in the special 
education departments of universities, which I found from the database of the Higher 
Education Counsel. While those dissertations were not problematizing the management of 
the SERCs, they were a good source of information for better understanding the context. 
Also, through the end of my data collection, I was able to interviews the managers of two 
GRCs in different districts of Istanbul. (My aim in visiting the GRCs was to better triangulate 
some data on the organizations in my sample. However, the mangers hesitated to make any 
comments due to the fragility of the issue- the previous corruption scandals including GRC 
officials- but made general comments.)  
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 During and after these interviews, I took jotted notes (recorded when the environment 
permitted) and wrote new insights in my research diary. Analyses of my notes from the expert 
interviews and the jotted notes from participatory observations, coupled with the articles and 
reports on special education in Turkey, provided me the necessary field knowledge to prepare 
more relevant and meaningful questions for the semi-structured interviews, the surveys, and 
the dataset I would request from the organizations.  
3.2.2 Selection of Cases  
 As my aim was building theory through case studies, the sample selection standards of 
the positivist approach such as statistical representativeness and statistical sampling were not 
applicable (Siggelkow, 2007; Van Maanen, 1999). In case studies, cases are selected for 
theoretical reasons such as extension of theory, replication and contrary replication of the 
theory under construction, and elimination of alternative explanations (Yin,1994). Therefore, 
I chose the cases according to their contribution to theory development. I added new 
organizations which extended the findings from others, helped reveal the logics between the 
constructs in the emerging theory as well as eliminating alternative explanations.  
 As there is a limit to the number of cases which can be studied, it is fruitful to choose 
cases such as extreme situations and polar types (Pettigrew, 1988). I initially identified some 
cases such that they varied in their age, the legal form (for-profit vs non-profit), and the 
characteristics of the founders (parents of the disabled vs specialists) - due to the expected 
potential of those differences to contribute to the theory after analyzing my initial notes from 
expert interviews. My objective was to include SERCs with similar characteristics (in terms 
of size, ownership structure etc.) to ensure saturation in observations, as well as SERCs with 
diverse characteristics in order to maximize variance in the data collected (Yin, 2003).  
 Though not coding the interview data immediately, I noted what I learnt from the 
interview of that day comparing it to previous interviews. I jotted down the preliminary words 
and phrases and the key factors and mechanisms emphasized by the interviewees in order to 
use those for both adding new cases until theoretical saturation. One additional important 
factor, with a potential moderating effect in the theory, surfaced as the socioeconomic 
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situation of the location of the SERC; therefore, I added cases from districts varying in this 
aspect.  
 To aid me in the selection phase, I compiled a dataset that included the opening dates 
and districts of all the SERCs in Turkey. To do this, I benefited from a list of the SERCs 
including their opening dates, district, and contact information, which I solicited from the 
Ministry of Education. In this list; however, the SERCs which were originally opened with 
the permission of SHCEK were included with the dates in which they were transferred to 
MoE. To solve this, I skimmed the organizations listed in the Country Report for Disabled, 
1995-2000 prepared by the Prime Ministry Department of the Administration of the Disabled 
(2001). Later, I found a list in answers to the written questions in the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly, by Aug 2004, which also helped me depict the real opening dates. For the short 
remaining period, Aug 2004- 2006, I manually searched the real opening dates.  
 In addition to the cases selected with a systemic approach, three cases were identified 
opportunistically- based on their interesting situations which can sharpen the theory- through 
snowball sampling. An interviewee in one organization told me about a SERC in which s/he 
was a partner and that they sold the SERC after the changing dynamics in the field. I solicited 
her to put me in contact with the founder to include this case in my sample. Later, in the 
interview with that founder, I learnt about another organization that was opened within the 
same time period by a person similar to this founder in terms of profession and age- they had 
actually partnered for a short period. In order to compare and contrast why one chose to stay 
in the market while the other quit and how it was able to survive, I wanted that interviewee 
to put me in contact with that founder. The third case I added opportunistically again emerged 
from the interviews of another case. I was told by an interviewee that s/he had worked there 
in the past and that they had state-of-art applications for ensuring quality and that the 
organization later grew very fast opening other branches, but eventually seized. Yet another 
interviewee told me that s/he was friends with the founder of this particular organization and 
that it would be interesting for me to analyze this case, also kindly putting me in contact with 
that organization. This flexibility during the sampling was beneficial both to extend and 
sharpen the theory as well as enabling triangulation of their data from outside parties, which 
were historically associated with those organizations.  
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 I continued adding cases until I believed I reached theoretical saturation, when I felt 
that the theoretical insights gained from new cases had diminished a lot. The number of cases 
was initially 11. However, I later dropped one case, as my reason for choosing that 
organization (the interesting situation of a firm opening an association) also surfaced in 
another case which provided other fruitful information as well. Table 2 presents the basic 
information for the ten cases included in the final sample. In line with my statement in the 
ethical committee approval for this research and the consent forms of the participant, I am 
using their information in a covered way which will abandon the association with the 
organizations and people.    
 
Table 2- Demographics for selected cases 
Name 
Founding 
Year 
Founder/s 
Legal 
Form 
# of Branches 
Mercury Before 1990 Parents of disabled children Foundation more than 5 
Venus Before 1990 
Academics with high-net-
worth individuals 
Foundation 1 
Jupiter Before 1990 Specialist Firm between 1-5 
Eris Before 1990 Specialist Firm 05 
Pluto Btw 1990-2000 Parents of disabled children Foundation 06 
Earth Btw 2000-2005 
Parent of disabled child with 
high-net-worth individuals 
Foundation 1 
Mars Btw 2000-2005 Parents of disabled child Firm between 1-5 
Saturn Btw 2000-2005 Specialists Firm 1 
Uranus Btw 2000-2005 Specialist Firm 1 
Neptune Btw 2000-2005 
Specialist with 
businessperson 
Firm 1 
 
 The number of cases in a multiple case study design depends on the level of certainty 
that the researcher wants to have about the findings, similar to the idea of ‘power’ in 
quantitative research. However, there is a trade-off between the depth and scope of the 
research. A larger number of cases provide more evidence on the robustness of the theory 
while also offering information on variations across cases, thus bringing the potential to fine-
                                                     
5 Sold before 2006. 
6 Closed after 2014. 
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grain the theory. However, it is hard to get in-depth information on more number of cases as 
well as the limited capacity of the researcher to process the huge amount of information. 
Eisenhardt (1989) recommends having between 4 and 10 case studies, stating that (pp. 545); 
“With fewer than 4 cases, it is often difficult to generate theory with much complexity, and 
its empirical grounding is likely to be unconvincing, unless the case has several mini-cases 
within it... With more than 10 cases, it quickly becomes difficult to cope with the complexity 
and volume of the data.” Thus, I believe that the number of cases included is also in line with 
the research standards, and it was the maximum number I could handle within the process. 
 I first contacted those organizations by telephoning (except the cases where first calls 
were done by the referents) and explained to the managers/founders a brief overview of the 
research. I made a general statement that I was doing research on the changes in the field and 
their effects on the organizations, rather than giving the exact title, as I did not want to 
influence their answers in the interviews in any way. There was only one instance which 
accepted participating after a long written approval process, others accepted on the phone. A 
few organizations I initially picked refused to participate, stating they don’t have time, and I 
replaced them with other cases with similar characteristics according to my selection criteria. 
At the beginning, I did not tell the organizations about all the interviews, surveys, datasets, 
documents I would request, as the associated time and work load could make them hesitate 
to participate. I rather requested those gradually as I built more rapport, saying, e.g., “May I 
also interview the other founder?”, “Could you also fill in this dataset?” 
 No direct compensation was offered to any of the participants on the phone; except 
promising to share with them the findings of the study. However, as I stated in my ethical 
committee approval, during the interviews, I told them that I can either help them on writing 
an impact report or give trainings on the subject. Upon their interest, I gave trainings at two 
of the participating organizations. Those trainings also provided me additional observations 
and knowledge on many details pertaining those organizations. 
3.2.3 Sources of Data  
 Each case study was built on multiple sources of data; multiple interviews, 
observations, employee surveys, data sets provided by the organizations, and archival 
49 
 
sources. The reason for using multiple sources of data was to achieve “triangulation”, a 
stronger substantiation of findings from different sources of information (Eisenhardt, 1989), 
which is crucial for building rigorous theories based on case studies. I compared the 
information gathered from different sources with each other, in order to ensure that the events 
or facts of the case studies have been supported by more than a single source of evidence 
(Yin, 2003). This approach increased robustness of my evidence and also helped decrease 
biases related to subjectivity or forgetting. The following sections provide further details on 
specific data sources used for collecting case study evidence.   
3.2.3.1 Semi-structured interviews with managers and founders  
At the first round, I conducted semi-structured interviews with the general managers of 
the SERCs (See interview questions in Appendix). Before visiting each organization, I 
collected information from their web sites and social media accounts, as well as skimming 
the info I face when googling the organization and the founder/s. In addition to the interview 
questions common to all cases, I also asked about the occasions I deemed interesting. If the 
manager did not work in the organization for a long enough time to assess the changes, I tried 
to interview another employee/former employee in a managerial position with sufficient 
experience in the organization. The manager interviews were partly analyzed before I 
proceed to the founder interviews. I compared my notes across the cases to find out the 
fundamental differences and develop some preliminary theoretical insights.  
For the founder interviews, I modified some questions in manager interviews and 
added new questions in light of the gained insights, taking advantage of the flexibility and 
opportunistic nature of data collection procedures in case study research (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Before I visited the founders, I listened to the manager interviews one more time and noted 
the points I should ask for clarification. In cases when the general manager was the 
founder/one of the cofounders, thus already interviewed in the first round, I tried to arrange 
one more interview with the same person.   
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Table 3 Description of interview data 
Name 
# of 
interviews 
Interviewee's profile 
# of coded 
interviews 
Duration of 
coded 
interviews 
Mercury 6 
General Manager 
Members of BoD 
Branch Managers 
4 472 mins 
Venus 6 
General Manager 
Branch Manager 
Former Vice General Manager 
First Evaluation Manager 
Public Relations Specialist 
Education Coordinator 
3 215 mins 
Jupiter 1 Founder & General Manager 1 141 mins 
Eris 1 Founder & General Manager 1 95 mins 
Pluto 5 
Co-founders & members of BoD 
Branch Manager 
3 326 mins 
Earth 3 
Co-founder 
Branch Manager 
Education Coordinator 
2 142 mins 
Mars 2 
Co-founder 
Education Coordinator 
2 273 mins 
Saturn 2 Co-founder & General Manager 2 156 mins 
Uranus 2 Founder & General Manager 1 111 mins 
Neptune 4 
Co-founders 
Branch Manager 
3 303 mins 
     
Total number of interviews conducted  32 
Number of interviewees involved  26 
Number of coded interviews  22 
Average duration of coded interviews  1 hour 42 min 
Number of pages of coded interviews  765 pages 
 
 The semi-structured interviews let me gather comparable data from the cases while also 
leaving space for emergent themes and concepts from the interview data. The interviews were 
organized around 4 general topics: (1) changes in the field across time; (2) history of the 
organization; (3) management of the organizations; and (4) changes in the organizations 
mission, strategy and several aspects of the services offered. While it is recommended that 
the researcher does not start inductive studies with predefined concepts and theories in mind, 
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an early identification of possible constructs which already exist in the literature may also 
help the researcher assess the constructs more accurately (Eisenhardt, 1989). For this reason, 
the interviews also included questions inquiring constructs such as organizational identity 
and corporatization.  
 All parts of the interviews started with general questions, both serving as warm-up 
questions and giving more free space to the interviewee, then continued with more specific 
ones. Several times within the interviews, I wanted them to compare past and now, trying to 
make them think of the differences. I also asked the same/similar phenomena in different 
ways, such as “what is effectiveness for this organization”, “do you have goals…” In 
addition, when I wanted them to rate some practices with respect to the average of the field, 
such as quality, I later asked how they ensure quality, why they have higher/lower 
quality…etc. During the interviews, I was also keen on showing an acceptable incompetence 
on the subject and the organization, such that people gave me information (Lofland and 
Lofland, 1995). In addition, I paid attention to not using loaded terms for not affecting their 
responses; for example, I never used the term marketization myself, before they themselves 
used it. 
3.2.3.2 Field observations and memos  
 In almost all settings, I had the opportunity to walk around with the interviewees to 
observe the physical conditions and the general atmosphere while also having lunch with the 
interviewee and other employees. In addition, in four of the organizations, I was able to 
participate in some classes and the events hold during my presence. Therefore, my field notes 
included both notes from the interviews as well as other observations from my several visits 
to those organizations. Those informal interactions were also useful for supporting or 
challenging my inferences from the formal interview data collected.  
I later utilized the insights from the field notes while evaluating and comparing other 
information. For example, in some settings, the disabled kids entered the room to invite the 
manager out for playing, or to say good bye (which is not in the job definition of the manager, 
but is an indication of the value given to and intimacy with the kids- triangulating the other 
sources of information, e.g. my codes from the interview of those organizations such as 
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“tender to the kids”). Those observations also added new data not mentioned/emphasized in 
the interviews. For instance, in one setting, the parent of a disabled person called the founder 
of a big foundation from her personal cellular phone, this showing me the intimate care she 
herself puts, despite not mentioning in the interview. Without those observations in my 
several visits to those organizations, my analysis would be incomplete and/or biased, as some 
participants tend to emphasize some facts in the interviews but others don’t although they 
also have those characteristics/applications.  
 Another interesting instance was when I visited a different branch of an organization, 
despite having done several interviews at the headquarters and another branch. The facility 
was quite rich in terms of the physical conditions; separate rooms for several purposes, 
different education methods, sports facilities, music rooms etc. While the other informants 
had told me that their other branches have better facilities than where I visited, I had not 
given much credit to this information, as I had not seen in person. Moreover, this organization 
does not use social media and their website as effectively as some others do, which had put 
me back from assessing their superior facilities. This and other experiences with different 
cases, in fact, made me contend that, what was reflected to media/social media about those 
organizations as well as their websites was more of a function of their marketing capability 
or their will to market themselves through these channels rather than a robust indicator of the 
variety and quality of their services.  
3.2.3.3 Datasets filled by the organizations  
 I prepared a set of questions to be filled by the organizations for the years 2006, 2010 
and 2014, by year-end. The reasons for selecting those years are as follows. The legislative 
changes in 2006 create the stronger wave of marketization to which the effects and reactions 
would start to reveal after some time elapsed. I therefore wanted to see the situation just 
before they were had been affected. I collected this dataset in 2015, and I wanted to see 
situation by 2014-end, to compare data with the interviews. I also requested the data for 2010, 
because the organizations were not affected linearly; e.g., seizing after growth. To gather this 
dataset, I made new interviews with the founders in most of the cases, in which I also asked 
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about the open issues.  For the rest, I sent the file via e-mail. If the SERCs had more than one 
branch, I wanted them to provide information for all.  
The questions in the dataset pertained to several aspects (See Appendix), such as the 
number of specialists per student and their experience, trainings to teachers supported by the 
organizations, prices charged, services offered…etc. While compiling the questions which 
would serve as indicators of quality, I benefitted from the report of Assessing the Efficiency 
of Supplementary Special Education Services Project conducted by the Ministry of Social 
and Family Policies (2014), the dissertations I had skimmed, and the suggestions of the 
academics and other experts I had interviewed in the initial phase of the research. 
I gathered the datasets for 7 of the cases. One of the cases had sold the SERC prior to 
2006, within the first marketization wave, therefore no dataset was requested from that 
organization. In one case, the founder was experiencing a severe burnout as a result of the 
pressures in the field (will be discussed in the findings) and was not willing to commit more 
time energy for the research on the field. While not having the dataset, I was able to 
triangulate the interview data of these two organizations through other informants in the 
sample who had historical connections. The third case I could not gather the data kept 
promising that they would prepare it, but yet no dataset has been sent. Luckily, in addition to 
multiple interviewees from that organization, 13 of its employees participated in the survey, 
enabling the compensation of some information in the dataset.  
3.2.3.4 Employee surveys  
In order to further triangulate parts of the interview data and reduce the potential 
subjectivity bias, I conducted online employee surveys (see questions in Appendix). The 
survey included multiple choice and forced choice questions for measuring specific 
constructs as well as a set of questions where participants rated particular organizational 
practices (price, quality, differentiation, level of extra services, disability level of students) 
and an open-ended question on their organizational identity. If the participant declared that 
s/he had been working in the organization for more than 9 years, the survey opened up an 
additional section, requesting them to think about the applications in the past for one minute 
and later answer the questions regarding strategic positioning again. The embedded scales 
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(See table 4) were derived from the existing literature on potentially important constructs 
after a preliminary analysis of interview notes. The scales those had not been validated in 
Turkey were translated and back-translated by my cohorts in order to ensure the right 
translation.  
 
Table 4 Scales used in the employee survey 
Construct Name Scale 
Formalization Oldham and Hackman (1981) 
5 point Likert  
5 item scale 
Organizational Identification Mael and Ashforth (1992) 
5 point Likert  
6 item scale 
Customer orientation  Narver and Slater (1990) 
5 point Likert  
6 item scale 
Enactment of social welfare 
& commercial logics  
Lee and Battilana (2013) 
5 point Likert  
12 item scale 
Entrepreneurship orientation Covin and Slevin (1989) 
7 point semantic  
9 item scale 
Social/economic/legal/ethical 
orientation 
Stevens et al. (2015) (Adapted from 
Aupperle et al., 1985) 
Forced choice, 10 
points allocated to 
4 items in 4 groups 
Global service climate Schneider et al. (1998)  
5 point Likert  
7 item scale 
 
Before sending the link for the survey to the managers to share with their employees, I 
conducted 6 pilots with employees of 3 SERCs which were not included in my sample. 
During the first 3 pilots, I sat near the participants and wanted them to ask any confusing or 
annoying points. Their answers made me realize that I needed to adapt the wording of some 
scales to the context of my study. I performed the rest of the pilots after associated changes 
and made a few final corrections.  
As mentioned earlier, one SERC had closed a long time ago, and another SERC in the 
sample was closed during the research process; so these two had no employees. 4 out of the 
remaining 8 organizations participated in the survey, with a total of 39 valid surveys. Only 
one founder (with severe burnout) stated that he does not want the employees to spend time 
for research or alike purposes anymore, due to his resentment. 2 of the organizations had 
started to be bored by my several demands and said “we will look,” but the fact that no one 
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participated from those organizations may indicate they did not share it with the employees- 
perhaps due their annoyance of the survey questions, e.g. the commercial/social orientation 
scale that directly ask fragile topics. The other non-participating organization was one of the 
most helpful organizations that far, even collecting a lot of data for me from their several 
branches. I am not aware of any specific reason for their non-participation, maybe the work 
load of the general manager; however, I hesitated to ask again after reminding once. 
There was only one response from an organization, which I evaluated it with caution, 
only as weak evidence. There were 22, 13, and 3 responses from the remaining organizations, 
those numbers being proportional to their number of employees. I aggregated the responses 
to the scales, calculating scores for each organization on associated dimensions. For the items 
on rating quality, price, extra activities, and level of disability of students, I calculated 
averages for 2014 and 2006. I also tabulated the definitions on organizational identity to 
corroborate interview evidence.  
3.2.3.5 Secondary sources 
 I collected several archival data including annual reports and organizations’ 
publications (where available), and bulletins and histories from websites.  I also googled the 
news on the organizations and founders for additional information. In addition, I examined 
the contents of the web pages, and social media accounts. I used the information from the 
archival sources for several purposes; first to prepare for the interviews, second to connect 
parts of the case histories, and thirdly to complement and confirm the evidence from the 
interviews. In order to correctly evaluate the archival data and rule out potential biases, for 
each archival document, I considered what purposes it was created for. (As explained earlier, 
the content in social media and web pages of some organizations such as photos of several 
activities, was not a reliable source of data as some organizations could not / did not chose 
to use those channels densely. Therefore, I did not make any structured content analysis or 
cross tabulations based on these sources) 
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3.3 Data Analysis  
 The data analysis was conducted by following the framework outlined by Eisenhardt 
(1989) for building theory from multiple case studies. Following her method, I first made 
within-case analysis to gain familiarity with data and start preliminary theory generation. 
During this phase, the main resource for theory generation was the qualitative analysis of the 
interview transcripts, iteratively validated by the other data sources. The founder and 
manager interviews were transcribed and open-coded for inducing theory, together with my 
field notes and the analytical memos I wrote after each interview (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
(I provide the details of this coding process in the next section). 
 After assessing the unique patterns for each case, I started comparing the findings from 
different cases with each other, to see if there are consistent patterns among cases. In this 
process, evidence confirming emergent conceptualizations and relationships increase 
confidence in the validity of the emerging model, while the disconfirming data across cases 
should be interpreted to refine the emerging model (Eisenhardt, 1989). Theory building in 
case studies “occurs via recursive cycling among the case data, emerging theory, and later, 
extant literature” (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; pp. 25). Therefore, this was an iterative 
process whereby I went back and forth between the data and the theory asking the ‘how’ and 
“why” questions searching evidence for the causal relationships among emergent concepts. I 
continued this induction process until I believed I reached the theoretical saturation, the point 
at which incremental learning and the necessary refinement is minimal (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967).  
 This kind of theory building grounded in data produces a strong theory, because it is 
empirically valid (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). However, in order to increase the 
generalizability of the theory, the challenge in case studies is to come up with a framework 
that does not 'over-determine the phenomenon' by the particular details of cases. While the 
specifics of each case may appear to be crucial to the researcher, s/he has to make choices 
and simplifications in order to create a generalizable theory (Siggelkow, 2007). Keeping in 
mind this inherent challenge, I was keen on the level of abstraction, making sure that I am 
not creating a very narrow-range theory.   
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3.3.1 The Coding Process  
 The coding was performed in AtlasTi – a software extensively used by scientists for 
qualitative data analysis. The coding of data was conducted in the original language (Turkish) 
to eliminate the risk of misinterpreting the data by translating it first into English and then 
coding. Prior to starting coding, I listened to audio recordings of interviews once again, 
correcting any mistakes in the transcriptions, which also enabled me to “digest and reflect on 
the data” (Clarke, 2005). 
3.3.1.1 Open coding  
 Open coding is the process of breaking down qualitative data into separate parts, 
examining them comparing for similarities and differences, and assigning codes to these parts 
while remaining open to all possible theoretical directions emerging from the data (Charmaz, 
2006; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). To generate an integrated, consistent, plausible and data-
driven theory, it is essential to follow the constant comparative method of qualitative 
analysis- continuously comparing and contrasting data- as well as preserving a theoretical 
sensitivity- asking how and why at each phase of the analysis to find the underlying patterns 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967).  
I was keen on not imposing any theory during the coding process- letting the theory 
emerge from the data-, and in order to remain alert on the most important elements for my 
research aim, I put my research questions to a visible place and occasionally skimmed them 
during the coding. I always compared the text I read to the previous codes, evaluating whether 
it was mentioned a different phenomenon and how it differed. I kept memos on my thoughts, 
to keep the freshness of my theoretical notions and to relieve conflicts in my thoughts (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967). 
Following Saldana’s (2009, p. 15) method for coding the interviews and field notes, I 
coded what rises from the data corpus to the surface; the “relevant text” as named by 
Auerbach and Silverstein (2003). I coded the unrelated text, the short passages scattered 
throughout the interviews which are distant from the topic of interest, as N/A-not applicable. 
While doing this, I was keen on not losing any potentially fruitful data. For example, some 
interviewees were inclined to comment on the ideal type of education the students should be 
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getting (socializing with their peers, the importance of repeating what they learn at school at 
their homes… etc.) While not coding their details, I coded those passages as N/A-technical 
info. I later checked those codes to see if they provide any meaning for my analysis; e.g., 
whether particular participants were speaking more technical language or made more 
comments on the ideal education process- as supplementary evidence to the depth of their 
technical knowledge and importance given to quality of education. 
 As the coding proceeded, I felt the need to create a form of “eclectic coding” (Saldana, 
2009) to help me better organize the data around my research questions, logistically handle 
the high number of codes and also be able to cognitively process the complicated events and 
processes at different levels of analysis. Therefore, I created a broad coding scheme 
explaining the level of analysis and the dimensions I would seek to code within each level. 
This scheme had emerged from the data analysis that far and was modified several times 
throughout the process until I felt I captured all the key elements feeding the theory.  
  
Table 5 Coded elements 
Actors Coded elements 
Macro Environment The situations, events and processes affecting the field or 
particular organizations State 
Field   
Workforce Key motives and actions of these actors 
Changes in their motives and actions 
The processes exerting pressure on SEs 
Pool of beneficiaries 
Organizations in the field 
The Organization   
Organizational 
characteristics 
Reason of birth, mission, identity, activities, key historical 
events, elements of strategy and structure, strengths and 
weaknesses, pressures felt and reactions 
Changes caused by other (potentially confounding) factors 
Founder/s 
Actions, motives, values, emotions, beliefs and key changes 
in these dimensions (associated with marketization) exerting 
pressure on the organizations and affecting their reactions 
Employees of the 
organizations 
Beneficiaries of the 
organizations 
 
  
 At this stage, this was not a theoretical categorization, but only a descriptive coding 
embedded in the open coding, such that: “Level of analysis_ coded element y_ code 1.” When 
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there was manageable number of codes under a particular level of analysis, I did not indicate 
the name of the element, but coded as “level of analysis_ code 1.” To give substantial 
examples; the codes looked like: 
Org_ reaction_ stopping investing in employee 
Org_ mission_ being an exemplar org 
Field_ profit maximizers_ not competing on quality 
Field_ beneficiaries_ requesting bribe 
Macro_ increase in the number of NGOs 
 As seen from Table 5, I coded both the actions, and the social meanings which are 
infused into them: intentions, motives, beliefs, and values (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, 
p.7). I incorporated InVivo codes (own words of the interviewees), and process codes (with 
“-ing”) into the open codes that arose from my analysis of the data (Saldana, 2009). While 
letting the codes emerge from the data, I also sought for statements on some specific 
organizational elements such as reason of birth, mission and identity. These elements also 
rose from the data and emergent theory. For example, I figured out that, while all 
organizations in the sample wanted to create social value, their reasons of birth varied; such 
that some were aiming both social value and an amount of profit at founding while others 
only had the social impact in mind. Those differences were later reflected to their strategic 
reactions. Thus, I was keen on catching and coding any statement related to reason of 
founding and the starting mission for all cases. Similarly, after realizing that the organizations 
were affected at differing levels by the pressures exerted by marketization and that their 
organizational strengths and weaknesses protected them or made them more vulnerable, I 
tried to figure out which specific strengths and weaknesses they had from the interview data- 
later triangulating it with other sources of data.  
 In addition to the emergent codes, I coded the specific complementary activities they 
performed other than education and rehabilitation to the students; e.g., organizing 
conferences, publications. One question asked whether there were differences in the range of 
the complementary activities and/or the importance given to some of them. I coded any 
mentioned change as an emerging process code; e.g., decreasing social activities, which I 
would seek to explain with emerging concepts and mechanisms asking the “why” question 
in the second cycle coding (provided that the change was a consequence of marketization, as 
later inquired in the interview). At the same time, I tabulated the static codes (the activates 
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themselves) in an excel file and noted any mentioned changes, later triangulating the data 
from other sources. For example, the answers in the datasets on the number of conferences 
organized in that particular year, related statements in their annual reports, and the 
information in their web pages enabled me to compare the evidence on organizing 
conferences activity.  Another set of codes not directly used in inducing theory but for 
supplementary analytic purposes were the historical events codes. (I explain the use of those 
codes in associated sections.) 
 During this open coding process, I tried not to lump nor split the data excessively- as I 
would lose information in the former and not be able to manage the huge number of codes in 
the latter. Although there is no optimum number of codes for qualitative analysis, it is 
suggested not to exceed 200 codes due to the cognitive limitations of human mind (Saldana, 
2009). After coding each interview, I revisited the code list for detecting redundant codes and 
any unfitting quotes within individual codes. As new data was analyzed, new codes also 
emerged. I repeated the elimination and reorganization process (including new emerging and 
old ones) until I was convinced that the new data analyzed was not providing any novel 
insights (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
 Staying within the advised limit of 200 codes was not possible for my analysis as there 
were two articles embedded in the research at different levels of analysis, the field level and 
organizational levels. In addition, I coded the elements regarding several actors at both levels 
of analysis.  Moreover, I not only coded the processes, actions, motives, values, emotions, 
and beliefs which would be directly used as focused codes in theory building, but had 
supplementary codes such as main characteristics of different types of organizations in the 
field (for accurately grouping them), activities, and historical events. Therefore, in order to 
cope with the high number and variety of emergent codes, I started “adding structure” to the 
codes, following the advice on AtlasTi Manual. This also enabled me to better manage the 
task of working with the higher and lower order codes. As some categories emerged and 
some codes were evidently sub codes for them, I wrote the category name followed by the 
sub code. And they were preceded by the level of analysis from my eclectic coding scheme. 
I also created main category codes, which I utilized for the quotations which were under the 
main category but did not fit into a sub code yet, and reviewed later with all related codes, 
such that: 
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 Field_ profit maximizers_ corruption_ officials as hidden partners 
 Field_ profit maximizers_ corruption_ fake disabled reports 
 Field_ profit maximizers_ not investing in quality 
 After I finished coding all transcriptions, I iterated the modifications two times, with 
one week intervals. Within this process, I read the texts to ensure that I recoded the texts 
those were coded before a particular new code emerged according to the new codes and also 
made several new arrangements such as reorganizing and merging or splitting some codes, 
and eliminating redundant codes. While there were substantial changes in the first iteration, 
minor changes were necessary at the second one.   
 Analytical memos are informal analytical notes which prompt a qualitative researcher 
to analyze data and codes earlier in the research process. They form the core of grounded 
theory, as they help increase the level of abstraction of ideas (Charmaz, 2006). “The purpose 
of analytic memo writing is to document and reflect on: your coding process and code 
choices; how the process of inquiry is taking shape; and the emergent patterns, categories 
and subcategories, themes, and concepts in your data–all possibly leading toward theory.” 
(Saldana, 2009; p 32). While coding or analyzing the data, I wrote memos whenever 
something significant came to my mind either on potential remedies to the coding, surfacing 
theoretical mechanisms, arising possible concepts and categories, unanswered and pondering 
questions, insightful connections between events… etc. I also noted the plausible alternative 
explanations and the confounding factors whose effects I needed to rule out. Through the end 
of this stage of coding, some emerging concepts and mechanisms had already surfaced, which 
would help me in the next phase.  
3.3.1.2 Second cycle coding  
  Second cycle coding in qualitative research is a focused, selective phase in which the 
researcher uses the most significant and frequent codes to sort, synthesize, integrate, and 
organize large amounts of data Charmaz (2006). In this stage, I first downloaded all codes 
and separated them as field level and organizational level. At the field level, I initially 
subdivided the codes according to the actors involved and later grouped the codes related to 
each actor according to the emergent mechanisms such as increased mobility of beneficiaries, 
decreased morality of beneficiaries, and decreased dependence of beneficiaries on SEs, 
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which all had unique effects on the sub-dimensions of the emergent concept of “degeneration 
of the field.”  This process was fed by the categories that already started to emerge through 
the end of first cycle coding and my analytical memos written after the interviews and during 
open coding. I also determined the codes which served as moderators, such as ineffective 
inspections of the state, as I was trying to come up with a theory generalizable to other 
contexts. During these processes, I did more modifications in the codes by checking whether 
there were unexplained connections in the framework. In some instances, I realized that I had 
grouped the quotes explaining a situation and a related process under the same category, and 
split them into different codes accordingly.  
 At the organizational level, I scattered and compared all the categories to see whether 
there were overlaps either between the codes under the same category or between different 
categories in general. This data to data comparison helped me develop focused codes, which 
were further compared with data for further refinement (Charmaz, 2006). I made the 
necessary modifications by splitting or merging some codes as well as recoding some group 
of codes under different categories, while at the same time making sure that the quotes of 
particular codes were all coherent. As I proceeded to create a framework explaining the 
relationships across emergent concepts, I also refined some codes with the same motivation 
at the field level; to make sure there were not unexplained processes as a result of aggregating 
a situation and process in a static code.  
 As I wanted to compare and contrast each case, for establishing a more robust and rich 
theory, I created separate excel files for each organization. I downloaded a codes-primary 
documents matrix and grouped all the interviews for each organization to reach all the codes 
passing in a particular case. In one sheet, I put all the codes that under their categories and 
grouped them according to the sequence of the effects. Therefore, I was able to see the 
differential levels and ways of being affected by the pressures of marketization, different 
structural and strategic elements, strengths and weaknesses of each organization which were 
safeguarding or increasing their vulnerability, their strategic reactions, and other changes 
(ruled out effects and explanations). 
 The next stage at the organizational level was generating theory to explain variations 
in the reactions of the organizations. Axial coding is a strategy for identifying conditions, 
actions/ interactions, and consequences by asking ‘when, where, why, who, how, and with 
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what consequences’ (Charmaz, 2006), which seemed as a perfect strategy for my research 
aims.  However, whether the researcher should impose a structure to the analysis at this stage 
or should s/he totally let the theory emerge freely is a contradictory issue among the pioneers 
of grounded theory, namely Glaser and Strauss. While their seminal book did not provide an 
analysis framework, Strauss, together with Gorbin (1998), suggested an axial coding 
framework in their book named “Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and procedures 
for developing grounded theory.” There are supporters of the axial coding framework among 
researchers as well as some who find it cumbersome (Saldana, 2009). Therefore, I embraced 
a theoretical coding at this stage, in which substantive codes related to each other as 
mechanisms to be integrated into a theory. As suggested by Charmaz (2006), throughout the 
theoretical coding, I kept asking “What’s happening here, what are the basic social processes, 
what are the basic social psychological processes?” I revisited my analytical memos and 
noted the gaps and the contradictory points, so that I could revisit the data and modify the 
theoretical relationships. While not being bound to the axial coding paradigm, the resultant 
framework was similar in structure; showing the causal conditions, phenomena, strategies 
and consequences together with moderating factors. 
 I revisited the code list for detecting redundant codes and any unfitting quotes within 
individual codes. As new data was analyzed, new codes also emerged. I repeated the 
elimination and reorganization process (including new emerging and old ones) until I was 
convinced that the new data analyzed was not providing any novel insights (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994).  
 At the end of the iterative process of coding, recoding, eliminating redundant codes, 
adding newly emergent codes, and reorganizing existing codes, there remained 421 codes. 
20 of them were not used in the analysis due to their limited relevance to the topic, but 
served.as additional information to reflect on the data. Of the remaining 401 analyzed codes, 
142 were at the field level, and 259 were at the organizational level. 63 of the 259 codes at 
the organizational level were related to key historical events, founding mission or activities. 
These were not used to construct categories, but provided information for the case analysis. 
(Code lists are provided in Appendix) 
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3.3.2 Analyzing Key Historical Events  
I coded the key historical events which could pose potential alternative explanations 
to the emergent theoretical framework. I listed those codes for each organization to create a 
major events history, also complementing with other resources such as the histories in their 
websites and annual reports. Seeing the big picture and the historical evolution, I re-
evaluated the changes they were subject to after 2006 with an aim to assess whether an 
action was a reaction to or consequence of marketization or was caused by other factors.  
 For example, in two cases, there were restructuring and corporatization processes 
starting after the second wave of marketization. While there were no specific references to 
them as reactions to marketization in the interviews, I was undecided- thinking perhaps 
participants failed to explain the connection explicitly- because of the fit of the timing of 
those acts. However, a reconsideration of the interview data strengthened with historical 
information made clear that those were not reactions to marketizations. One of them, for 
instance, started the process as consequence of the operational mistakes in the branches and 
the huge financial burden the organization faced afterwards. In addition, as participants stated 
more explicitly, the law making payments to the SERCs for all disabled people was also tying 
them to the MoE and assuring to comply with MoE’s regulations would be harder in the 
previous structure. The second rationale was related to the same law bringing the 
marketization, but in a different sense, unrelated to my interest on the effects of 
marketization. And the latter rationale was totally endemic to the history of that particular 
organization. Therefore, I ruled out corporatization as a strategy; however, putting it under 
the strengths category, as this helped relieve the effects of marketization from the 
organizations (to be explained in detail in the findings section.) 
 Another such instance was a case which historically had several disputes within the 
board of directors and with particular stakeholders. Therefore, I traced the associated 
transcripts in detail with an aim to distinguish the effects of those instances from the pressures 
and effects of marketization on this organization. Yet another example where I benefited 
from the historical events was a case in which I was undecided to label the organization as a 
balanced or social first category according to my clustering scheme. The historical splits from 
two partners at different points in time and the reasons behind these, which were consistently 
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explained in the two interviews helped me make a more robust judgement, which I later 
triangulated from the employee survey data.   
3.3.3 Analyzing the Surveys  
 As mentioned earlier, using the survey data, I calculated scores for 4 organizations on 
formalization, identification with the organization, customer orient, commercial vs social 
logic, service climate, entrepreneurial orientation, economic-social-ethical-legal orientation. 
In 3 of those cases, there were multiple participants; 3, 13, and 22 employees. To check 
whether the data was compatible for aggregating the results of different participants into 
scores for the organization, I calculated interrater reliabilities in SPSS statistics program. All 
3 cases yielded very high and significant intra-class correlation coefficients as shown in Table 
6. 
Table 6 Intra-class correlation coefficients among survey respondents 
  
N of 
Items 
Intra-class 
Correlation 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
F Test with 
True Value 0 
F Test with 
True Value 0 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Value df1 df2 Sig 
Case x 3 0.753 0.585 0.86 4.044 40 80 0.00 
Case y 13 0.831 0.677 0.931 5.908 15 180 0.00 
Case z 22 0.894 0.8 0.956 9.393 15 315 0.00 
 
 The survey data also provided ratings on the 5 strategic positioning dimensions for 4 
cases (in 3 cases, before and after marketization scores available as some participants had 
worked there for more than 9 years). I used these ratings in conjunction with the scores I 
collected in the interviews, first aggregating the survey responses for each organization and 
then comparing with the average of the ratings from the interviews of the particular case. 
Lastly, the surveys included identity claims by the participants, where they wrote up to 8 
identity claims in an open-ended question. I plotted these claims and corroborated with the 
related codes in each case. 
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3.3.4 Analyzing the Datasets  
 The datasets enabled the verification of several changes in the organizations throughout 
the years I focused for the research. They included items on number of students, braches, 
capacity, educational and other services, conferences organized, number of students with 
scholarship, trainings provided for employees, trainings supported by the organization, 
availability of school bus, as well as many quality indicators. As explained earlier, the quality 
indicators were determined through discussions with experts and readings of publications. 
The items related to quality were: number of teachers with graduate degree and double 
majors, average years of experience of the teachers, number of teachers per student, number 
of students coming from other districts, and most importantly, the distribution of teachers 
according to their area of education. The ratio of specialists (e.g.: teachers for mentally 
disabled, teachers for hearing impaired, speaking therapists, physiotherapists) was explained 
as a key indicator quality by the experts. Due to the scarcity of specialists in the field, MoE 
permits other teachers (pre-school teachers and elementary school teachers) as well as 
psychologist to educate particular sessions. It also sometimes organizes trainings for 
elementary school teachers, making them “certified teachers” who can educate the courses 
reserved for specialists. However, while the certified teachers can technically offer these 
courses, their backgrounds are much weaker than the original specialists, who are really 
scarce and more expensive to employ. Therefore, the change in the ratio of specialists within 
all teachers is a strong indicator of the change in the education quality.  
3.4 Validity and Reliability  
 Although validity and reliability are ideas born quantitative research, they are equally 
important for ensuring the scientific rigor of case studies. However, research based on 
qualitative studies has endemic ways of establishing validity and reliability throughout the 
design, data collection and analysis phases (Guba and Lincoln, 1981; Kirk and Miller, 1986). 
Whereas the types of validity relying on positivist assumptions, such as concurrent validity, 
predictive validity and convergent validity are not seen as relevant to qualitative research, 
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descriptive, interpretive, theoretical validity, and external validity constitute concerns 
(Maxwell, 1992). Theoretical validity, as posited by Maxwell (1992), is actually a 
combination of construct validity and internal validity, and many qualitative researchers also 
use these terminologies by noting that ways of establishing them differ in qualitative 
research. Therefore, I evaluate the scientific rigor of my research in terms of reliability, 
descriptive validity, interpretive validity, construct validity, internal validity, and external 
validity categories. 
 There is an inherent threat of “researcher bias” in qualitative research, which can result 
from selective observation, selective recording of information, and allowing personal views 
to affect how data are interpreted (Johnson, 1997). I had several strategies to ensure that the 
research process and the findings were not affected by my personal tendencies, as will be 
discussed in the following sections. However, as there is no real remedy for the potential 
subjectivity of the researcher, being constantly aware of this threat and having a critical self-
reflection on his or her potential biases, world-views and assumptions are suggested 
(Johnson, 1997; Suddaby, 2006). In addition, it is recommended that the qualitative 
researchers inform their audiences about their background, experience, assumptions, and any 
personal agenda. With this aim, I am attaching my curriculum vitae in Appendix to the 
attention of the audience and summarizing my personal perspective wıth a few sentences.  
 I am both upset about and critical of many societal and environmental issues in the 
world today particularly fostered by the ideas and practices of capitalism. Following a 
personal enlightenment period, I shifted my area of interest from strategic management and 
international business to social entrepreneurship and the management of social ventures. I 
did and do wish that my academic work both contributes to theory and practice, serving to 
create a better word. With this agenda, one question I wanted to help answer was “can social 
ventures beat profit-seeking ventures within the market mechanism?” Translating this 
question to appropriate levels of analysis to my area of study and later finding the context of 
this research to my chance, which actually provided a natural experiment, have shaped the 
final research question. 
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3.4.1 Reliability  
 The term reliability pertains to the quality level of measurements, more specifically, 
their consistency and repeatability. This reveals in case studies as ensuring that the data 
collection and analysis procedures can be repeated with the same results (Yin, 2003).  
 While data collection process in case studies entails flexibility and catching 
opportunities (Eisenhardt, 1989), developing a protocol, which describes all procedures and 
general rules to be followed in collecting the data increases the reliability (Yin, 2003). 
Throughout the data collection phase, which yielded to nearly two years, I kept in mind the 
concern for reliability, but also tried to stay open to opportunities. I had a draft protocol at 
the very beginning to outline the types of basic documents and data I would seek to collect 
from each organization, but I also tried to gather any potentially useful data such as booklets 
and brochures in the interview settings. One specific strategy to establish reliability in data 
collection was during the interview phases. Although new insights emerged as I started the 
manager interviews and I saw a need to modify part of content and sequence of some 
questions, I kept using the same interview protocol with all managers- so that the answers 
would be comparable. Later, before starting the founder interviews, I made the required 
changes and did not make any modification later on during founder interviews. The case-
specific questions for clarification and comparison were, of course, unique to each case. 
 Retrospective bias occurs when informants cannot accurately remember the past and/or 
when they are inclined to present a socially desirable image of themselves or their 
organizations (Golden, 1982; Huber and Power, 1985). I believe that this research did not 
suffer from this bias due to the following reasons. First, I did not ask the informants about 
distant past (the dynamics are actually increasingly affecting them and shaping their actions) 
and I motivated them to provide accurate information by ensuring the confidentiality of 
information and explaining the importance of the research (Huber and Power, 1985). In 
addition, I interviewed multiple informants in six of the cases, thus checking the facts they 
provided with each other. In two of the cases where I interviewed one informant, I conducted 
multiple interviews with the same person. Moreover, in 3 out of the 4 cases with one 
informant, there were outside informants; I was directed to those organizations via snowball 
sampling and thus had the opportunity to ask questions pertaining those cases to my 
informants in other organizations. I also conducted multiple interviews with 5 of the 
69 
 
interviewees. In addition, 2 of those repeated interviews were in the houses of the 
interviewees, creating a different physical setting. Finally, I also sought to reduce the 
potential retrospective bias by verifying the validity of the retrospective facts stated in the 
interviews with observations of practices and sites, the information in the datasets filled by 
organizations, employee surveys and secondary sources (Philips, 1981).  
 The other reliability concern in case studies is related to data analysis; whether different 
researchers would interpret and explain the phenomenon similarly. This can be achieved by 
coding the data twice after some time has elapsed, and by involving several coders to analyze 
the data independently. My coding process was designed to enhance reliability; I recoded the 
data two more times after one-week breaks following each open coding period. The codes 
scheme changed in all repetitions, as I merged codes, changed their names, separated some 
codes to sub codes, etc.  When I finally I skimmed the codes and their content after those 
iterations, I saw the need for only minor changes and finalized the process after making those 
modifications. Later, in the second cycle coding, I iterated the modifications even one more 
time with the focused codes. 
3.4.2 Descriptive Validity  
Descriptive validity refers to the factual accuracy of the researchers’ reports, meaning 
that they are not making up or distorting what they heard and saw either intentionally or 
unintentionally (Maxwell, 1992). I attempted to ensure this concern through recording all the 
interviews as long as the situation permitted and taking field notes during the interviews and 
visits or right after, so that I would not reconstruct the reality after some time passed. Before 
analyzing the interviews, I listened them to each of them to correct the mistakes in the 
transcriptions, which were actually plenty despite being transcribed by a firm specializing in 
this work. I even corrected the punctuations to make sure the text reflected the accurate 
meaning in the speech, as even a comma could sometimes change the meaning.  
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3.4.3 Interpretive Validity  
Interpretive validity refers to the degree to which the researcher accurately understands 
and reports the real meaning attached by the participants including their feelings, thoughts, 
intentions, viewpoints and experiences (Maxwell, 1992). Being cautious of this threat, I tried 
to make sure that I am not imposing my meaning rather than the participants” in several ways. 
First, I situated myself in the community for nearly three years starting with the 
brainstorming phase through the end of data analysis. I conducted several interviews with 
various actors, participated in their conferences, did a total of two weeks’ participative 
observations in two organizations, joined some classes in several organizations, had lunch 
with the founders, managers and employees where I had informal discussions and analyzed 
their daily speeches, organized workshops for measuring their social impact, and became 
friends with many of the interviewees in Facebook. Thereby I was able to get a solid 
understanding of the actors’ viewpoints. In addition, I read several forums on the web and 
joined the groups in Facebook founded by actors in the field where they had informal 
discussions. 
Secondly, I sought clarifications during the interviews on the concepts the participants 
mentioned by probing questions such as “what do you exactly mean by this”, “could you 
open this a little more?”. I also asked about any confusing points in my following visits to 
clarify the intentions of the actors for specific actions. In addition, to enhance the relevance 
of my findings, I requested feedback from the participants (Johnson, 1997), by explaining 
them about my perceptions about some situations and events in the informal talks following 
the interviews. In many cases, the interviewees themselves asked about my perceptions, and 
how their organization differed from others, thus opening fruitful discussions those 
strengthened my interpretations.  
Lastly, where appropriate, I also inquired particular occasions and situations in some 
cases with the interviewees from other organizations (staying in line with confidentiality 
agreements and not mentioning the names of those organizations). Here, my aim was to make 
sure that I was not making irrelevant judgements through the help of the feedback from the 
actors in the field. For example, I detected that a few SERCs (under a firm status) founded 
associations, one of them being in my sample. This was quite a strange occasion, and I did 
not want to be bound to my interpretation but asked several actors how they interpret it.   
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3.4.4 Construct Validity  
Construct validity’ refers to the quality of the conceptualization or operationalization 
of the relevant concept. Construct validity of a procedure is the extent to which a research 
investigates what it claims to investigate (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). In case studies, 
construct validity is achieved through data triangulation, establishing a ‘clear chain of 
evidence’ (Yin, 2003). As described in the analysis section, I benefited from several sources 
of information, such as internal and publicly available documents, multiple interviews, 
employee surveys, and datasets. Moreover, I operationalized potentially key constructs 
through several measures. For example, I had multiple objective indicators for quality within 
the datasets, in addition to having it rated by the interviewees and employee surveys. 
Similarly, for assessing the social and commercial orientations, I created composite measures 
of enactment of social or commercial logics and social/economic/legal/ethical orientation 
scales, also supported by customer orientation and service climate scales as indicators of 
social orientation. 
3.4.5 Internal Validity  
Internal validity in qualitative research pertains to the logical validity of the induced 
theory and necessitates clear causal relationships between the constructs of interest and the 
results (Gibbert et al., 2008). Main threats to internal validity are ignoring nonconforming 
evidence and failing to consider alternative explanations of the phenomena (Maxwell, 1996). 
For not ignoring potentially important evidence, I corroborated all the data collected from 
different informants and archival resources for each case.  
As the theory started to emerge during initial data analysis phase paralleling the data 
collection, I was able to ask the interviewees questions pertaining some causal relationship 
and the alternative explanations. For example, while all cases complained about being “tired, 
their resentment, high stress…etc.” at varying levels, one of the founders did not make any 
such statement related to psychological burnout. Therefore, I questioned this by asking 
“Everyone is stating some sort of burnout, but you did not. Why do you think you do not 
suffer from it?” Her explanation afterwards was really insightful for refining the theory. In 
addition, to increase the robustness of the theory in the qualitative analysis phase, I kept going 
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back and forth between the data and the theory and continued asking the ‘how’ question until 
I reached a saturation of ideas (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
Another technique for increasing internal validity in case studies is ‘pattern matching’, 
which refers to comparing empirically observed phenomena with theoretically plausible 
explanations (Yin, 2003). With this aim, I thought of explanations those could disprove the 
evolving theory and tried to rule them out. As explained earlier, I detected the key historical 
events posing alternative explanations to be able to sort out their effects. I also attempted to 
ensure that I am not including the effect of macro level changes in the field level theory. For 
example, due to some scandals in Turkey, the legitimacy of all NGOs were hampered, as also 
mentioned by an interviewee. To rule out this alternative explanation, I compared the 
situation of the social enterprises which were in firm status. Many of the interviewees in those 
cases had also mentioned that their legitimacy had decreased in the eyes of several 
stakeholders including the general public, state officials, and beneficiaries as a consequence 
of marketization. Therefore, I concluded that, while there was a diverse effect of those 
scandals to decrease legitimacy, marketization also decreased the legitimacy of social 
enterprises 
In addition, using various sources of data for each case, I prepared separate theoretical 
frameworks emerging from each of them and replicated the pattern-matching exercise across 
multiple cases (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). The commonalities helped 
build a more robust theory, while the differences enriched the theory with contingencies. For 
example, the socioeconomic situation of the beneficiaries rose as a contingency shaping the 
behavior of the social enterprises. Last but not the least, I explained each significant step in 
the causal sequence that lead to the strategic reactions (George et al., 2005), thus clearly 
showing the relationships.  
3.4.6 External Validity 
In its common use in quantitative research, external validity indicates the 
generalizability of the findings to other samples and contexts. Case studies do not aim 
statistical generalization, as they do not involve randomly selected large samples but entail 
theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Instead, 
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generalizability from cases is concerned with the usefulness of the theory in making sense of 
similar events rather than drawing conclusions from a sample to a wider population 
(Maxwell, 1992). Therefore, external validity for case studies is achieved through ‘analytic 
generalization’ using the replication logic across cases (Yin, 2003), which enables 
generalizations from empirical observations to theory.  
In line with this recommendation, replication of the 10 cases in this study provided 
literal and theoretical replications, in which theory developed from particular cases were 
compared with the empirical results of other cases. As more cases supported the theory 
whereas not supporting rival theories, I considered it to be replicated. As the theoretical 
sample in this study is quite large for a multiple case study design, I believe to have enough 
replications, which enhance analytic generalizability. Moreover, as the cases chosen vary in 
dimensions such as age, size, socioeconomic condition of the location, and the characteristics 
of founders, the resultant theory may also provide some level of statistical generalizability- 
when the population is defined as social enterprises in the sector, rather than all SERCs.  
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4 
FINDINGS 
Presenting findings in multiple-case studies is a quite challenging task, as Eisenhardt 
and Graebner (2007; pp 29) explicate: 
   “Presenting a relatively complete and unbroken narrative of each case is 
infeasible for multiple-case research, particularly as the number of cases 
increases. If the researcher relates the narrative of each case, then the theory is 
lost and the text balloons. So the challenge in multiple-case research is to stay 
within spatial constraints while also conveying both the emergent theory that is 
the research objective and the rich empirical evidence that supports the theory. 
The best way to address this challenge is to develop a theory in sections or by 
distinct propositions in such a way that each is supported by empirical evidence. 
Thus, the overarching organizing frame of the paper is the theory, and each part 
of the theory is demonstrated by evidence from at least some of the cases.” 
 
 Following this advice, I will be presenting the findings within tables and organizing the 
text around the theory in the subsequent sections. I also provide figures for the frameworks 
explaining the functions of emergent mechanisms. In addition, to use the advantage of 
grounded theory regarding the richness of data at the same time, I insert exemplar narratives 
from the empirical evidence.  
 As explained earlier, I combined various evidence for each case; first analyzed them 
separately to establish within case patterns and then compared them across cases to generate 
richer and stronger theory. I present short analysis of each case regarding the effects they felt, 
the strategic actions the took, and their particular characteristics connected to their actions. 
Due to my confidentiality agreement with the organizations, I am covering some information 
that can lead to the association of the cases with particular organizations by the audience. 
 The chapter is organized in two main parts; findings at the field and organizational 
levels. First part explains the changes in the nature of the field as a consequence of 
marketization at multiple levels. It also outlines the pressures exerted by marketization on 
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social enterprises. The second part of the chapter first posits that social enterprises are 
vulnerable to the pressures at varying levels, depending on their particular characteristics. 
Later, it elaborates the strategic actions taken by the social enterprises, comparing and 
contrasting their behavior to each other to find clues to the reasons for their different 
responses. The acts denoted as mission drift in the literature are also evaluated within the 
cases, to assess whether their true nature as well as the causes to them in case of a real mission 
drift.   
4.1 The Changing Field Dynamics  
 In the following sections, I explain the changing dynamics in the field as a consequence 
of marketization. I first describe the characteristics of incumbent organizations and the new 
entrants, and explicate the different competitive acts of the new entrants who are mainly 
motivated by profit. Later, I explain the two interesting emergent mechanisms occurring with 
marketization, other than the rise of profit-maximizers; changes in the beneficiaries and the 
workforce. I then evaluate the macro level effects and weakening of social enterprises, which 
serve as moderators in the emergent framework. Following this, I introduce the emergent 
concept of degeneration of the social sector and summarize the mechanisms operating at 
multiple levels to cause this consequence. I conclude by explicating the various pressures 
exerted on the social enterprises in the new state of the sector after marketization. 
4.1.1 The Good Enterprises Facing Bad Enterprises  
 There is a clear divide in the minds of actors in the field, such that there are ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ enterprises operating in the field of special education and rehabilitation. This both 
reveals from their discussions of the issues and from the answers to one interview question, 
where I wanted them to form any number of clusters from the organizations in the field 
according to any criteria they would like. While most of them named the organizations with 
these exact words, as ‘good’ and ‘bad’, some participants used more specific labels such as 
‘the ones who do their job’ vs ‘the ones who do not do their job’ or ‘the ethical ones’ vs 
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‘unethical ones.’ However, the explanations they later provided for the two groups they 
formed were quite similar, whether they used a generic or more specific label. Therefore, two 
broad categories of organizations emerged, being divided to sub categories in themselves by 
some participants. Using the language of the participants, at this point I name them the ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ organizations, and later label them with a management terminology based on their 
characteristics. 
 A few participants also made a second categorization based on managerial capability, 
size, and availability of resources, independent of the first categorization. These 
categorizations did not later surface as mechanisms shaping the market forces, but emerged 
among the factors affecting social enterprises’ level of being affected by the pressures exerted 
by marketization and the reactions they gave. Moreover, all kinds of organizations vary by 
size and management capabilities. Therefore, I continue with explaining the characteristics 
of the two broad categories, good and bad organizations, by focusing on the associated codes 
(Charmaz, 2006).   
4.1.1.1 The “good” enterprises  
 While the participants did not consistently distinguish the organizations according to 
their legal forms, non-profit vs for-profit, a clear distinction existed between the 
organizations solely seeking profits and the ‘good’ organizations, which are stated to 
constitute a minority in the field - with statements like “one in each 10 organizations.”  The 
base for the separation is the intent; the good organizations are social service centered, they 
have either good quality or the intention to serve with good quality. In addition, they either 
have no competition orientation or attempt to compete by increasing education quality. 
Besides, their founders love for the profession and act ethically. One interviewee explains 
this categorization as follows: 
   “We can say good organizations and bad organizations. I mean the 
organizations those provide good service and those provide bad service. I mean 
the organizations functioning ethically, and the ones functioning unethically with 
a concern for through whichever ways they can make money. The organizations 
with commercial aim and the social service centered ones…” 
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 As stated earlier, in addition to intent, SERCs also vary in size, resources and 
managerial capabilities (Table 7). Therefore, the quality of education varies among the good 
organizations; some providing very high quality, even creating and transferring new 
knowledge, while others serve with high to moderate quality. However, the quality of 
education in good organizations is always higher than the ‘bad’ organizations whose reason 
of being is maximizing their profits. One may argue that, profits may also come through 
charging high prices for high quality service, and that at least some of the profit-seeking 
enterprises would focus on quality for this reason. This is totally true, and to define clearly, 
I should note that the enterprises seeking profits through high quality are still considered 
among the good organizations as long as they act ethically (I create sub-groups of the good 
organizations based on their will-for-profit in the next chapter).  
 I should also note that, making high profits while serving with high quality is 
considered an unlikely scenario by the actors in the field, given the high cost of education, 
the decline in the state payments and the low willingness or ability of the families to pay high 
prices for higher quality or extra services. Yet, the wealthiest people are stated to hire teachers 
for private lessons in their homes or in the offices of some therapists, and also send their 
children to a few expensive sports complexes designed for the disabled individuals. While 
the room for profits might be higher in those businesses, they are a different organizational 
form and are not included in the sample. Also not included in the sample are health centers 
offering physiotherapy, a service also provided by many special education and rehabilitation 
centers. State makes much higher payments to the health centers for the same physiotherapy 
services, a situation mentioned as unfair by many interviewees. Again, the room for profits 
may be higher in the health centers; however, they are a different organizational form with 
one common service with the SERCs, and are excluded from this study. 
 
Table 7 Common and varying characteristics of ‘good’ enterprises 
Common Characteristics Varying characteristics 
Ethical 
Loving the profession 
Knowledgeable founders 
Social service centered 
Moderate to good quality 
Size 
Managerial capabilities 
Competition orientation 
Level of seeking profits 
Level of knowledge creation 
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4.1.1.2 The “bad” enterprises  
 Marketization not only increased the number of organizations in the field, but also 
introduced a group of ‘bad’ actors to the scene, which I label as ‘profit-maximizers’ 
representing their reason of being. While contrasting with the ‘good’ organizations in main 
motivation, they also differ in other several characteristics. The founders of the profit-
maximizers usually had backgrounds in other various businesses; therefore, lacked 
knowledge on special education, as one participant explains:  
   “A grocer or baker can open (a SERC) as well. But the aim of opening... If there 
is no professional management leading, unfortunately the service provided 
remains limited with the money. If you ask whether everyone coming from within 
the field is successful, no. Because there is also personality involved, the 
personality characteristics. You may be coming from the field, but your mind 
may be merchant. However, this ratio is much lower at the people coming from 
the field.  The main point here is; the people entering this field from other fields 
should not just approach like “hmm, this is a business with the state, this should 
be a good business.”  They should first learn about this business. They should 
consider their qualifications; what is needed, is it feasible, what are the 
difficulties, what personnel is necessary, how they can be successful... They 
should evaluate those, and question whether they can provide this service and 
later join this field.” 
 
 Not being tied to the field by heart nor by profession, the profit maximizers tended to 
“see the disabled people as commodity to be bought and sold” as one interviewee describes. 
A striking example to this commodification was a story told by a manager of a SERC (an 
expert from outside of the sample). He explained that some SERCs intentionally do not make 
a physically disabled kid walk; because if s/he walks, the disabled report will not be renewed 
meaning they will lose a customer. He mentioned the case of his current boss who used to 
work as a specialist at another SERC and resigned to found his own center following a quarrel 
with his employer. The issue was that, he wished to give proper education to a child whose 
situation was promising to walk, but his employer opposed this saying “will you pay instead 
of him when he leaves here?” Another interviewee explains this commodification by these 
words: 
   “I think they do not see (the disabled people) as part of the society and as a 
community that should receive the education they deserve. I mean, they think like 
this: “state pays for this and I will open this center. I can get this money by 
invoicing the state, no matter the quality of education I provide. Because it is not 
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worth serving good. How much can (the disabled) change?” The people investing 
in the sector are not people who give their hearts to this task. This is what I think. 
They don’t see (the disabled) as individuals.” 
 
Table 8 – Characteristics and acts of profit-maximizers 
Main Characteristics Competitive Acts 
 
 
 Founders:  
 Unrelated to the field 
 Lacking knowledge 
 Many of them unethical 
 Some engaged in corruption 
 
 Motive: 
 Not caring about impact 
 Seeing disabled people as commodity 
 
 Quality 
 Not investing in quality 
 Not competing on quality 
 Non-qualified employees 
 Excessive student per teacher 
 Not proctoring the employees 
    
     Fierce sales & marketing: 
     Free school bus 
 Offering different activities 
 Emphasizing additional therapies 
 Doing families' legal duties 
 Tea & cookies to families 
 Employing sales people 
 
Unethical sales practices: 
 Bribing families 
 Making deals with doctors 
 Lying to the families 
 Offering more hours (with no quality) 
 Salesforce waiting at hospitals & schools 
  
Unethical cost reduction: 
 Merging classes to reduce cost 
 Heavy cases not accepted 
 Paying less employee tax 
 
Unethical attacks to competitors: 
 Approaching to students of other SERCs 
 Causing legal trouble for competitors 
 Not deleting records to prevent transfers 
 Transferring teachers for their students 
 
Corruption: 
 Bribing officers 
 Fake disabled reports 
 Officials as hidden partners 
 Invoicing without providing service 
 
 The profit maximizers have high competition orientation. However, they do not chose 
to compete with quality. They hire unqualified employees and do not invest in training their 
employees. They also do not function in a well-structured way by assigning teachers for each 
student, but in a haphazard way in which the available teacher lectures the next child in line. 
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Moreover, they are characterized by excessive student per teacher ratio (either staying within 
the limits of the MoE, or even faking the system by hiring diplomas of retired specialists but 
employing high school graduates to teach the classes), and they do not proctor the education 
the teachers provide. Many among these actors are stated to engage in unethical conduct and 
corruption, as well as the existence of a group of SERCs solely operating through corruption.
 Table 8 summarizes the main characteristics and acts of profit-maximizers. There 
emerged 5 categories of competitive acts, ranging from sales and marketing strategies those 
are ethical yet unconventional to the field to pure acts of corruption. Between the two ends 
of the continuum lie the unethical acts regarding sales, ways of cost reduction and attacks to 
the competitors. The titles in Table 8 represent the emergent categories for competitive acts 
and the items listed below are the associated code names in the data analysis. In what follows, 
I elaborate on those dimensions providing explanations as well as quotations from the 
transcripts. 
4.1.1.2.1 Fierce sales & marketing 
 Profit-maximizers had several sales and marketing activities most of which were 
historically unusual to the field. They employed personnel specifically for sales and 
marketing purposes. Those people, named as “public relations”, engaged in proactive sales 
behaviors ranging from ethical acts for increasing visibility to quite unethical conduct such 
as bribing officers. They were so proactive to knock the doors of the families of the disabled 
individuals for whom they have the information. As the disabled people are usually unable 
to assess the education quality and communicate it to their families, those centers focused on 
“selling the package,” as well as pleasing the families by serving snacks, cookies, tea and 
coffee in the waiting room. 
 The marketed ‘package’ included an emphasis on the social activities performed 
outside of the classroom such as trips and picnics with families. While similar activities 
were also done by the good organizations as long as their budgets permitted, they were not 
emphasized over the education nor marketed. Moreover, the profit-maximizers promoted 
some complementary therapies with unproven or slight effects, such as putting the children 
in oxygen pressure rooms, as promising new solutions. This way, they not only registered 
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their children to their centers but also charged the families high additional amounts for 
those therapies. One participant, herself a mother of a disabled person, criticizes the 
phenomenon as follows: 
   “There emerge new therapies with music, with animals such as horses and 
dolphins. These are not the cure for autism. Let me state like this: You have a kid 
and you want him/her to be raised well. You make him/her receive a good 
education, also on the hand you send him/her to violin or piano lessons for 
developing a gusto, a feeling of art..... Those have such an impact on autism. Of 
course, they have positive effects, but they are not a form of education. The right 
kind of education is through the individual and condensed special education. 
Others (such therapies) are entirely for increasing socialization. However, people 
request enormous amounts of money (for them), that is a different sector (in 
itself). And families see them as source of hope...” 
 
 The marketed “package” also included free school bus, which was quite an appealing 
service for the families, as they would not have to take their kids themselves. However, this 
also meant that as the families did not accompany their kids, they would not get feedback 
from the teachers on the things they should practice at home with their children. In addition, 
rather than providing the necessary education, those centers tended to cover in class what the 
families wanted, just to please them. For example, families would wish their kids to learn 
reading and writing, or to learn math, when the level of the kid was in fact not appropriate 
for those. And trying to teach the topics the children were not able to comprehend resulted in 
not covering the convenient topics.  
 Another appealing service the profit-maximizers offered to the families was following 
up their tasks for taking disabled reports or for renewing the reports and individualized 
education plans. As the parents had to be present in the visits, the employees of the SERCs 
took them from their homes and carried to the hospitals and GRCs. They also followed the 
whole process, which is at times complicated and tiring, families and children being 
transferred to different doctors and hospitals. The process was, however, shorter and easier 
if the employees of the SERC bribed the officials, as will be mentioned next. 
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4.1.1.2.2 Unethical sales practices 
 The ‘bad’ organizations frequently bribed the officials at the hospitals, gaining an 
unfair advantage over the SERCs who did not. While the disabled reports of the students 
from other centers could delay several months due to the inadequate services and inefficient 
operating of the public organizations, the reports of their students did not delay. Many profit-
maximizers also made deals with the doctors and GRC officers, wanting them to direct the 
students to their centers by providing interests. Furthermore, the sales people waited at the 
hospitals and GRCs to pick the families who just got the reports themselves and took them 
to their centers.  
 These sales people also wondered around at Muhtars’ offices, leaving brochures and 
asking for information. With lists of the disabled people at hand, that they acquired either 
from the Muhtars, from the bus drivers of other centers, or the employees they just 
transferred, they paid visits to the homes of those potential customers. In those visits, they 
tended to exaggerate their qualifications as well as offering more hours of education for the 
amount that state pays. However, as the quality of education they provide was low or non-
existent, more hours of education would mean more hours of no education. 
 The most striking unethical act was bribing the families through various ways, or 
making promises for providing them some interests, which they at times did not keep. They 
paid the electricity bills, offered aid packages, promised taking them to vacation, and even 
directly paid to the family part of the payment the state made. In one expert interview, I was 
told about a man living in the neighborhood. He had 3 disabled kids and left work after 
starting to get half of the payment for each kid from a SERC. In many instances, the kids did 
not even attend any classes, but the family handed in the disabled report and the GRC report, 
which were usually taken with the directing of the SERC itself. These acts were frequently 
mentioned by the interviewees in all cases with a disappointment and anger to the situation, 
with expressions like: 
   “%90 (of the SERCs) buy the kids from the families. The families are poor. 
They tell the families “Register your child to our center, you do not need to send 
him/her, do not bother, we will give you 200 TL each month.” The families are 
poor and illiterate. They think like “what will happen if I send this (the child) to 
education? Will he be a man? I better send the other one (non-disabled child) to 
school and s/he will take care of this one.”” 
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   “There are organizations paying visits door by door and making false promises. 
There are approximately 10 organizations in each district. Two of them work 
ethically. The other eight organizations steal each other’s students. They make 
promises such as giving them coal. They later do not keep the promises either.” 
4.1.1.2.3 Unethical cost reduction 
 In order to reduce their costs so as to maximize their profits, the bad organizations paid 
less employee tax by declaring the wages of the employees lower in official documents. In 
addition, they did not accept the heavily disabled people as they were costlier to serve (e.g., 
hard to transport) and as other families sometimes hesitated to send their kids when they saw 
the heavily disabled children in a center. Furthermore, as the profit opportunity declined with 
decreasing state payments, they increasingly started merging the classes those were supposed 
to be on different days, in order to decrease the cost of school bus. As the capacity of the 
disabled kids are limited, and as they need to practice at home and digest what they learnt 
that day, merging the classes meant decreasing the effectiveness of the education.  
4.1.1.2.4 Unethical attacks to competitors 
 The fourth category of competitive acts emerging from the data is unethical attacks to 
the competitors. The profit maximizers transferred the teachers from other SERCs, 
bargaining with them on the number of students they could bring with them. They also 
directly approached the students of other centers, whenever they found information about 
them. While doing this, they tended to tell lies about the center the kid was attending as well 
as giving false information and unrealistic hopes to the families regarding the potential 
development of the kid, relentless of the actual level of development his/her disability may 
permit. They not only transferred students of other SERCs through such lies and false hopes, 
but also urged the families to make a call to the MoE for the inspection of their case. Having 
such an inspection meant that the time and energy of that competitor would be spent on this 
instance as well as a lowered reputation. Some organizations in my sample had also suffered 
from such inspections upon false claims. While they were found “clean” at the end, they had 
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lost months of energy and suffered the associated stress. An interviewee explains this 
experience as: 
   “The father came and said “you cheated me. I learnt that my kid should have 
walked but you did not make him walk.” We said “Your kid is spida bifina. He 
is a very heavy case. He came to us at a very bad condition, now he cannot walk 
but can use some muscles. We have the camera records; you can watch all of 
them.” But he said that he would make a complaint. Why? The other SERC told 
him to do so. The aim is to discredit us, to hurt us, to make us deal with it. Later 
my teachers called him and he said he would complain if we don’t make him a 
payment…... He then filed a paper to the inspection committee. He would not 
know how to do this under normal circumstances. An organization arranges this; 
they write the paper and take him there…”  
 
 In addition, when the families wanted to transfer their kids to another SERC, some 
unethical SERCs did not delete their record from the electronic system of the MoE. 
Therefore, the child could not be officially registered to another SERC. 
4.1.1.2.5 Corruption 
 Many profit-maximizers are stated to engage in some form of corruption at varying 
levels, once they had the opportunity. In addition, participants (as well as the news in press, 
and the reports of MoE) explain that some SERCs were found only for corruption purposes, 
the center not even functioning in reality. Those centers were widespread especially in the 
East of Turkey, where the socioeconomic situation of the families were low, and there were 
less inspections. There were also several instances when the SERC owners, doctors and the 
officers formed criminal organizations which prepared fake disabled reports and invoiced the 
state, as well as registering an individual to multiple SERCs in different cities. 
 While such totally corrupt organizations were common in the East, later decreasing to 
some extent after the news in media and the increasing inspections, other forms of corruption 
also existed in the West of Turkey, particularly at the rural areas. These included fake disable 
reports, bribing officials and/or having them as hidden partners to SERCs, and invoicing the 
state without providing any service. The sales personnel sought disabled kids in the poor 
districts, where they were more likely to find poor and uneducated families they could bribe. 
They took their children to the hospital to get disabled reports, together with other kids “who 
were not disabled but looked like a bit mentally retarded due to being raised in an illiterate 
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family without proper attention” as defined by an interviewee. Those newly identified 
disabled children, however, did not receive proper education, but were “bought and sold” to 
make the families and SERCs earn money. 
4.1.2 Changes in Beneficiaries  
 The analysis revealed interesting mechanisms operating at multiple levels. 
Marketization did not only change the composition of organizations and the intensity and 
nature of competition in the field. These developments had further effects on the 
characteristics and attitudes of the beneficiaries and the employees, which had both direct 
effects on the social value created (e.g., through the quality of education the teachers were 
willing to provide) as well as indirect effects through various pressures on social enterprises. 
 There emerged 6 categories of changes regarding the beneficiaries; inclusiveness, 
mobility, family profile, their morality, their dependence on social enterprises and attitudes 
towards them (See Table 9). While the disabled people are the ones who receive the special 
education and rehabilitation services, most emergent categories pertain to the changes in 
characteristics and attitudes of their families. This is simply because the families make the 
decision as their children are mentally disabled, or both mentally and physically disabled. In 
cases when the individual is only physically disabled, the decision-maker is still the family, 
as their children are not adults. In addition, while the children receive the education and the 
parents only get psychological support services provided at differing levels by particular 
centers, the parents are still considered among the main beneficiaries. This is due to the fact 
that, as their children develop better social and personal skills, the burden on the family 
regarding the intensity of necessary care decreases. For example, when their children can 
walk, they do not have to use a wheel-chair anymore, or when the children develop the 
abilities to eat on their own, or make-up their beds, the necessary care level of the family 
declines. Similarly, as their children learn to wait or not to scream, the families can attend 
social events with their children, thus themselves can socialize more. 
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Table 9 – Characteristics and attitudes of beneficiaries 
  Before Marketization After Marketization 
Inclusiveness 
Limited number of 
beneficiaries 
      Enlarged pool of beneficiaries 
Family Profile Conscious families 
Less conscious: 
Less attentive to their kids 
Lacking knowledge 
Not willing to learn 
Believing in the "package" 
Family Morality Ethical 
Less ethical: 
Seeking interest through their kids 
Requesting bribe from SERCs 
Not using state's payment for the kid 
Mobility Low mobility 
Increased mobility: 
Having more alternatives 
Seeking hope at different orgs 
Seeking hope in new therapies 
Transferred with the teachers 
Dependence 
Dependent to social 
enterprises 
Decreased dependence to SEs: 
Having more alternatives 
Having free alternatives 
Attitude 
towards SEs 
Appreciating the SEs 
Willing to volunteer 
Willing to pay if they can 
afford 
Less willing to contribute: 
Less appreciating the SEs 
Seeing as public service 
Less willing to volunteer 
Less willing to pay/donate 
4.1.2.1 Inclusiveness  
 As the new entrants fiercely sought more customers for increasing their revenues, they 
attempted at both transferring students attending other SERCs and identifying new disabled 
kids who did not initially have disabled reports. Through those acts, the profit-maximizers 
served to increase the inclusiveness of the education services provided to the disabled people, 
however offering low quality education or sometimes no education at all. On the other hand, 
many interviewees noted the positive side of this situation stating that “at least the disabled 
kids started to go out of their homes for some hours of the week.” In addition, as more people 
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learnt what special education is and that the state paid for it, there was a catalyzer effect; they 
told their friends and relatives, so that the inclusiveness increased further.   
4.1.2.2 Changing family profile  
 As the number of beneficiaries increased, their composition did not remain unchanged. 
Before marketization, the disabled people benefiting from the services were the children of 
conscious families, who had taken their children to doctors for diagnosis and also learnt about 
the special education opportunity that was little known in the society. Although the social 
enterprises were applying fees according to the parents’ income and were providing 
scholarships for the children of poor families then, the beneficiaries before marketization also 
had higher income on average due to following reasons. The profit-maximizers entering the 
field saw a larger potential for new customers at the suburbs where the socioeconomic 
situation of the parents were lower. Lower income and education level signaled that, there 
potentially existed more unconscious parents in those regions whose children’s disability 
were not yet diagnosed. Those families were also less likely to question the quality of 
education than the conscious families would do, meaning that it was easier to market the 
‘package’ to those families. In addition, the children of the poor families were easier to “buy” 
with direct payments or help packages. The new group of less conscious and less attentive 
families, on the other hand, were not willing to increase their knowledge, a topic which will 
be discussed later as a factor demotivating the social enterprises to organize family trainings 
after marketization. 
 It is beyond the aims of this research to question whether the previously conscious 
families also became less attentive to their kids as the profit-maximizers started to follow up 
their tasks at the hospitals and carried the children with school buses as part of their sales 
strategy, or whether they also accepted bribes from those centers. Some interviewees made 
statements such as “they (profit-maximizers) made families get used to bribes.” However, 
these statements were not necessarily pointing at changes within particular individuals, but 
were related to the current situation of beneficiaries compared to the period before 
marketization. Therefore, while it may be another interesting facet of the phenomenon, I 
cannot claim that the behaviors of particular individuals also changed, as my analysis is not 
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adequate for such a conclusion. However, I state that the changes in the socioeconomic 
composition of the beneficiaries and the associated attitudes in the field were among the 
mechanisms effecting the social value created.  
4.1.2.3 Changing morality level of families  
 Accompanying the change in the consciousness level of the parents was the change in 
their average morality level. The participants explain the rise of a large group of parents who 
were seeking interest through their disabled children. 
   “There are families who see their disabled children as a source of income, 
because the state pays for home-care and education. These payments are efforts 
to help the families. (But) the families get those and do not look for jobs; they 
pay their rent from this money and spend livelihood expenses from this money. 
They say “Oh, I have a disabled child, I am comfy.” Some parents have 4 disabled 
children and the 5th is on the way...... They see it as an insurance. Through their 
kid, they are valued as they were never valued before. Because, again due to the 
competition, the centers offer them money, they value them highly, they behave 
extremely well, they take them around. Families have their personal tasks done 
by those centers.” 
 
 While the practice in the field regarding the families getting benefits for registering 
their children to particular SERCs was initiated by the profit-maximizers, some families later 
perpetuated this by themselves asking for benefits. Many participants explained that parents 
come to ask them what the organization could provide (direct payment, paying electricity 
bills etc.) if they registered their children. Interestingly, those families not only asked for 
benefits to the centers run by individuals but also approached the centers run by foundations 
in the same way. One manager in a foundation explains this transformation in the pool of 
beneficiaries as follows: 
   “Especially in the East, in the Southeast regions, and in rural areas, abuse is 
very high. And this abuse comes even through the families...... Unfortunately, the 
parents of the disabled are abusing disability. There has been this kind of a 
change. If you asked me years ago, I would not think like this, but today, I can 
say this with confidence.” 
 
 As an extreme example to this decreasing morality, indicating that even rich parents 
may be inclined to abuse their child’ disability, was an occasion experienced by a friend of 
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one interviewee. A man is told to have visited a SERC with his Mercedes and asked what 
they would give him in return for registering his child. I should note at this point that, while 
a group of people abusing their children’s disability rose after marketization, there were still 
some parents who were willing to “sell their jackets and pay large amounts for the alternative 
therapies” those were marketed by some profit-maximizers as promising solutions despite 
their complementary nature. 
4.1.2.4 Increased mobility of beneficiaries  
 As the alternative centers to send their kids increased, many families wanted to try 
different SERCs, with the hope that their children may develop better at another center. 
Participants mentioned that the families of disabled people are much prone to being abused 
with unrealistic hopes, as they want to believe that their child will recover. However, while 
the quality of education is quite important in the development the child shows (in addition to 
the intervention age), there are limits to the level they can go beyond depending on the 
specific kind of disability and its severity. As the profit-maximizers tended to market their 
services with over-claims, many families wanted to try their chances as they were permitted 
by the state to shift between two centers per year. One participant told that some families 
even enjoy the task of transferring the child across centers. Moreover, as new therapies started 
to emerge, parents wanted to try those therapies and transferred their kids to the centers which 
offer those therapies. The records on the developmental histories of these children were, 
however, not transferred with them to their new centers, which caused a loss of information 
reflected to the effectiveness of the education. 
 Another mechanism increasing the mobility of the students was the increased transfers 
of specialists across centers, a topic I will cover in the section on employees. When the 
families liked one teacher, they tended to follow the teacher, thus transferring their children 
to his/her new workplace. In addition, the teachers often made promises to their new 
workplaces to bring several students with them, thus encouraged the family to follow them. 
Similarly, when the employees founded a center for themselves, they phoned and invited the 
families they knew from their previous workplace. 
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4.1.2.5 Decreased dependence to social enterprises  
 As the number of SERCs increased, the families had more alternatives to send their 
children. Moreover, all those alternatives were free as the state was paying to the SERCs. 
The new situation decreased their dependence on the social enterprises for providing 
education to their kids, hence decreasing the level of appropriation. Therefore, their 
willingness to make the centers run by the social enterprises survive declined, as explained 
by a founder:  
   “The family is not dependent on us anymore. State already pays an amount, and 
we are not providing them a service above that amount. They can bring (the child) 
to us or take to Ayşe’s center. They can take anywhere. There is no problem left 
to the family. We (families of disabled people) were formerly dependent on the 
few centers. Families may support the center for that reason. Now, they don’t 
need to.” 
4.1.2.6 Changing attitudes towards social enterprises  
 Following the decline in their dependence to the social enterprises, the level of 
appreciation the families showed to the social enterprises also decreased. Being less 
appreciated both affects the motivation of the social entrepreneurs as well as indicating a 
decline in the support the families provide. Families increasingly refused providing financial 
support or volunteering for the organization’s activities such as selling concert tickets to 
generate income. Moreover, participants indicate that, families started to see the service as a 
public service because the state was paying to the SERCs. Even in the social enterprises those 
either provided the beneficiaries a good education costing more than what the state pays, or 
extra hours of education for free as well as several complementary services and social 
activities, the beneficiaries did not want to understand their financial needs anymore. One 
foundation manager summarized the attitude of the beneficiaries as follows: 
   “They see us as a commercial organization. They in fact know that we are 
volunteers, but this is far beyond among their priorities. They say “you get a lot 
of money; the state gives you. Why do you want (support) from me? You will 
provide this service!” There are people who are angry with us. The way people 
look (at us) changed. We tell them that we need volunteer mothers and invite 
them to help us. They say “the state is paying you, what do you want from me?” 
They say “I cannot sell tickets.” Because what they think behind is this: “they 
take money from the state, why do they still sell tickets?” The reason we sell 
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tickets is because we receive payment for 12 hours from the state; however, we 
provide education for 140 hours. How will we finance the remaining 128 hours?” 
 
 Moreover, the willingness of the parents for paying is stated to decrease because they 
see that others are getting the service for free. As explained earlier, the family profile changed 
to include a larger ratio of low-income parents after the marketization, who are naturally less 
able to pay. However, participants state that, compared to the previous situation, the families 
with high income are also less likely to donate or pay for extra hours of education. This is 
both because of their decreased dependence to the few social enterprises but also because 
they see that others (most people benefiting from the services) do not pay, as one interviewee 
mentions: 
   “Because now people got used to (free services). Now the state pays for all. 
Now, the families actually do not want to give a penny from their pockets. I mean, 
neither the people who cannot afford nor the ones who can afford want to pay. In 
the past, the ones who had money used to pay (for the education of the disabled 
child), but not anymore. Because now, someone is paying while the others do 
not; they then said “why would we pay at all”.” 
 
 This decline in the willingness to pay across the high income families is also 
exemplified in instances when some families attempt to show their annual income lower, so 
that the foundation that requests an amount relative to their income (for providing longer 
hours of education on top of what the state pays for the 12 hours per month) will not want to 
make them pay.  
4.1.3 Changes in the Workforce in the Field 
 Another interesting finding is regarding the changes in the workforce in the field of 
education of the disabled. The analysis revealed three main categories of change, which either 
affected the social welfare created in the field directly through the quality of education, or 
indirectly through their effects on the existing socially oriented centers. 
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Table 10 - Characteristics of the workforce 
  Before Marketization After Marketization 
Popularity 
of the job 
Not popular 
Low demand 
Low wages 
The job becoming popular: 
Increased scarcity of specialists 
Increasing wages 
Nature of 
specialists 
Idealist 
Choosing the job full heartedly 
Many enthusiastic first 
graduates from new 
departments 
Decreased idealism: 
Unwilling to put effort 
Unwilling to add more value 
Unwilling to learn more 
Money main concern 
Individuals with improper traits joining 
Mobility Low 
Increased mobility: 
Enlarged pool of employers 
Themselves opening SERCs 
Transfers to state schools 
Transferred to SERCs that pay more 
Unwilling to sign special contracts 
 
4.1.3.1 Popularity of the job  
 Before marketization, being a teacher of disabled was not a ‘popular’ job. There was 
neither high demand to the specialists in the field nor high wages were offered. Preferring a 
quite difficult job with limited employment opportunity and low wage levels, the few 
specialists who had selected related departments in the university had mostly made this 
choice out of their hearts. After marketization, however, the demand for the specialists rose 
sharply with the increasing number of SERCs and the regulatory requirement for them to 
employ specialists. Thus, even if the profit-maximizers did not have concern over the quality 
of education they provided, they needed to employ a number of specialists to be able to offer 
particular classes to the disabled. Given the limited number of specialists in the field, the 
sharply increasing demand created a scarcity of specialist also giving rise to the wages; thus, 
the job became popular and attractive for many individuals. 
   “Firstly, working with disabled people is a special thing. I mean it requires 
some personality traits. As there is scarcity of specialists in Turkey, and as those 
specialists find jobs easily, some university students (candidates) show a high 
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demand for it. I mean they enter the departments with high scores etc. Because, 
there is no problem of unemployment. For that reason, sometimes their 
characteristics do not match (with the job). When I entered this field years ago, 
the people with more compatible characteristics used to prefer it.  Because it was 
not a field with much job opportunity. It was not a highly known field. I mean 
the job opportunities were not that developed. But now, your diploma is “selling 
out quickly,” unconditionally. That is the case.” 
4.1.3.2 Nature of specialists  
 As the wages in the market rose sharply along with the enormous demand from the 
newly opening centers, this newly popular job was preferred by individuals seeking a 
guaranteed job with high income. This situation, in turn, caused a “decreased idealism” in 
the workforce in the field, which is characterized by employees who are mainly motivated 
for earning money, unwilling to put effort or add more value as well as unwilling to develop 
themselves in their profession.  
   “The ideals were different. They were more ambitious, they had more 
willingness to develop themselves. But now, perhaps most of them are entering 
those departments (of universities) by chance and find themselves in the field of 
special education. And now the people (employees) are looking for their 
worktime to finish so that they can go home. Therefore, I think that the quality of 
special education also decreased because of this factor.” 
 
 Says one participants. One occasion I experienced during a class observation was also 
indicative to this. The mobile phone of the teacher rang and she left the classroom telling me 
to continue playing with the child. This was quite an irresponsible act, as the child was autistic 
and I did not have the knowledge to cool him down nor teach him properly. I eventually had 
hard time as the child wanted to go away. And after persuading him to sit down and play, I 
made a wrong thing, as I later figured out. The real aim of that play was teaching him to wait 
and that kid’s mental ability was in fact superior. Unaware of those, I had been so happy to 
see him finding pieces quickly and kept clapping rather than wanting him to wait his turn.  
 This instance clearly showed the vulnerability of special education and the importance 
of the knowledge and attention of teachers, which is stated to decline after marketization. In 
addition, contrasting with the before-marketization period, the personality traits of the new 
kinds of employees were not compatible with the job requirements such as being passionate 
and having high others-regarding values. As a consequence, the teachers are said to be 
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inclined to abuse being one-to-one with a disabled child in a room, playing with their phones 
instead of giving education, or at some extreme cases hitting the students. One participant 
acknowledges this as follows:  
   “I lost my trust in the people here. I mean, through my business administrator 
lens, teachers are quite valuable people. But the valuable ones are quite few now. 
(They are) passing to another classroom during their class hours to play with their 
phones, gossiping with each other... I mean, I think they are doing acts which do 
not suit their identity. I also tell this to their face. We generally try to pick (the 
good ones), but I think that too little of the teacher identity is left (in the field)”   
 
 Under these circumstances, proctoring the employees was quite an important task. 
While the profit-maximizers did not have a concern for proctoring their employees, it was 
becoming more difficult for the social enterprises with a high concern for quality, given the 
fragile dynamics. During a lunch I had with the employees, some of them were complaining 
among themselves that a manager was watching from the glass window and that they were 
irritated. As the scarcity of specialists increased in the field, it also became a critical task to 
retain them. The need for pleasing the employees, on the other hand, usually limits the 
amount of feedback they can be given: 
   “There is nothing as being like a boss in our organizations. You just survive as 
long as you keep the dialogs good. Because the teachers can start working in 
another center as they step out of here. Because there is a high search for them. 
Therefore, you cannot bother anyone. Even if the parents come to us and tell that 
they are not content with a teacher, you cannot easily say anything to the teacher.” 
 
 I should also note here that, although there are little glass windows on the doors and 
cameras in some centers, I realized during my observations that the parents sit in a waiting 
room (if they go to the center with their children at all), rather than standing by the window 
to monitor the class. As the windows are small, inside of the classroom cannot be seen from 
where they sit. In addition, even in the social enterprises I made observations, the screens of 
the cameras were located inside the managers’ rooms, when they had a camera system. Only 
in one center, there were screens visible to the parents in a separate waiting room in each flat. 
The parents, however, preferred siting with other parents at the main entrance downstairs.  
 I was not able to make observations in the profit-maximizers, as they reacted badly 
even when I visited some of them by picking random SERCs to make pilots for the employee 
interviews. But the inconvenience of the settings for the families to proctor the classes even 
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in the social enterprises indicates that families cannot assess what is happening in class in the 
profit-maximizers unless they detect that their child does not show any development in the 
long term- if they are conscious and attentive to their kids at all. 
4.1.3.3 Mobility of employees  
 Another important change in the field arising with marketization was the increased 
mobility of teachers. As the pool of employers enlarged with too many centers opening 
continuously, those centers needed employees and made offers to the employees of other 
centers. They typically paid higher wages for transferring them, particularly to some 
specialists who were necessary to be able to legally operate a center. One direct implication 
of this situation was that, when their teachers changed frequently, the development of the 
children retarded as the new teacher needed to learn about the child and the child needed to 
get used to him/her. On the other hand, the incumbent organizations fell short of employees, 
explained by an interviewee as: 
   “The teachers started to shift to the center whoever pays more. I mean you start 
with a teacher, you work with him/her for three months, then 3 months later the 
other center pays more and the teacher can leave here and go there. S/he does not 
care, there is no thinking like “I have responsibility here.” There has been such a 
reflection.” 
 
 In addition, many specialists quit their jobs in the centers they work to start their own 
center. In some cases, a group of specialists working in a particular center came together to 
open a new SERC, thus leaving their previous workplace in a very difficult situation. The 
organization then had to find several new employees in a very tight market as well as having 
to find new students in the place of the ones who left with their teachers. While some 
organizations sought to sign special contracts with the employees in order to guarantee that 
they will not leave soon, this was not possible as the employees did not accept it given their 
high power and low dependency to particular employers. 
96 
 
4.1.4 Macro Level Effects  
 The impacts of marketization on field dynamics were moderated by a number of 
factors; mainly, the weak institutional infrastructure, state’s deterrence policy, and its poor 
mentality on social enterprises.  
4.1.4.1 The weak institutional infrastructure  
 First of all, the participants explain that the infrastructure was not ready when the state 
issued the law which paved the way for marketization of the sector; thus, the following years 
saw plenty of new arrangements to fix the deficiencies. This situation was also evident from 
the high number of new regulations I faced when collecting data on the field. The lack of a 
solid infrastructure opened the room for more corruption and unethical behaviors. For 
example, the electronic system used to let registering the same disabled individual to centers 
in different cities at the same time, which was to be fixed years later. Several new 
amendments e.g., on the physical characteristics of the space, the kinds of lessons particular 
teachers can teach or on the reporting and documenting system are stated to create both 
ambiguous situations and required allocating time and financial resources to comply with 
them. The ambiguity was fostered as the authorities at the Ministry of Education were less 
knowledgeable on disability compared to ones in the Social Services, which previously 
regulated the sector. 
 The weak institutional structure also surfaced as the continuous scarcity of specialists 
and ineffective inspections. While there were very limited number of specialists in the field, 
the few universities who had those departments did not increase their capacities nor the 
Higher Education Council directed other universities to open those departments. The state 
time to time organized some training programs for a limited number of participants and 
entitled their graduates as certified teachers. However, while having the legal permission to 
teach as specialists for particular classes, those certified teachers did not have the background 
and knowledge of the specialists. In addition, the state schools vastly lacked the teachers for 
the disabled people as well, and as the state opened employed new teachers, the scarcity of 
teachers also increased because of employee transfers to the state. 
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 Least but not the least, the weak institutional infrastructure did not permit a healthy 
inspection system. Due to the scarcity of related personnel at the MoE, the inspectors 
assigned to the task were not knowledgeable on special education and rehabilitation. The 
evaluation scheme on the other hand, was based on the very details of the physical setting 
and existence of some materials or documents. All participants mentioned the ineffectiveness 
of the inspections such that it did not tap on the quality of the education provided, such as; 
   “I always said this to the inspectors. I am not afraid of control. Control is always 
a mechanism enabling my development. But do this control well. I mean, instead 
of writing down the absence of one pencil in my physical setting, inspect the 
quality of education.”  
4.1.4.2 State’s “deterrence policy”  
 Another emergent effect was the state’s “deterrence policy” as named by several 
interviewees. This included increasing red-tape, irrational new inspections, delaying 
payments, making unfair cuts, and decreases in the hourly payments, which is evident from 
the comparison of hourly payments across years with the inflation rate. Below quotations 
summarize their main concerns:  
   “As I said, there were funds provided to Turkey (on this topic). At those times, 
they (the state) used to pay well. But when those funds finished, they started to 
do whatever they can for not paying. The inspectors come, they search, they find 
an open point, and they fine... A new thing each day, as to make it more difficult. 
I say this; when they put their heads to the pillow at nights, they think of what to 
do for not paying. Next day, they wake up and find something.” 
 
   “At the beginning, people earned a lot of money. The payments were high and 
inspections were low. As the people who jumped into this business seeing the 
high return started to abuse it, and when the abuse increased, the state started to 
show more sensitivity. But when showing this, the organizations like us, which 
would do this business in reality, were harmed.” 
 
   “The centers in the East used to make double records for some students. Now, 
this is not possible. There was no (control) system; they could show the same 
identity number at two places. We lost trust (after those). State continuously bears 
down on us. We are very bad organizations from the perspective of the state, as 
organizations only earning money without doing much thing. However, we put 
our day and night’s work here.” 
 
98 
 
   “You are like a Palestinian firm trying to do business in Israel. How much work 
could you do? How much trust would you have? How much room for movement 
would you have? They would always look at you as if you are terrorist. Similarly, 
they (state) always see us as devious.” 
4.1.4.3 Institutions not supporting social enterprises  
 The organizations in the sample express the lack of support from the state and posit 
that “it lumps the organizations which try to work correctly together with others.” Firstly, 
there is no tax exemption for the social enterprises neither in for-profit nor non-profit legal 
forms, which is mentioned with reproach: 
   “The state should have provided support. At least, they should research who 
did what, who is doing what. At least they should have supported those (doing 
good jobs). I don’t have any difference from the man who buys for 1 (TL) and 
sells to 5 (TL). He is a commercial enterprise and so I am. There is no discount 
in my electricity, water, gas. The same for me and for the man who buys for 1 
and sells for 5.” 
 
   “When they have visitors from abroad, all the state organizations bring them to 
us. But they still do not see us as a school. They see us as private. We could not 
make them accept this: we are a foundation, at least do not get value added tax 
from us.”  
 
 Most of the time, managers at the municipalities or officials of the provincial districts 
want to charge an amount to provide space for the musical or dance shows of the disabled 
people organized by the social enterprises. This is both the case for the privately owned social 
enterprises and the ones operated by foundations and associations. One foundation manager 
explains that the officials tell them “You are a private enterprise as well. You also receive 
payments. Why would I give you (for free)? It will be unfair competition then.” 
 In addition, as is also the common case across the world, social enterprises with a for-
profit legal status have difficulty in raising funds. They cannot apply to the grants because 
they are not a foundation or association. On the other hand, they do not usually qualify with 
the requirements of the funds for the private enterprises, as explained by an interviewee: 
   “They say, “You are an SME.” I say, “Yes I am an SME.” There is no such 
thing (funds) for the service sector. You should produce something, you should 
own a factory, you should develop something (product). This is the perception. 
There is no fund for the service sector. I go apply to the World Bank or European 
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Union funds. No! They say “you are not an association.” Do I have to be a 
foundation or association?” 
 
 The regulations, on the other hand, rely on the assumption that all organizations in the 
field are potential cheaters, and they restrict the discretion of the social enterprises along with 
others. The current regulation states that, the special education and rehabilitation centers 
cannot use any room for any other purpose within the same facility. Therefore, if the social 
enterprises do not have any other facility adjacent to the center or in another location, they 
have to cancel those services. For example, one of the participant organizations had to open 
a separate family consultancy center by making several physical, personnel and internal 
regulatory arrangements to be able to offer paid therapy services to families. 
 Moreover, the state makes payments only for the specific classes stated in the GRC 
reports. However, participants declare that, the schedule formed at the GRCs may often be 
mistaken as they evaluate the child in only 45 minutes, which is quite a limited time for 
making a good judgement. Moreover, the disabled children tend to behave differently 
“according to their mood that day, the weather conditions, the approach of the 
correspondent...etc.” as one specialist explains. 
 As the social enterprises want to provide the right education, many of them have their 
own evaluation processes for the disabled children. While trying to provide the necessary 
education in practice, on paper, they need to comply with the GRC report. This decoupling 
creates two kinds of difficulties. First, they have hard time “fitting it to the official” in the 
electronic reporting system as they need to allocate different kinds of specialists according 
to the content the GRC reports which differ from the practice. Second, what they do for 
enabling the right education is considered as unconformity by the inspectors. Moreover, 
when the student cannot come to the center due to reasons such as illness, they provide 
compensation hours at another time. This application is again considered as nonconformity 
in the inspections. All those arrangements require additional labor and create costs as well as 
the stress and risk they add. The profit-maximizers, on the other hand, do not have these 
burdens given their low concern for quality of education. 
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4.1.4.4 Other macro level changes  
 In addition, a few participants mentioned the general degeneration of the society as 
macro level changes. Moreover, some participants appointed to the worsening economic 
situation of the country and its potential effect on the parents’ ability to pay for superior 
quality or extra services. While those factors may have accompanied the changes in the field, 
they do not reveal as plausible alternative explanations. This is because the same participants 
also clearly mentioned the mechanisms I explained in related sections as effects of the 
marketization process, thus the effects also exist separately. Nevertheless, the socio economic 
situation of the beneficiaries (which captures the differing income levels) is already included 
in the whole framework, as it emerged from the data as a moderator for the acts of the parents, 
e.g. poor and illiterate parents compared to others. Therefore, this effect is included in the 
framework and shown separately from the main mechanism as a moderator.  
4.1.5 Degeneration of the Field  
 The most easily visible effect of marketization was the sharp increase in the number of 
organizations in the field. This increase was mainly caused by the new entrants from 
unrelated areas who were seeking to maximize profits. In addition to their motives and 
knowledge levels, the actions of those actors also differed from the incumbent enterprises 
and they were mostly regarded as unethical. Moreover, marketization caused several changes 
in the characteristics of the beneficiaries and the pool of employees, which highly contrasted 
with the prior situation. Most of the participants of the study evaluated these transitions by 
referring to degeneration of the field. They usually used this phrase, also sometimes 
describing with more striking expressions such as:  
“Unfortunately, the system broke down.”  
“The field has been polluted, because it turned into trade.” 
   “There is a saying as “The gun was invented and manliness was deteriorated.” 
In Turkey, now there are unfortunately nearly 2000 centers and who is doing 
what is not definite “ 
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   “It sort of turned into cooking pot merchandizing. You know, people used to 
come to your door and sell pots. Then its handle would dislocate and remain in 
your hand. “ 
 
 This degenerated state of the field is mainly characterized by unfair competition, less 
idealistic employees, low quality of services, commodification of beneficiaries, disputes 
among organizations, and low legitimacy of the organizations (See figure 2). Although I 
mentioned some of those results while discussing the changing dynamics, I define them more 
clearly in the following paragraphs.  
4.1.5.1 Unfair competition  
 The entrance of a large number of profit-maximizers to the field brought along a type 
of competition, which was defined by the participants with words such as “ugly,” “bad,” and 
“unfair.”  The new entrants had aggressive sales and marketing strategies which could be 
unethical at many times. In effect, the aim of the competition was registering more number 
of students through whichever ways possible, and no matter the quality of education provided 
to them. 
   “It (marketization) brings a lot of unfair competition. There is competition. At 
the end, the private sector invests in this and they rightfully want to fill in their 
capacity. However, I think the way many rehabilitation centers compete is wrong. 
Competition should be based on quality, based on the service you provide.” 
 
 Under this type of competition, the more unethical organizations had an unfair 
advantage over the others, a fact that further motivates the organizations to focus on those 
acts rather than the quality of services. Added on the unconsciousness of the families, their 
inclination to believe in unrealistic hopes, and the seeking of personal benefits by a group of 
them, the high information asymmetry embedded in this particular kind of service also paves 
the way for an environment favoring the unfair competition. This is because it is hard for 
families to know beforehand the quality of education and requires a long time to access it 
after starting to take the service. In addition, each disabled individual is a unique case, 
limiting the ability of the family to compare their children’s development to those of others. 
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4.1.5.2 Low quality of services  
 All participants state that this kind of competition did not increase the level of quality 
in education, but even decreased the field-wise quality. While not aiming quality in their own 
services, the profit-maximizers also caused a deterioration in the service quality of incumbent 
organizations through their sales and marketing strategies. For example, losing plenty of 
students to other centers, many incumbent organizations had to mimic the practices such as 
free school bus and following up families’ tasks at hospitals. These practices, however, had 
a trade-off: incumbent enterprises allocated their financial and other resources as well as 
more of their attention to those practices for keeping their students rather than being able to 
focus on quality. In addition, the increased mobility of students across centers in the new 
situation served to decrease the effectiveness of the education. 
4.1.5.3 Less idealistic employees  
 As explained earlier, the rising wages and increasing demand for the specialists made 
the job popular; thus, attracted the individuals who were seeking high income to the field. 
The decreased social orientation and the love for the profession among the workforce was 
directly reflected to the quality of education provided. In some cases, the teachers even 
physically abused the disabled students. 
4.1.5.4 Commodification of beneficiaries  
 The profit-maximizers tended to see the disabled individuals as commodity upon which 
they perform their trade operations, rather than a group of people with the right to get proper 
education. Moreover, many parents, particularly the ones with low socio-economic situation, 
also commoditized their children. They not only accepted the benefits offered by the profit-
seeking organizations, but also proactively sought personal benefits through their children. 
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Figure 3 Degeneration of the field 
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4.1.5.6 Disputes across organizations  
 The “dirty” competition included transferring the students from other centers through 
unethical tactics, referred to as “stealing students” by some participants. In addition, the 
profit-maximizers both attacked each other and the social enterprises with unethical acts such 
as lying about them to potential customers and trying to cause legal troubles for the 
competitors. Given those occasions in the field, there emerged high disputes between the 
centers as one participant notes: 
   “The relationships across the organizations deteriorated a lot. For example, we 
used to gather as organizations in Istanbul. After our meeting, the ones with 
urgent tasks would go and the remaining ones would stay to eat and chat together. 
After 2006, it is nearly impossible to bring people together. I mean no one talks 
to each other. They even experienced very bad occasions. Everyone within the 
regions are enemies. They score points by discrediting others.” 
4.1.5.7 Decreased legitimacy  
 As those unethical acts spread in the field, the public image of the special education 
and rehabilitation centers was damaged as well as their status in the eyes of the state officials 
(See an exemplar discussion in a public web forum here; http://goo.gl/7lW4LK ). As the 
corruption scandals were reflected in the media, the legitimacy of SERCs decreased as a form 
of organization. In addition to the increased inspections following those instances, which 
were nevertheless not on the education quality, the respect shown for the SERCs decreased 
sharply.  
   “Before 2006, we were held in much more esteem. After 2006, now everyone 
sees us as thieves. “Over the disabled people’s back...” This is the sentence I 
cannot tolerate most. I mean if they refer to stealing, I am absolutely against it. 
But “earning money over the disabled people’s back...” This is my job! I don’t 
earn money by making disabled people work, right? I am giving education to 
them, and (earning) in return to it. But unfortunately this happened after 2006. 
Let me state it more clearly. While seeing respect from the administrative chief 
in my region before 2006, while I could visit without an appointment, now even 
the servant’s looks to me are different. It is even hard to communicate with the 
servant there.” 
 
 Although the level of corruption decreased following the increased sensitivity of the 
state on the issue and some profit-maximizers left the field after the decline in state payments, 
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the field composition and dynamics never turned back to the before marketization period. A 
decade after marketization, it is still dominated by profit-maximizers who are now operating 
with lower profits. Most participants of the study stated that they only communicate with the 
social enterprises, except the two organizations which are in contact with the others, trying 
to unite the centers within the region and develop some ethical norms. Regaining the 
legitimacy, lack of which effects both the unethical and ethical enterprises, is a difficult task 
given the structure of the field, as declared by an interviewee: 
   “When more than half of the people in the sector come from outside, when some 
identities and personalities from out of the sector rise, there occur difficulties for the 
sector to form a unity and to explain and express itself.” 
4.1.6 The Moderating Role of the Power of Social Enterprises  
 Due to the several pressures exerted by marketization, the group of social enterprises 
lose power in the sector by a decrease in their number, seizing in the number their branches 
or total number of students, limiting the types of their services, as well as experiencing 
decline in their service quality. Their power in the sector, on the other hand, serves as a 
moderator between the initial effects of marketization and the resultant degeneration of the 
field. More specifically, their power in the sector determines the extent to which the field is 
prone to degeneration.  
 This is firstly because of their role in the field on raising well-equipped specialists. 
When they have adequate financial resources, rather than distributing the income to a group 
of shareholders, social enterprises invest in the development of their employees either by 
providing on the job trainings or supporting their participation in the external trainings and 
conferences. In essence, those employees both become more knowledgeable and have higher 
respect and dedication to their job by seeing the right applications.  
   “Many of our specialists left here as their spouses were appointed to other cities. 
Or, even at times when other centers transferred our specialists, I always thought 
like this: they at least took our disciple; them touching another kid there is at least 
something for us.”   
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 In addition to spreading quality through their former employees, social enterprises also 
collaborate with universities for accepting their students as apprentices. Many organizations 
in the sample explained their mission on raising high skilled workforce to the field, one of 
them even accepting about 60 apprentices per year despite its small size.  
 Another role of the social enterprises in the field emerges as increasing the 
consciousness level of the families. While they are preferred by the most conscious families 
who seek the best quality, they have beneficiaries from quite diverse socioeconomic 
situations and levels of consciousness. After attending the seminars organized by the social 
enterprises for themselves and also seeing their best applications in education, the awareness 
of the parents on the importance of proper education and their knowledge on methods of 
education increases. This also has a spillover effect; as they leave that social enterprise for 
some reason, they are less prone to be abused by unrealistic statements and they demand 
better quality in education from other centers. Yet, the existence of influential social 
enterprises in particular regions serve to raise the quality in that region. One interviewee 
clearly explicates this mechanism in these words: 
   “The GRC manager of X district said to me: “We are very content that you are 
located in X district and that you run a SERC. Because you are here, the other 
SERCs in X district are working more ethically and with higher quality. You are 
pushing up the quality of this district.” I think it is because of this: our capacity 
is limited. While we can serve many more students, we prefer staying with a 
limited capacity; because we don’t want to do mass production, we want to serve 
with high quality. Of course, the families in this district have either been our 
beneficiaries or are waiting in the line to be able to come to us. But meanwhile, 
for not losing time, they attend other SERCs in the region. And they (other 
SERCs) automatically raise their quality for not losing them. Because they have 
the concern for losing the them (families) when their turn comes here...... or, there 
are some families going from us, they demand (quality). When the families come 
here, their knowledge level increases, their demands become more specific in 
time. They know what to demand when they go somewhere else, they don’t 
accept what is offered to them. I think this makes a difference in the quality in 
this region.”  
 
 This mechanism, however, becomes less powerful when the social enterprises decrease 
in number in the field, or seize in size, or themselves unintentionally decrease the level of 
quality under the pressures exerted by marketization. As Hirth (1999) posited, the larger 
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market shares of nonprofits in the sector forces for-profits to deliver the promised quality in 
a mixed-market form. Therefore, as the social enterprises weaken in the sector, they do not 
constitute a critical mass to be able to effect the behaviors of others, and the field becomes 
more vulnerable to further degeneration. 
4.2 Pressures on Social Enterprises  
The changing dynamics in the field posed several threats for the survival and 
effectiveness of the incumbent social enterprises. “The old ones, the organizations those 
come from within this field and those have digested and embraced this business, suddenly 
fell into difficulties at the point of unfair competition,” notes one interviewee. The unfair 
competition caused a decline in the number of students of the incumbents, therefore in their 
revenues, as well as increasing their average operating expenses. Besides, the decreased 
legitimacy of the special education and rehabilitation centers in the eyes of the officials and 
the decreased dependency of the beneficiaries on them decreased the in-kind aid and financial 
support the social enterprises could receive. The decreased idealism of the employees, on the 
other hand, was eventually reflected to the quality of education. These effects are discussed 
in detail in the following paragraphs. (See Table 11 for a summary). 
4.2.1.1 Resource constraints  
After the marketization of the sector, social enterprises faced declines in their resources 
as a result of decreasing revenues and donations, rising costs, and the unwillingness of the 
families of disabled to volunteer for their activities. 
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Table 11 Pressures on social enterprises 
Resource 
Constraints 
Decreasing revenues 
Decreasing students 
Beneficiaries less willing to pay/donate 
 
Decreasing support 
Beneficiaries less willing to volunteer 
Authorities less responsive 
 
Increasing costs  
Increasing wages 
Costs of mimicked sales & marketing acts   
Costs of non-mimicking unethical acts 
Time & Labor 
Constraints 
Time lost on false claims 
Time lost on red-tape 
Difficulty in finding & retaining specialists 
Unable to be selective on specialists 
Psychological 
Pressures 
Being less appreciated 
Increased financial concerns 
Burdens of unethical attacks 
4.2.1.1.1 Decreasing revenues  
Due to their ethical nature and their emotional ties rising from being parents of disabled 
individuals or the respect for the profession, the social entrepreneurs did not engage in the 
unethical sales acts performed by the profit-maximizers. As the families were provided 
personal benefits and/or believed in the unrealistic hopes and exaggerated claims of the 
profit-maximizers, many of them tended to choose the new organizations over the incumbent 
social enterprises. Even the conscious families whose children had been receiving education 
from particular organizations and who were content with the services wanted to at least try 
those new centers, seeking hope in what they could offer.  Besides, as the profit-maximizers 
provided benefits to the doctors, the doctors directed the parents to those centers relentless 
of their quality. Moreover, the proactive sales force of the profit-maximizers located at the 
schools and hospitals instantly reached the families and took them to their centers, limiting 
their search for the good enterprises. Even the conscious families willing their children to 
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receive a decent education had an illusion on their service quality being flattered by the 
attention paid by their sales personnel. One participant noted: 
“To whom comes to our door, we explain the issue (education of the disabled) 
and then we accept them. But at the other places with a commercial aim, they 
visit door by door and collect students. There is such a difference.”  
 
In addition to not performing the unethical acts, as will be discussed in detail later, most 
social enterprises lacked the commercial mindset as well as the sales and marketing skills of 
those of the profit-maximizers. In fact, many of them saw the act of proactively seeking 
beneficiaries or engaging in marketing behaviors as unethical or as clashing with their 
identity. They on the other hand, wanted to focus on the quality of education they provided, 
with a will to create higher social impact. Their passivity in marketing combined with the 
unethical acts of the profit-maximizers set them back in the newly raised competition for 
finding students. While many of their old beneficiaries turned back to them after trying a new 
center for a couple of months or years, the number of students of the social enterprises 
continued to decline, as the places of the growing and graduating children were not 
completely filled with new coming students.  
The decline in their number of students brought along the decline in the revenues of the 
social enterprises. This decline was even fostered by their decreased ability to get payments 
from the parents of their students. As discussed earlier, under the new dynamics of the field, 
the parents were less dependent to a few social enterprises, because they had plenty of free 
options. This situation decreased their need and motivation to make them survive. Their 
expectations from the social enterprises; however, did not decline under the new state of the 
field. “As we are a foundation, their expectations are higher from us” says one participant, 
while another participant notes that some families tend to show their income lower so as not 
to pay for additional classes and other services. 
4.2.1.1.2 Decreasing support  
The families’ decreased willingness to support social enterprises not only surfaced as 
unwillingness to pay for extra classes. They also did not donate money nor volunteer to spare 
their time for the activities of the center. “Previously, there was more embracement” says a 
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foundation manager, expressing the decreased engagement of the families. In addition to the 
loss of support from the beneficiaries, social enterprises also started to suffer from the 
decreased responsiveness of the authorities. While they used to be of the few centers working 
for a social aim, after marketization, they belonged to a large group of organizations which 
dominantly sought profits. Thus the authorities were less willing to help them by, for 
example, providing municipality’s busses for their picnics, or rent their concert halls for free. 
At this point, the social enterprises in firm status start with a disadvantage. However, the 
analysis reveals that the authorities could be equally distant to the centers run by the 
foundations, stating they could not favor their center as this would cause unfair competition 
with others. When the SEs could not use those facilities for free, they needed to either pay 
for them, or cancel the social events if they cannot afford paying or cannot find other 
opportunities to perform such events for free. 
4.2.1.1.3 Increasing costs  
The financial pressures exerted on the social enterprises through declining revenues and 
the support of families and officials were augmented by the rises in their costs. 
“For example, while I was paying 2.000 TL, as this was the sector average, 
the centers that cannot find teachers offered 2.500 TL in order to persuade them 
to transfer to their center. Eventually, five to six months later, I also had to 
increase it. This is how it (wage level) increased. It (marketization) gave such 
sort of harms. Then the school bus occurred, because of the competition. There 
was no school bus, everyone could bring their children. In addition, everyone 
could get their GRC reports (for the children). However, we had to do this as 
well. While we used to spend our labor and capital for other things before… I 
mean although we need to buy education materials, we had to limit the education 
materials and spend the money on such things.” 
 
As mentioned in this quotation, the wage levels increased sharply as a consequence of 
high demand for the workforce in the field, especially for the scarce specialists. The 
incumbent organizations, on the other hand, were pressured to either mimic some services of 
the profit-maximizers, or they lost several students. When they mimicked those services to 
preserve their students, such as the free school bus or doing the families’ tasks at GRCs, their 
costs increased even further. Moreover, while many incumbents mimicked the ethical sales 
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activities, which increased their costs, they did not imitate the unethical acts those could 
reduce their costs or increase revenues. Therefore, they ended up with deeper financial 
pressures. For example, as they did not bribe to the officials at the hospitals, they lacked the 
advantage of quick service; the yearly repeated disabled reports for their existing students 
were delayed for several months. Therefore, they had the financial burden of providing 
service without being able to invoice to the state until the reports are issued.  
4.2.1.3 Time and Labor Constraints  
As also mentioned in the above quote, those unethical attacks created labor losses for the 
social enterprises and limited their ability to focus on the quality of education instead. The 
attention of the founders and managers are directed to the issues other than their main task of 
providing good service. Meanwhile, they also face the problem of scarcity of specialists, 
allocating high energy for finding and then retaining them. Despite willing to be selective on 
the qualifications and the personality of the specialists they recruit, the tight labor market 
occurring after the quick marketization limits their ability to do so. This ability is further 
hampered by the decreased idealism of the employees in the field, and is in turn reflected to 
the quality of service social enterprises can themselves offer. 
The pressures posed by marketization on the field were accompanied by the decrease in 
state payments, unfair cuts and delays in payments, increased red-tape, and some irrational 
new inspections, which were reactions of the state to the corruption in the field as well as its 
own decreasing resources. The changing regulations and the uncertainty of state’s acts, on 
the other hand, posed additional stress factors as well as financial burden. 
4.2.1.2 Psychological pressures  
“For instance, as they stole our student that day, I was nervous; I mean I could not deal 
with other tasks well...” says one co-founder. As the profit-maximizers transferred their 
students, the social enterprises needed to operate with lower revenues. The fixed costs, on 
the other hand, did not become lower but increased after marketization. Their ethical stance, 
when not combined with particular strategies as pressure relievers, caused some social 
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enterprises to fail or experience the treat of bankruptcy every day, thus, creating a heavy 
psychological load. One interviewee expresses this as follows: 
“Because of those (unethical) things I am resisting to, of course we have the 
danger of failing financially. The biggest is the concern of this. Sometimes its 
effects can even reach to the extent of depression.” 
 
On the other hand, being less appreciated by the beneficiaries and the officials in the new 
form of the market decreases the motivation of the social entrepreneurs who are already 
working in a psychologically challenging and trying task of education services to the disabled 
people. Added on to this, the unethical attacks from the competitors and some false claims 
against them through the families directed by other centers even causes health problems, as 
one manager explains: 
“I mean because of those false claims on our parts, we face serious labor 
losses, face stress, and we experience a resentment to the sector. Had I not been 
in this sector for years, had I not been an experienced manager... I mean, someone 
new to this business would face a depression, would quit this job and not come 
back. Believe me, it causes health problems even on me. This job I do is stress in 
real terms.”  
4.3 Vulnerability to the Pressures  
Figure 4 explicates the mechanisms by which the pressures arising from marketization 
effect the social enterprises. The reason I explain this process prior to their reactions is to 
distinguish between their intentional acts and what comes automatically through changing 
market dynamics. This clarification is particularly important as it helps enfold the concept of 
mission drift, as will be discussed later in detail.  
Among the pressures exerted by marketization, the resource constraints lead to decreased 
quality, mediated by a poor financial situation. In addition, time and labor constraints also 
affect the quality of services provided by social enterprises. On the other hand, the 
psychological pressures work to create a psychological burn out on the founders and 
managers of social enterprises, who make decisions on their strategic responses. This process 
starting with the marketization, and reflected to financial situation, quality of services, and 
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Figure 4 Vulnerability to the pressures 
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the psychological state of social entrepreneurs is moderated at for points, which are 
indicated with subsequent numbers in Figure 4. More specifically, social enterprises vary in 
the level of being effected by marketization’s pressures, based on their particular 
characteristics, resources and capabilities, which are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
The region’s economic condition, reputation and strategic positioning of the organization, 
as well as the commercial skills, affect the vulnerability of social enterprises to the emerging 
pressures. First, in the urban areas, compared to rural areas, there is less of corruption due to 
more often inspections. In addition, in the high-income regions, families are less inclined to 
accept bribes as well as being more selective on the quality of education given their higher 
level of consciousness. Second, a higher reputation of the center in terms of quality attracts 
the families which are knowledgeable and highly attentive to their children’s education. Yet, 
the moderating effect of reputation is weaker in low income regions. Third, the commercial 
skills of the founder and managers of the social enterprises affect the ability to attract students 
in a competitive environment, also decreasing the financial concerns. 
Organizations in the sample suffer from financial problems at varying levels. Some have 
difficulty in paying the salaries, some survive with bank loans, and some have debts to several 
parties including severance pay to former employees and tax debts to the state. Several 
participants describe their situation with words such as “being on a knife-edge”: 
“We are trying to bring it into balance by keeping the social (value) aspect 
good, while on the other hand trying to take the precautions which will minimize 
our loss. We are, of course, on a knife-edge.” 
 
Some organizations in the sample, have higher ability to raise funds through, e.g., 
public donation campaigns, domestic and international project grants, donations from high-
net-worth individuals. This is best exemplified in the case of Mercury, whose several SERCs 
experience operational losses each month. Some of these losses are compensated with the 
funds raised by the branches themselves, and the remaining deficit in their budgets are closed 
with the funds transferred from the headquarters, which itself generates revenues through 
fund raising activities. The ability to raise funds, on the other hand, is a function of reputation 
and the legitimacy of the organization in the eyes of the donors, its network structure, and 
the associated skills of the managers in the organization. While all are foundations, for 
example, Pluto had a quite limited ability to raise funds compared to Earth, Venus, and 
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Mercury, who have professional public relations personnel and better established networks. 
Another moderator at this stage is the savings of the founders, which they use to close the 
financial deficits; e.g., in the case of Mars and Neptune. 
A poor financial situation of the organization leads to declines in their quality of 
survives, as they cannot afford to buy teaching material, invest in new education methods, 
nor to increase the number teachers per students. Constrained in their personnel selection by 
the scarcity in the field, social enterprises at many times had to opt for non-idealist or low-
skilled employees, which also decrease the quality of their services. On the other hand, 
constrained by time, organizations cannot arrange internal trainings for the employees, which 
are not much costly as employees usually teach each other but necessitate devoting their time. 
In addition, organizations were less willing to invest in the development of their employees, 
as they were frequently transferred to other centers.  
There are; however, moderators to the mechanism decreasing the quality. First one is 
the employee identification. Some organizations have well-structured recruitment and 
control systems. While all organizations face the scarcity of good quality employees, some 
of them emphasize that they seek idealist, good-hearted, and open-to-feedback teachers, if 
not highly qualified, while some organizations give priority to being presentable. In addition, 
some of them have sophisticated internal regulations and peer control mechanism that work 
to guarantee a level of quality. Another moderator is employee identification. Data regarding 
the identity claims in the interviews as well as the employee surveys indicates that, some of 
the social enterprises are “like a family,” which is even reflected to the photos and comments 
in the social media pages of the founders. Those organizations have a low employee turnover, 
which enables the accumulation of knowledge and experience in the organization. On the 
other hand, they can reap the benefits of keeping their employees despite paying below-
market wages.  
A drastic effect of marketization is on the founders and managers of the social 
enterprises themselves; most of them experience a psychological burnout. They have quite 
frequently explained how, tired, stressed, and hopeless they are. Their tiredness is also rooted 
in the difficult nature of the education of the disabled people and support to the families. 
However, the psychological pressures rising after marketization more than double this effect, 
as the interviewees explain. Several social entrepreneurs also explained their resentment for 
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not being adequately appreciated. In addition, they all have an anger to the degeneration of 
the field relentless of their organization’s degree of being subject to the pressures of 
marketization. This is exemplified by expressions such as: 
   “They turned the families into beggars. For example, (they say) “if you come 
Mr. X’s center, if I get 500 TL from the state, I will give 100 TL of it to you.” 
(Giving) money started! I said, damn it! I cannot deal with those.” 
 
   “We, as a foundation, are reactive to the situation that those children have been 
turned into commodity!” 
 
On the other hand, a higher degree of corporatization emerges as a stress-revealer 
mechanism. The founders who delegate several tasks to the professionals that they trust, 
rather than trying to do everything themselves, are better manage the pressures. For example, 
one interviewee says,  
“We are very tired. But we have very good professional staff.  For example, 
we have a social tasks manager. This year we recruited a project specialist. 
Similarly, a part-time social media specialist. She helps me for instance.” 
 
4.4 The Differing Responses of Social Enterprises 
The varying reactions of the organizations to marketization are summarized in Figure 5. 
Not all organizations offered all the free services nor did R&D before marketization. 
Therefore, to avoid any misunderstanding, I shaded the areas with grey if the act was not 
already performed by the organization before marketization. In addition, some actions were 
taken recently at the time of data collection. For example, Pluto added the school bus in its 
last year before closing the center; therefore, the potential effect of this act to increase the 
demand was not fully realized. To provide a better understanding of the acts and connections 
between them, I wrote “Late” to those cells when the organization performed the acts lately, 
and wrote “Early” if the actions were taken at the first few years following 2006. Lastly, I 
signed the cell as with “o” rather than “x” if the change happened, yet not as a reaction to 
marketization but for other reasons. In the following sections, I provide brief information 
regarding the effects of marketization on each organization and their strategic reactions.  
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Table 12 Responses of social enterprises 
Earth Venus Mercury Mars Jupiter Saturn Uranus Neptune Pluto Eris
Scaling Opening new branch/es (after 2006) Early Early Early Early
Adding free school bus o Late x x x Late
Doing families' legal tasks x
Increasing social activities x x
Increasing prices o
Reserving capacity for high payers o
Extensively using volunteers x x
Recruiting employees who will volunteer x
Extensively using sponsors o o x x
Volunteer arragements with schools x x
Firm founding association Late
New fundraising techniques o o x
Offering new services o Late
Employee contracts to ban student transfer Late
Forming collaboration groups Late Late
Decreasing social activities o x x x
Decreasing free complementary therapies x x x
Decreasing free education to the poor x x x
Decreasing organized seminers x x x x x
Decreasing R&D x
Stop investing in new methods x x x x
Decreasing employee trainings x x x x x
Cutting operating expenses o x x x
Paying below-market wages x x
*Merging classes to reduce transport cost x
Reducing high-cost 
beneficiaries
*Eliminating heavy disabled
x
Seizing the branch/es x x
Closing / handing over branch/es o o o x x x
Quitting Quit Late Early
Increasing free 
services
Seizing
Risk management
Increasing high-
income beneficiaries
Creating alternate 
resources
Decreasing free 
services
Decreasing quality 
investments
Cost cuttings in 
expenses
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4.4.1 Eris  
 Eris is among the first organizations in the field and was the first to leave the field, 
even before the second wave of marketization hit the sector. It was particularly affected by 
the market forces, as two more centers opened in the same street, which specifically targeted 
Eris’s students by offering extra benefits to the families if they were transferred. Added on 
to this, while the state payments were not enough to cover the expenses of high quality service 
provided by the center, the families did not want to pay any amount, explained by the founder 
as follows: 
“Before, there were people who came to you and asked “I want to bring my child 
to you, what is the price of it?” Now, they don’t ask. They directly bring the report 
and say I will bring my child to you. But what the state pays does not cover your 
expenses.” 
 
 The founder of Eris vastly mentioned the degeneration of the field, and his resentment 
and anger to that situation, stating that he “wanted to get out of the system.” In fact, he 
decided to sell the center after one specific instance: 
“Because one day somebody came to me. He held the (disabled) report like this. 
(here he imitates the man holding up the piece of paper with his fingertips) And 
he is holding it like this to me! Think of it! I am not someone else. He said “I will 
bring my child to you, what will you give me?” I said “we will give education.” 
He said “No, no what will you give to me?” And I remember sending him away 
by pushing him. I told him to go to the rehabilitation center at the other corner 
and that I did not want to see him again.” 
 
 As he was a highly reputable specialist himself, and one of the initiators of the field, 
the founder of Eris would not decrease the quality in order to reduce the costs and become 
similar to profit-maximizers. When I asked him about how he could compete in the new 
circumstances had he not quit, he explained that he would do new investment to move to a 
better facility with superior physical conditions, so that he could provide better education. 
However, he lacked the necessary capital, and did not want to use bank loans in an 
environment where he could not freely determine the price of services.  
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4.4.2 Pluto  
Pluto, on the other hand, resisted to stay in the market until it had to close the center 
following some financial problems that it could not cope with. This kind of quitting is actually 
not an intended reaction but rather a consequence of its inability to strategically react to the 
pressures exerted by marketization. As seen in Table 12, Pluto did not take any of the actions 
that several other organizations took, other than decreasing the extent of free services and 
employee trainings due to financial constraints. Despite reducing the costs to an extent, those 
passive precautions served to decrease the demand for its services even further. While the 
conscious families have an inclination to choose the centers of foundations over others, and 
while Pluto used to have students from even neighboring cities before, not investing in quality 
and annulling the free services made it less attractive to those conscious families. Many of 
the less conscious ones, on the other hand, had shifted to profit-maximizers following their 
promises or the personal benefits offered. Pluto thought that actively seeking students is 
unethical, and did not realize any acts for this purpose. In addition, as the profit-maximizers 
did not accept the heavy disabled, Pluto’s student portfolio shifted to over the average 
disabled students, who are costlier to serve. Losing several students, and not being able to 
compensate the loss in revenues by creating alternative resources, the finances of Pluto 
deteriorated gradually, to finally reach zero level. The income of the SERC, at times when it 
could make profit in the past, were never accumulated but donated to a public school on 
disability, a situation fixed with a protocol.  
Different than the other foundations in the sample, Pluto also did not restructure the 
organization to establish internal regulations for quality control. It suffered from being 
“personalized” by the board of directors (BoD), who did not want to step back despite being 
less engaged in the activities. The board also wanted to do everything themselves, rather than 
hiring professional staff for the managerial activities. Yet, they increasingly spared less of 
their time. This inertia made Pluto nonresponsive to changes, while the lack of cohesion 
limited some board members’ wish to invest in new education techniques.   
Only in the last year the center operated, increasingly facing financial constraints, Pluto 
started to take strategic actions to revitalize the center. The BoD was also renewed 
meanwhile. Some non-idealist teachers were sent away to increase the quality of education. 
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Yet, the organization had to pay severances to those employees, and even worse, those 
teachers took away their students to other centers, causing further decline in the number of 
students and revenues of Pluto. The organization later added a school bus to make itself more 
attractive to families, which further increased its costs. The school bus, was not enough for 
increasing the demand, as the center had nearly no visibility as well as a decreased reputation. 
The managers were planning to more actively promote the center by preparing brochures and 
renewing the foundation’s webpage. However, as it could not pay the wages after an 
unexpected cut in state’s payments, many employees left immediately and the center was 
shut. Despite all the unfortunate experiences they had and all the psychological burnout, the 
founders of Pluto are still highly motivated to start a new center, this time differentiated with 
higher education quality and different services, if they can raise funds. “As long as there are 
those (disabled) children, we are here,” says a member of the board, herself a mother of a 
disabled child.  
4.4.3 Earth  
Earth was not affected by the pressures of marketization at all. The only effect 
reflected to them was the scarcity of specialists, because of which they cancelled a particular 
kind of therapy. A co-founder stated that the demand for their services even increased after 
marketization. This is because the pool of beneficiaries is expanding and the people who 
realize that the service quality is low at other centers increasingly bring their children to 
Earth. As there is excess demand, the center accepts students based on a lottery. There is both 
a full-time school and a SERC operated by the foundation, along with other activities for 
awareness raising and developing the quality and scope of education of the disabled in 
Turkey. The foundation is managed quite professionally with an increasingly corporatized 
structure, employing specialists for different set of tasks such as public relations. It is able to 
raise high amounts of funds by several state-of-art fundraising techniques. Those funds; 
however, are not solely used for compensating the losses from the education services, but 
also used for the various activates such as preparing online education kits that the families of 
disabled individuals can benefit. 
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Until its foundation, Earth has positioned its education services distinct from others. 
Its prices are quite high, given the intensity of education both in terms of class hours and the 
number of teachers per student. While providing full-time education at their school, they also 
accept students to their SERC who will take at least 24 classes per month, as they believe 
that a lower number of classes will not serve their purpose of effective education. When one 
calculates the hourly price for education, it is the same with what state pays per hour at the 
full-time school. Yet, the state does not compensate full-time education of the disabled, and 
Earth has to find resources when a family wants to register their child but cannot pay for it. 
They provide a number of scholarship based on the availability of their resources each year. 
The hourly price for the SERC, on the other hand, is much higher than what the state pays. 
Thus, when a family wants registers their child to Earth’s SERC, they need to pay a big sum, 
both because of the high hourly price and because of the number of minimum classes the 
child needs to take. The foundation wants the SERC to be self-sustaining, while also 
generating some surplus to be transferred to the full-time school to provide scholarship to the 
poor.  
The business model of Earth is an example to creating cross-subsidies across different 
segments of beneficiaries. Yet, the organization is vastly criticized by other actors in the field 
for charging high prices and providing education for only very few children. Earth, 
sometimes along with Venus, have been referred to as “luxury,” “visible,” or “resourceful” 
foundations by several participants in the study. Some interviewees, while appreciating their 
work and especially their corporatized structure, noted that their service is limited to few 
individuals, comparing with themselves to state that they have a broader coverage. In 
addition, some participants were inclined to state that their education is no worse than “some 
popular foundations.” However, my data triangulation methods make it clear that those 
resourceful foundations have higher quality; in terms of, e.g., the number of teachers per 
students, the ratio of specialists to all employees, the education level of the employees, the 
trainings provided for employees and families. In fact, the cofounder of Earth explicitly states 
that they wanted to create a “model” (rather than providing education to a broad set of 
beneficiaries), “a laboratory that could show how this task needs to be done,” as well as 
showing to the public that “if you give proper education starting at the early ages, some of 
those children can be saved completely, and some can achieve several successes.” In effect, 
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Earth also collaborates extensively with the state organizations to transfer them knowledge 
and helps the state to initiate pilot projects with new models in the schools for disabled. 
4.4.4 Venus  
Similar to Earth, the demand for the services of Venus has not been effected by the 
pressures of marketization. Yet, the scarcity of specialists limits their ability to be selective 
in recruitment along with all organizations in the sample. The reason Venus could keep itself 
away from the pressures of marketization was its early strategic moves to update their mission 
and restructure the organization. It had historically collaborated with the state to financially 
and academically support the education provided in foundation’s facilities by the public 
personnel, as well as a disability care center. However, following the regulatory changes in 
2006, the collaboration on education services ended, and Venus opened a SERC that itself 
operated independent from the state.  
Being aware of their limited commercial and managerial capabilities at that time, the 
organization decided to hire a consultancy firm to establish a robust organizational structure 
and to build a new road map. After several meetings and discussions, a new mission was 
clarified: “to be a model organization, which is also self-sustainable.” The starting aims of 
the foundation on doing and supporting scientific research, raising personnel, organizing 
conferences and trainings, and collaborations with universities for accepting apprentices were 
remained unchanged. Yet, they needed to replace the aim of guiding and helping the state on 
the education state provides, with a new aim. Rather than defining an aim similar to that of 
many other organizations in this sample, which is providing good quality education, they had 
a specific target; “to be a model.” Interestingly, the managers of both Earth and Venus used 
the very same words when defining their missions, which were clearly separated from other 
organizations in the sample. General manager of Venus explains this as follows: 
   “We are a reference organization on X disability in Turkey. We are an 
organization whose door the families and academics can knock. Our target is to 
be a reference organization at international level. We follow international 
developments, we inspect them, and we try to adapt them to Turkey. And the 
kitchen we build the models is our SERC and the school... We also aim to spread 
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these (education and rehabilitation) models. And we do this by publications, 
seminars, meetings, opening our doors to apprentices.”  
 
The social business model of Venus is quite similar to that of Earth; a special 
education and rehabilitation center and a full-time school serving only few children, some of 
which are provided scholarships at varying levels. While Earth can use the surplus created at 
the SERC to subsidize the full-time school, the SERC run by Venus is not yet self-sustaining 
given its average hourly price level that is less than that of Earth. The organization aims to 
make the SERC sustainable in itself; therefore, in addition to raising the hourly prices for 
extra classes, it limited the amount of services that it provides for the children coming with 
the GRC report. Doing so, in contrast to Earth, they also serve the poor families who cannot 
pay any amount to the SERC, with a high quality. However, the hourly cost of the education 
it provides is higher than what the state pays them per hour. Therefore, they are trying to limit 
the number of poor beneficiaries to a ratio at which the higher revenues they generate from 
high income families are able to subsidize the poor.  
While the limited number of empirical studies on the topic use a rise in the price level 
as a proxy to mission drift, the case of Venus clearly illustrates that, this can the result of a 
deliberate mission change, rather than mission drift. After evaluating the developments in its 
environment, Venus decides that it can best contribute to the field by being a model 
organization and creating knowledge spillovers, similar to what Earth has been doing since 
its inception. Moreover, by still serving for a significant number of lower income customers 
with high quality, it serves as a close competitor for the other SERCs in the region, creating 
a motivation to increase their quality.  
4.4.5 Mercury  
In contrast to Earth, which was established with a high quality-high price positioning, 
and to Venus, which also later situated itself to that position, Mercury operated in the same 
segment with the rest of the SERCs in the market, as did Pluto. In contrast to Pluto; however, 
it was able to restructure the organization to form cost and quality control systems, as well 
as hiring professionals for its management. It also started to aim self-sustainability, albeit 
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with an emphasis on the sustainability of the foundation, rather than making the units 
sustainable in themselves. This has a main implication; in contrast to Venus, it did not 
increase the average price of services, but only tried to rise more funds with project grants 
and public donation campaigns in order to subsidize its branches that need funds from the 
headquarters to survive. In contrast, while also Earth and Venus engage in new and even 
more innovative ways of fund raising, and are abler to do so given their higher visibility and 
connections to high-net-worth-people, they do not aim at using these funds for subsidizing 
their SERCs, but use for their broader research and awareness raising activities.  
The social business model for the SERCs run by Mercury is not sustainable in itself, 
but continuously needs to be backed by foundation’s other resources. It provides full-time or 
half-day education to a high number of students who come with the GRC report, for which 
the state pays 8 to 12 hours per month. For the extra education hours, it has a flexible pricing 
system depending on the income level of the family, not charging any amount for several 
students at all. While a few branches are self-sustaining, the foundation has to subsidize many 
of its branches with high amounts each month. The highest price charged in the most 
expensive city is 600 TL per month for full-time education of a child, which is less than 1/10 
of the price of Earth’s. However, Mercury’s education is not as dense and costly as Earth’s. 
After providing the classes written in the GRC reports, Mercury mostly offers socialization 
classes for the children, rather than one-to-one sessions with the teachers all day.  
The facilities belong to Mercury; thus they pay no rents. The organization also has 
the advantage of extensively using volunteers for their activities; e.g., some volunteer 
teachers come for the music and dance hours. However, the additional fees they can charge 
for the extra hours of education barely compensate the lunch expenses of the children, if they 
can charge any. As their hourly cost is not more than what the state pays, when the branches 
operate with higher capacity usage ratio in terms of the students with GRC reports, their 
finances can be better. Yet, despite the high care Mercury shows to the students and to their 
families, marketization has caused sharp decreases in their number of students, a situation 
fostered by the limited commercial skills of Mercury as well as their assessment of actively 
seeking students as unethical. Moreover, as the profit-maximizers do not prefer the heavy 
disabled students, and as Mercury does, their student portfolio shifted to more heavy 
disability. The heavy disabled children (and many grown up disabled individuals in the case 
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of Mercury) are costlier to serve, and the families refrain from sending their children to the 
centers where they see the heaviest cases. Mercury does not wish to change this naturally 
occurring shift to the more disadvantaged, but seeks ways to increase its resources mainly by 
financial and in-kind donations. The organization also employs the personnel who will 
volunteer for the foundation’s activities in addition to teaching and administrative tasks. Yet, 
it is still prone to pressures to reduce its costs, which constraints the capability to increase the 
quality of education by, e.g., limiting the ability to buy more teaching material and increase 
number of teachers per student. Mercury also pays below-market wages to their employees, 
but can attract them, as it is a plus for their CVs to work there.  
4.4.6 Mars  
Mars is unique among the enterprises with a private ownership in the sample with an 
increased demand for its services after marketization. It has been established by the parents 
of a disabled child, the father having a commerce background. As they could not find a good 
center to send their child in the region they lived, they started their own center, also with a 
wish that this could be self-rehabilitation especially for the mother. As the sector changed 
into a market with the state’s payments, Mars combined its entrepreneurial orientation and 
commercial knowledge to grow by opening several branches, which also included two 
partnerships in other cities. In time, it also increased its education quality as the knowledge 
accumulated in the organization with investments in new methods and therapies. It did not 
decrease investment in education methods even in the hardest financial situations. The 
organization is very high on entrepreneurial orientation, both evident from the results of the 
employee surveys, the interviews, and the visible courageous actions taken in its history. 
Thanks to its family-like atmosphere, the employee turnover is low despite the below-
market wages in the organization. The founder states that, he uses the savings from paying 
below-market wages again for the employees, e.g., organizing dinners, which both motivate 
the employees and increase their identification with the organization. Some employees left 
for higher paying centers or to open their own SERCs, also taking away some students. Yet, 
a high ratio of them stayed in the organization.  
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Overall, Mars was not hit by marketization at a high degree. Thanks to the founder’s 
commercial knowledge and skills, it can both work efficiently (e.g., he uses loans to pay taxes 
earlier, and gets a tax discount higher than the interest paid) and it can promote the 
organization to always find students. Its visibility in the field declined with marketization, as 
it could not organize seminars in the schools anymore, which used to raise public awareness 
on disability as well as promoting the center. “As there are now several people trying to hunt 
families of the disabled in front of the schools, you cannot do this anymore” says the founder. 
However, Mars prepares monthly bulletins and booklets on specific topics on disability, 
through which the organization both raises awareness on several issues regarding disability, 
while also making itself visible.  
Branches of Mars are located in regions with above average socioeconomic 
conditions, with many conscious disabled families. The reputation for high quality education 
and the intensity of social activities attract those conscious families. Yet, several children are 
also carried with free school buses from lower income regions. While many incumbent 
organizations suffered from decreased legitimacy after marketization, Mars was able to set 
itself apart; e.g., in the eyes of the officials in the MoE.  
“I don’t request anything from them, I don’t go to their doors. Plus, seeing 
me dressed well etc., they think that I am a very rich man who does not need their 
help. So, when I happen to go there, they invite me in by buttoning up their jackets 
while they turn back the other SERC owners.”  
 
While Mars does not often request help from the officials, so that it is responded when 
it happens to do so, it increasingly benefits from extensive sponsorships for its activities. In 
fact, Mars is the only organization in the sample with a firm status, that can extensively 
exploit some resources which are usually deemed for non-profits. When I make an in-depth 
analysis of this interesting situation with cross-comparisons across cases, the only non-
eliminated explanation of this additional legitimacy is the founder’s being a father of a 
disabled child. For example, Jupiter has even a higher reputation for quality than that of Mars, 
as well as a longer history and an entrepreneurial founder. However, Jupiter lacks the 
legitimacy for the support of high-net-worth individuals and corporations because it is in firm 
status. While using the dynamism of being a firm, Mars can also reap several benefits of 
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those of foundations’. The organization even makes volunteer arrangements with the schools 
and projects with international NGOs, just as the foundations do.   
In addition, the founder has a high commercial orientation, which the foundations 
lack. “Commerce is like that. You should not cut investments in times of crisis; it is the best 
time to invest,” says the founder, which is a quite interesting statement with a clear emphasis 
on trade, compared to the speeches of many other participants. Despite this high emphasis on 
trade, Mars was scored very high on social orientation and very low on economic orientation 
by its large number of employees taking the survey. The organization could make profits in 
the past, most of which was invested back in the business while a part being distributed to 
the founder. Albeit being able to preserve, and even increase, its number of students after 
marketization, the organization suffers financial problems. This is both because of the rising 
wage levels after marketization, as well as the state’s decreasing payments. The founder once 
sold his car to pay the salaries on time, and says that he can even sell his house for not losing 
the trust of the employees.  
Mars took a very proactive stance to competition, rather than reactive. The ratio of 
free extra education provided to the poor families naturally declined with decreasing profits. 
However, it did not decrease the quality investments in times of crises. The seminars 
organized for the families at schools were cancelled not because of financial or time 
pressures, but because they did not want to look like the profit-maximizers camping in front 
of the schools. Yet, the teachers at Mars continued to directly coordinate with the disabled 
child’s teacher at public schools, if the child also attends a public school, to raise the 
effectiveness of the education the child receives there. As the teachers at public school are 
mostly not specialists, they also learn a lot from Mars, a mechanism that creates value 
spillovers. The organization also has high number of apprentices. While providing them an 
opportunity to learn the practice, Mars also benefits from their work in its small daily care 
center for the disabled children. Similar to Mercury, Mars has flexible pricing for additional 
hours of education over the hours paid by the state. In contrast to Mercury, the base level and 
average income from those services is much higher; label price is 200 TL per hour, but 
arranged according to the income of the family. 
Added on its several awareness raising activities, Mars also started several projects 
such as a center which would both educate and provide job opportunity to the disabled 
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children. Many of these projects were; however, are now suspended as the founder was very 
tired at the end and decreased his level of engagement. In addition, he quit from partnerships 
in other cities as he could not visit those SERCs often. The founder was also involved other 
commercial business to generate him income, which better explains his level of tiredness. 
While Mars has some internal rules and controls, and mentioned as being “corporatized” by 
its employees for this reason, many managerial tasks are not given to professional staff 
employed for particular purposes. “You cannot corporatize much in this emotional work,” 
says the founder. Yet, the are no employees who develop and run after projects in the 
organization, and as the founder decided to take more time for himself and work less, the 
projects are suspended. 
4.4.7 Jupiter   
Jupiter is unique in the sample with the education methods it developed as well as 
several patents for educational tools. The brochures of the organization showing some of 
their techniques were even used as teaching materials at the universities. In a similar vein, 
the organization is unique among the enterprises owned by private individuals in the sample 
by investing nearly each cent it earned back to business. The founder does not own a house 
despite very long years of running big enterprises those saw quite high demand throughout 
its history, up until marketization. The organization’s strategy including continuous 
investments in new techniques, extensive trainings for the employees, and adapting each new 
technological development related to the education of disabled first was not possible after 
marketization. The demand for its services declined sharply thereafter, and its founder 
lacking a commercial mindset, Jupiter never saw days without debts. The organization 
survives with extensive bank loans. The wages are sometimes paid late, but the staff who 
loves and trusts the founder remain. Yet, a team of them had left together to open their own 
center. This, of course, also contributed to the seizing of the organization.  
Jupiter and Eris are like twin organizations with extensive similarities at their founding. 
However, there are some important differences causing Eris to quit the sector at an early 
stage of marketization, while Jupiter insisted on remaining despite financial problems. First, 
although both were established in two big cities, Eris had difficulty finding specialists in its 
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first years, as the only department graduating specialists was in the city of Jupiter at those 
years. While Eris had to opt for some other teachers in addition to the specialists it hired, 
Jupiter employed many new graduate specialists and created a knowledge hub. Added on the 
high availability of specialists at its founding years, Jupiter invested in their training 
extensively, and also eliminated those who were not idealist enough. Eris, on the other hand, 
did not invest extensively to the development of its employees nor to build quality control 
systems in the organization. The founder himself was engage in proctoring the development 
of the children. After several years, Jupiter had plenty of highly skilled specialists, its own 
innovations on methods, quality control systems for education, and extensive reporting 
standards regarding each child. While Eris was also among the pioneers to adapt some new 
technologies, such as education with computer games, it lacked a well-developed quality 
control structure and highly skilled employees. These extensive investments Jupiter made, 
served to escalate the commitment of its founder. Moreover, a deeper cause for those 
differing paths they took was the ambitious character of Jupiter’s founder; as explained by 
the founder of Eris. Last, but not the least, while both founders loved the kids, the founder of 
Jupiter literally lives for them, a fact evident from the case narratives. 
However, despite his tight attachment to his work from heart, and not distributing 
profits, Jupiter suffered a legitimacy problem rising from its legal form. Several high-net-
worth individuals who extensively donated to foundations on disability or sponsored the 
education of several disabled children refrained from helping Jupiter throughout its history. 
Having those doors shut, the founder of Jupiter found a solution by founding an association. 
While it historically provided free education to several disabled children, the financial 
problems following marketization made this impossible. Through the association, the 
organization seeks sponsors for some poor disabled children who promise high development 
if they receive dense therapies. Another strategic action recently taken by Jupiter is a new 
service offered; consultancy and training for other SERCs. This seems like good opportunity 
to increase its revenues while spreading its knowledge to the sector. Yet, the service is quite 
newly added on the organization’s web page, and I could not speak to the founder to ask the 
level of demand for it in the market.  
In addition to those newly taken steps to increase its resources under the new 
circumstances, Jupiter has a deliberate change in its strategy. It does not invest in R&D 
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anymore. The main reason is the financial constraints, also accompanied by a resentment for 
not being appreciated. The founder has a high level of burn out and is very angry to the new 
shape of the field. He had not found financial support for his big investment projects for the 
disabled in the past, and has now totally stopped even dreaming about them.  
4.4.8 Uranus 
Having worked at a SERCs in a central region and seeing that families brought their 
children from very distant locations, the founder of Uranus wanted to open his center to a 
region closer to some of those families. Uranus was the only center in a large area for several 
years, serving alone a few districts. But the later years saw the entrance of so many 
organizations that, 17 centers occurred only in his district, and 18 centers in the nearby 
district. Uranus was able to make profits in its initial years, and used them for scaling the 
business. He made extensive investments by opening a second SERC as well as two full-time 
private schools for the disabled. He had opened those schools, trusting to a whisper that the 
state would pay for the full-time education of the disabled in private schools, which later 
turned out not to be the case. In addition, the state decreased the hourly payments, as well as 
not paying for the group classes if the disabled child also attended a public school, even if it 
was written in the GRC report. Starting to suffer from big financial losses, Uranus started to 
seize until it remained only one small SERC. Similar to Mars, the founder ran after all the 
business himself, not delegating any work. In the meanwhile, he had also started producing 
special education materials. When the profits in the sector declined after state’s cuts, the 
centers did not buy any materials and he had to close that business. 
Uranus did not offer free classes to the poor in its history, but worked with a high quality. 
The founder has a high respect for the profession, regularly emphasized in the interviews. A 
former employee of Uranus told that she did not see the high quality applications and social 
activities they had offered in Uranus in the other organizations she later worked for.  
In addition to the decline in state payments, revenues per students decreased as the 
families did not want to pay anything extra after marketization- despite the center being 
located in moderate-income region. Added on to this, the rising wages and the cost of free 
school bus increased financial pressures. Allocating his attention to financially save the 
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business, the seminars organized for the families of the disabled were suspended for several 
years. The founder took the reactive strategies of closing branches, and cancelling free 
complementary therapies such as music and sports classes. He is upset that he cannot get 
grants due to the firm status. Yet, he did not take the proactive actions taken by, e.g., Mars 
and Jupiter, to find resources through other means. He now has no ambition to increase the 
number of students and wishes to work in a boutique structure, in which he will gradually 
buy new teaching materials to improve quality if he has finances. His level of engagement in 
the business declined sharply, the founder now sparing his time for other several activities. 
4.4.9 Saturn 
The founders of Saturn are three social service specialists. In the past, one founder 
had split from a partnership when he thought the partner was not adequately socially oriented.  
   “As I come from the profession, my feelings on the professional are at the front. 
I mean, you have to do some expenditures for the work, you have to organize 
some things for the children to receive a good education. On the other hand, if 
the people you partner with have only commercial mentality, these are much for 
them.” 
 
The second branch they opened, in time, “turned into a market firm” (“piyasa 
kurumu”) the co-founder says, by adding free school bus and employing the sales personnel 
that the profit-maximizers had. They split the partnership from the co-founder who managed 
that branch, leaving that branch to him. When I asked about why might have that partner 
changed his attitude, a co-founder replies as: 
   “In fact, if you ask him, he will probably say he did not change, that his idealism 
continues. But the environment that he is in... possibly that… That district is like 
Texas. Being established there... Because there everything is very aggressive. 
The acts for finding children were done at the most aggressive level there. 
Probably, as our partner breathed that air...thinking the work does not go 
otherwise...” 
 
Saturn was established with two goals; being a highly reputable organization and later 
opening a vocational training school for the disabled. While the first goal was achieved, as 
declared by the co-founder, the second goal has been suspended as they have no financial 
strength nor energy left given the pressures exerted by marketization. Saturn’s number of 
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students fell by one third after marketization. It took none of the proactive actions as a 
response. It even did not add school bus, stating that, besides its cost, adding a school bus 
makes the families less attentive. The organization wants to have attentive families as 
beneficiaries, and is selective in this sense. Among the organizations in the sample, also Mars 
and Neptune are selective on the families, not serving to non-attentive or problematic ones. 
However, this selection criterion is higher in Saturn, who says;  
   “I am not a hypermarket, so I don’t think like I should carry here more 
customers. We are providing a service with high quality here, the ones who want 
to benefit from this should come and apply us.”   
 
This high idealism, however, worked to decrease the revenues of the organization, with 
a lower capacity usage ratio. On the other hand, Saturn is located in a low income region. My 
observations tell that, the managing co-founder himself controls the quality of education 
tightly, following the development of each child. But, in order to increase the quality further, 
Saturn needs to buy materials and decorate classrooms for new methods as well as finding 
specialists certified in those methods. As it cannot charge the expenditures to the poor 
families, and cannot subsidize with other sources, investments in quality are suspended. Yet, 
the co-founder is very sensitive, such that he cannot accept money from some poor families 
without GRC reports even if they attempt to pay.  
Saturn is one of the “family-like” organizations in the sample, as also declared by its 
employees, and benefits from low employee turnover. As the pressures in the market 
increased, it cancelled the employee trainings, because they are too busy with “saving the 
day.” The co-founder is overly stressed and is not sure whether the center can survive the 
next day. The social activities offered to the children, on the other hand, continue. As the 
SERC cannot earn money with the co-founders’ high idealism in a low income region, and 
as the co-founders need living income, they opened a preschool for non-disabled children, 
partly decreasing their level of engagement in Saturn.  
One interesting occasion is that, there are collaboration groups formed in Saturn and 
Neptune’s districts initiated by the founders of these organizations, who run the most 
reputable organizations in their regions. Most SERCs have joined those groups, to organize 
monthly meetings or brunches. In Saturn’s region, they also invite the GRC manager to 
explain their technical problems, such as missing documents.  
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4.4.10 Neptune 
Neptune is located in one of the lowest income regions, where the market pressures are 
highest. In addition to adding free school bus, different than all organizations in the sample, 
it also follows families’ tasks at the hospitals and GRCs for taking the disabled reports and 
education programs. In fact, it also employed the sales personnel for a while in the past. A 
co-founder stated that those people do not work decently, laying at some place and telling 
that they were at the hospital. He, therefore, has not employed such personnel for 5 years. 
The co-founder explains that, when he says he does not employ sales personnel to other 
SERC owners in the region, they are quite surprised.  
The mission of Neptune changed in time, as explained by a co-founder: 
   “We were planning to do this work with very very high quality and opening 
new branches in different regions. This one is the first branch we opened. It is the 
first SERC opened in X district. Two years later, we opened a second branch in 
Y district. But as we did not see much future in this business, I mean, as we don’t 
know what may happen at any time, we cancelled this mission. Rather than 
opening other branches, two years later, we sold the second branch in Y district.”  
 
He also notes that, in the future, he can open a center specifically for the hearing 
impaired, because they are the ones who are most easily educable, who appreciate the 
organization’s work and attend classes regularly, even not requesting school bus. In fact, all 
participants from Neptune complained about their insensible family profile, which decreases 
their motivation. The organization decreased the seminars organized for the families, noting 
that they do not attend.  When faced with increasing financial pressures, Neptune requested 
small amounts of payment for some services, which were previously free. Yet, as none of the 
families wanted to pay, they cancelled the free service those were much costly to them.  
As easily visible from Table 12, Neptune did all the reactive acts to reduce costs, but 
none of the proactive acts for increasing its resources. When it has cash deficit, the main 
shareholder, who earns income from his other businesses closes the gap. In addition to 
cancelling free services, decreasing investments in quality, and cuts in operating expenses, 
Neptune also merged the class hours for some students in order not to carry them to the center 
twice a week, but only once a week. The co-founder is aware that this act may reduce the 
effectiveness of education, but states that they did this to only lightly disabled ones who can 
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handle consequent class hours. However, Neptune also eliminated the heavy disabled 
beneficiaries who lack some gross motor skills, as well as heavy autistic children. The 
manager stresses that they do not comprise from their education quality, and that they do not 
seek many students but provide good education to a mediocre number of students. But they 
are selective on the beneficiaries, excluding the most disadvantaged:  
   “Our heavy disabled students that we call gross motor. They need too much 
support during their transport. Both in the school bus, both the need for hostess... 
We eliminated some of the physio students, strategically. We needed to relax a 
little bit. And now, perhaps it is wrong, it is like discrimination, but I don’t prefer 
the students with only gross motor module. This is also the same in other 
organizations; they don’t accept (them). Why don’t we accept them? We need to 
give a lot of things. Physiotherapists are expensive, they are costly to us… Thus, 
now, in order to survive, most of the organizations unfortunately accept the 
student if s/he has fine motor. But the ones who are totally gross motor- perhaps 
some organizations may be preferring- we do not prefer much.” 
 
   “I accept if s/he is convenient to me. We are a selective organization in that 
sense. I sent away some of the very heavy autistics, and I don’t accept very heavy 
students. Because they affect the quality of education negatively. I direct them to 
other organizations who accept them. (Because) the instructors cannot cope with 
them, their motivation and energy declines. And as we don’t have large space... 
In very heavy autistics, there are serious problems such as spitting, attacking, 
messing around. Therefore, we go at a specific concept.” 
 
 
Table 13 Changes in strategic positioning  
  
Founding 
motivation 
Change 
in  
Price 
Change in 
Quality 
Change in 
Disability 
level 
Pluto Pure social - -- + 
Earth Pure social       
Venus Pure social ++ +   
Mercury Pure social -   + 
Mars Social > Profit + +   
Jupiter Social > Profit - -   
Saturn Social = Profit - -   
Uranus Social = Profit  - -   
Neptune Social = Profit  - - - 
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In fact, Neptune’s elimination of the heavy disabled is the only act among the reactions 
in the sample, that is clearly mission drift. As Table 14 indicates, most organizations suffered 
a decline in their quality through the effects of marketization; yet, they did not shift to the 
less costly beneficiaries. There are some more interesting differences between Neptune and 
other organizations in the sample, which shed light on this differing reaction.  
First, in contrast with many of the organizations in the sample, it was founded by an 
equal emphasis on profit as well as doing social good. Second, it is the only center in which 
merchants have shares, in fact, majority of the shares. The pressure for making profits at 
these financially difficult times does not rise from the merchant main shareholder, but from 
the small shareholders. Neptune’s ownership structure is scattered. It was founded by 3 
partners, one specialist who knew the task, one big shareholder who provided the capital, and 
a third partner who was the manager. The third partner later sold the shares to three other 
individuals, two of them specialists and one unrelated partner. Moreover, the co-founder who 
knows the task has been disengaged from the SERC, stating he now quickly goes mad with 
the family profile served. He is engaged in other business that they also started with the main 
shareholder in the SERC. The specialist co-founder did not mention eliminating the heavy 
disabled, perhaps not aware of the situation, if he did not try to hide consciously. The main 
shareholder mentions that he wants to quit because he is really tired and stressed in this 
business under these circumstances. However, his family resists this as they deem the 
business as good deed. On the other hand, the small shareholders, who are not financially 
well-off, expect some income from the SERC, creating pressure on the main shareholder.  
Another interesting difference is that, participants from Neptune always took the 
organizations in their low socioeconomic region as reference points throughout the 
interviews, comparing themselves with those to conclude that they provide very high quality 
and work idealistically. Neptune manager states that they are a model “for that district,” while 
Earth and Venus stated they are models for Turkey, Venus even wishing to be a model 
internationally. Moreover, the organizations in the sample are not in contact with the profit-
maximizers, even not becoming member to SERCs’ association for not being put within the 
same category, except for Saturn and Neptune. Saturn’s cofounder attends the monthly 
meetings, that himself initiated, to discuss the problems of SERCs in that region. He also 
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helps other organizations if they need his technical help. Neptune’s case is a little different, 
as they state that they are the president in the district. They try to help other SERCs in 
technical problems as well as representing them to solve the problems within the district 
regarding mistakes in the hospitals, retarded payments etc. In addition, they impose some 
norms regarding competition, to which some profit-maximizers started to obey, partially, if 
not fully. In sum, Neptune is highly embedded in its low socioeconomic environment and is 
in close contact to profit-maximizers, and compares itself with only those centers. 
Figure 5 Resources of social enterprises 
 
 
Under the forces of marketization, it cannot choose a high quality-high price strategy 
in its low income region. The remaining options for this organization are, either operating 
with lowered quality and no profits as long as it can (as Saturn does), try to create alternative 
resources (as Mercury, Mars, and lately Jupiter does), or to close the center. (See Figure 5 
for a clearer exhibition of the balance between resources of social enterprises and their 
allocation. As the total resources of the organization decline, it has to decrease some of the 
items in the resource allocation). Given the income expectation of some shareholders and the 
decreased psychological capital of the others, the only option now discussed by Neptune is 
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selling or closing the center. However, while Neptune eliminated the less disadvantaged, it 
is still the highest quality and most ethical center in its region. Its mission drifted to an extent. 
Yet, if it quits, the quality in the region may decrease further, as the rest of the SERCs are 
motivated by profit maximization and compete by providing personal benefits to the families 
rather than increasing quality. Neptune attempted to change the profit-maximizers’ attitude 
by taking the role of their leader; imposing them normative pressures in return for 
representing them in front of state officials. (The other SERC owners in the region are stated 
to lack the ability to speak properly and represent themselves to protect their rights in times 
of unfair cuts and delays in payments.) This, “leader of the region” role, on the other hand, 
embedded Neptune in their system, to make it normalize its act of eliminating heavy disabled 
stating that everyone does this and only the centers who cannot find any students accept them. 
4.3 Reasons for Different Reactions 
There emerge several factors as reasons for the differing responses to marketization from 
the cross case comparisons provided above. (Also See Table 13 for a comparison of particular 
strengths and weaknesses of the organizations). These emergent factors are explained in the 
following paragraphs.   
 
 Vision and cohesion of the board: First of all, not all organizations in the sample were 
able to see the big picture regarding the changing dynamics in environment and how their 
financial situation as well as the social value created may be affected in the future. A 
quite good internal and external assessment, for example, came from Venus, which 
changed its mission to shift to a “model organization” form, as well as restructuring for 
sustainability. Venus has a broad variety of members of BoD; e.g., business persons, 
academics, high-networth-individuals. Mercury, similarly restructured to be able to 
control the quality level as well as putting an emphasis on creating alternative resources 
for sustainability. In Pluto, while the leading co-founder had wide vision and saw many 
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challenges to the organization, she could not persuade the BoD to take actions for 
working more professionally, later leading her to disengage, as she explains.  
 Imprinting effects: Two evident shifts in the sample regarding strategic positions are 
Mercury and Venus. While, Venus changed its mission to focus on educational 
excellence and being a reference organization, to the expense of increasing the prices, 
Mercury shifted to the more disadvantaged. We are “a child of the public” (halk çocuğu), 
says the manager of one of its branches. Mercury was founded by the families of the 
disabled with moderate income levels. As parents of disabled, they experience what it 
means to have a heavy disabled child, and the financial and physical difficulties those 
increase as the child grows. While a co-founder of Earth also has a disabled child, she 
has a business background and comes from an above the average income family. The 
business knowledge brought an emphasis to professionalism at the founding, while not 
being a low income family enabled to be able to set aside emotions for creating excellence 
to the expense of excluding poor beneficiaries, except for the few scholarships provided. 
This situation is much contrast to Pluto, which did not welcome Earth’s initial offer to 
create special high quality classes with high-prices within the organization. Board of 
Pluto, mostly mothers of disabled with no business background, evaluated this as 
discrimination, while Earth sees it as a sustainable business model. Those examples, 
among many other in the sample, indicate that the imprinting factors affects the direction 
that the social enterprises take.  
 Pro-social values of the founders: While all founders in the sample are high on pro-
social values, some of them are visibly more so. A co-founder of Saturn, for example, 
explained several emotional moments in which he could not accept the money that the 
poor families wanted to pay. While increasing the share that the poor families get from 
the services of the organization, this orientation, on the other hand, limits the quality level 
as the founder cannot invest in new materials. The organization also increasingly suffers 
financially, as it cannot raise funds such as, e.g., Mercury can do with its foundation legal 
form.  
 Legitimacy of the organization: The organizations in firm status generally lack 
legitimacy compared to the foundations and associations. This is actually the reason 
Jupiter founded an association to be able to find scholarships for its students. However, 
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legal form is not the only determinant of legitimacy. While Mars and Jupiter are similar 
in many aspects, the latter having an even higher quality in addition to high reputation, 
Mars can find support from various parties. Some wealthy people even want to donate 
cash, so that Mars will allocate it to poor disabled families, an offer that the founder did 
not accept. This additional legitimacy basically arises from the founder of Mars being a 
father of a disabled child. In addition, Mars is keen on not being put in the same category 
with the profit-maximizers, which are also in the firm status. The organization, for 
example, cancelled the seminars it organized at the schools, as the sales personnel of 
profit-maximizers were located in front of the schools, seeking potential customers from 
the families of the disabled who attend special classes or inclusive education at public 
schools. It however, found other ways, which would both raise awareness on, e.g., sexual 
abuse to disabled children, while making the organization more visible. 
 Entrepreneurial orientation: As seen from Table 12, some social enterprises took only 
reactive steps while others proactively sought new resources. For example, Mars 
extensively uses volunteers for social activities as well as benefiting from the apprentices 
in the daily care unit, always seeking opportunities to create alternative resources. It also 
had several innovative projects in its history, with its entrepreneurial orientation that is 
also verified with the employee survey results. The founder is a risk taker; he says “You 
should invest in times of crises; after the crises, when the others fail, more students will 
come here,” while many others chose to cut costs in hardest times. This contrast is also 
evident from a comparison of Eris and Jupiter. While Eris quit the market, stating he 
cannot get loans to invest in an uncertain environment, Jupiter stayed to continue its 
investments. “He is very ambitious, as ambitious as he was when we first graduated,” 
says the founder of Eris for Jupiter’s founder.  
 Escalation of commitment: The impact of escalation of commitment is most obvious, 
again in the comparison of Eris and Jupiter. The founder of Jupiter extensively invested 
in quality and new techniques. In addition, he spent each cent back for the organization, 
bringing in the last technology with camera systems, computer systems, and so on. When 
he compares his organization to Eris, which quit the market, the founder of Jupiter 
emphasized these differences in the past investments. Similarly, not in terms of physical 
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investment, but regarding the psychological commitment, an old member of the BoD of 
Mercury says, “We initiated the education of the disabled in Turkey. We cannot leave.” 
 Level of engagement: Many of the social entrepreneurs in the sample suffer from high 
psychological burnout, and decrease their level of engagement in the organization by 
putting it to the periphery of their lives. Moreover, some of them seek alternative 
businesses in order to earn money to make a living, thus further decreasing their 
engagement in the social enterprise. The level of engagement effects their behavior on 
seizing the organization (e.g., Saturn) vs seeking new resources (e.g. Mercury). There are 
some factors emerging from this study as determinants of their level of engagement. 
 Putting realistic goals: In addition to having a continuing high engagement, 
the cofounder of Earth even did not mention being tired, offended etc. in the 
interview. When I questioned the reason behind this, she replied as “I am not 
tired nor offended,” adding that she accepts the realities of Turkey and puts 
small realistic goals which can gradually extend in time. 
 Past failures: The past commercial failures of the organizations in their 
growth attempts, especially in the case of Uranus, served to decrease their 
level of engagement. “There is no need for adventure anymore” says the 
founder of Uranus. He is rather involved with politics and managerial 
positions in associations now, putting the SERC at a peripheral role in his life. 
 Level of appreciation: The social entrepreneurs want to be appreciated by 
either their beneficiaries, the state, or the public in general. The specialist co-
founder of Neptune suffered high burnout as a consequence of marketization’s 
pressures coupled with the attitudes of the inattentive family profile they 
served. He finally disengaged himself, not dealing with daily works despite 
keeping his shares, stating that the families do not know their value.  
 Association with the cause: Both the professional association (being a 
specialist on the topic) and personal association (being a parent of a disabled 
child) motivate the social entrepreneurs, in addition to their high pro-social 
values. However, a personal association with the cause has a larger effect on 
preserving the engagement of the social entrepreneurs. This is most evident 
in the case of Pluto, founded by the parents of disabled, compared to e.g., 
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Uranus, whose founder is a highly idealist specialist, but put the center at the 
periphery after his entrepreneurial failures. He says that he knows no other 
business he can do and will continue doing this job with a small size and not 
any ambition to grow anymore. On the other hand, the founders of Pluto, who 
have suffered even worse disappointments throughout its history, both in their 
collaborations with the state and the failure of their SERC at the end, are 
willing to do even more. “We can reborn from our ashes,” says one co-
founder, while another co-founder says “we hit the bottom but we are now 
trying to raise again.” They have plans to open a new, big and differentiated, 
center and seeking funds for it.  
 Socioeconomic situation of the region: The socioeconomic situation of the location 
limits the set of options available for social entrepreneurs in terms of strategic actions. 
While they can charge higher prices to some individuals in moderate or high income 
regions and use those revenues to subsidize the most disadvantaged beneficiaries, the 
ones in low income regions are not able to do this. of the beneficiaries limits the prices 
the organization can charge. discretion of social enterprises.  
 Frame of reference: As it was discussed in detail in the case of Neptune, an increasing 
embeddedness in the network of profit-maximizers made the organization normalize its 
unethical acts which increasingly looked like theirs. In case of Saturn, for example, their 
previous partner was the manager of the second branch they opened in a Texas-like district, 
where all kinds of unethical acts were vastly performed. He, in time, added the sales 
personnel which sought disabled children, which the other partners working in another 
district still saw unethical. The network that the organization is embedded in also determines 
their frame of reference in terms of quality. The organizations that are in contact with 
international organizations deem their quality as moderate, while it is much superior than the 
rest of the organizations in the sample, given the objective quality indicators in the data 
collected. The regionally embedded ones, on the other hand, compare and contrast 
themselves with the other organizations nearby, to conclude that they are much better than 
the profit-maximizers, perhaps a threat to their motivation to increase the quality further.  
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Table 14 Strengths and weakness of social enterprises 
  Strengths Weaknesses 
Pluto Expertise 
No commercial skills & public relations. 
Inertia in board. Limited ability to raise 
funds. No internal regulations. Donating 
all income in past 
Earth 
High ability to raise funds, high reputation. 
High income region. Internal regulations & 
external audit. strong public relations, 
connections to several high-net-worth 
people 
None. (Yet also suffers from the labor 
constraints in the sector and high 
employee turnover) 
Venus 
High ability to raise funds, high reputation, 
high income region, internal regulations, 
strong public relations, connections to 
some high-net-worth people, superior 
facilities 
None. (Yet also suffers from the labor 
constraints in the sector) 
Mercury 
Moderate ability to raise funds, high 
reputation, internal regulations, high 
employee identification, superior facilities, 
superior social activities 
Mostly low income regions, limited 
commercial skills 
Mars 
Entrepreneurial orientation & commercial 
skills. High reputation. Ability to find 
sponsors to activities. Extensive 
socialization for students. Savings of the 
founder used when needed 
Decreased engagement of the founder. 
No managerial work delegation 
Jupiter 
Entrepreneurial orientation. High 
reputation. Internal regulations. High 
expertise. Innovativeness. Own techniques 
and patented education tools.  
Low commercial knowledge & ability to 
raise funds. No savings of the founder to 
close working capital deficit. No 
connections to high-net-worth people. 
High burnout of the founder. Bank loans 
Saturn 
Good reputation. High employee 
identification. Low employee turnover 
Decreased engagement of the founders. 
Low income region. No transport 
offered. no managerial work delegation 
Uranus Reputation, good facility 
No ability to raise funds, no connections 
to high-net worth people. Decreased 
engagement of the founder. No 
managerial work delegation 
Neptune 
Commercial skills. Personal savings of the 
cofounder. Using municipality’s buses for 
social activities 
Low income region. High burnout. 
Decreased engagement of the specialist 
partner. High employee turnover. No 
ability to raise funds. Several partners 
Eris Expertise. Reputation 
No ability to raise funds. No managerial 
work delegation. Specifically targeted by 
competitors. High burnout 
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Figure 6 Illustrative quality-price configurations after marketization 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Illustrative quality-price configurations before marketization 
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5 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
I start this chapter by explaining the contributions of this dissertation to the literature, 
followed by the practical implications of the findings. I later describe the limitations of this 
research and suggest related future research topics.  
5.1 Contribution to Theory 
This study contributes to the literature on 3 theoretical research streams. First is the 
marketization of social sectors mainly studied by the welfare governance scholars. Second is 
the strategic management of social enterprises, which is quite a nascent area of study. Finally, 
the third research stream this dissertation contributes to is the concept of mission drift, a 
much discussed but under-researched and theorized topic related to the management of social 
enterprises.  
5.1.1 Marketization  
This study firstly contributes to the research stream on marketization through an in-
depth analyzes of the process. While existing studies focus directly on the changes occurring 
at the organizations; e.g., embracing TQM practices, and discuss their impact on the social 
value created, I provide a framework explaining the changing mechanisms in the field at 
multiple levels of analysis. Doing so, I show the micro processes operating in the field with 
the entrance of large numbers of profit-maximizers, with their connections to the social value 
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created. In addition to the acts of the profit-maximizers that are unconventional for the field, 
I explore the changes occurring in the nature and attitude of the beneficiaries as well as the 
workforce in the field, which altogether cause degeneration of the social sector, characterized 
by unfair competition, low quality of services, commodification of the beneficiaries, less 
idealistic workforce, disputes across the organizations, and decreased legitimacy. The 
pressures exerted on social enterprises by several actors, on the other hand, make them lose 
their influence in the field, and paves the way for increased degeneration. This research is 
performed in a context characterized by a weak institutional infrastructure, including poor 
regulative framework and inspections, ineffective functioning of state organizations such as 
hospitals, inadequate planning on raising workforce for the field, and limited knowledge of 
the officials on the education of disabled. The analysis also explores the role of those factors 
in facilitating the degeneration of the field.  
5.1.2 Social Enterprise Strategy 
The nascent literature on the management of social enterprises has so far been mainly 
interested on how they manage internal tensions by focusing on their adaption of practices 
and structures prescribed by the commercial and social welfare logics. A few recent attempts 
to theorize on their strategic management pertaining to their decisions on the product or 
service mix, quality, pricing, and the targeted beneficiaries, are not based on in-depth 
empirical examinations. Moreover, despite focusing on the survival of social enterprises 
while preserving their social impact, they neglect the phenomenon of competition.  
The findings of this research at the organizational level first provide a framework 
explaining the vulnerability of social enterprises to the market forces given their particular 
characteristics; the socioeconomic condition of their location, their commercial skills, 
reputation, level of corporatization, recruitment and control practices, and employee 
identification, as well as the ability to raise funds and the financial resources of the founder/s. 
Later, the findings illustrate the varying reactions of particular organizations ranging from 
strategic acts to increase their number of beneficiaries and revenues, acts to create alternative 
resources, acts to decrease costs through various means, to voluntarily or non-voluntarily 
quitting the market. The social enterprises that stay in the market have particular strategic 
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positions, either chosen deliberately or by being pushed to that position by the market forces. 
Their strategic positions, in fact, point to a typology of social enterprises according to their 
role in the mixed-form market: 
 
a) Knowledge generator: Those organizations generate knowledge in the sector by either 
their own research and development activities, or by transferring the knowledge created 
elsewhere and applying it to the context. Their scope is limited in terms of the number of 
direct beneficiaries of their services. Their main goal is to constitute a model for other 
organizations by showing the best practices, accompanied by the aim of raising public 
awareness on the success is achievable in the beneficiaries (e.g., that the mentally 
disabled children can achieve many successes when provided good education). They 
enable knowledge spillovers through collaborations with the state, universities, and with 
other organizations in the field to raise high-quality workforce to the field, to support 
research, and to disseminate quality by guiding other actors. They reserve capacity for 
high paying beneficiaries; the surplus generated from them is used for subsidizing the 
financial loss from the other beneficiaries. Examples to this type are Earth and Venus 
among the organizations in the sample, that are in not-for-profit status, and can raise 
funds.  
b) Quality enforcer: While knowledge generators charge high prices on average and serve 
a small number of individuals, quality enforcers have moderate prices and a larger pool 
of beneficiaries; e.g., Mars and Jupiter. While not reserving capacity for the high payers, 
they have flexible pricing for extra services depending on the income level of the 
beneficiaries. This type constitutes a competitive treat for the profit maximizers, pushing 
them to increase their quality. The strength of this role, however, is determined by the 
consciousness level of the beneficiaries, such that unconscious beneficiaries may not 
value their quality and easily prefer other organizations that trick them with unrealistic 
promises or provide other benefits. In order to be more attractive for the beneficiaries and 
to pose a higher threat to profit-maximizers, quality enforcers need to invest in continuous 
development. Moreover, they need a competitive orientation, not necessarily trying to 
beat the competitors but being able to promote their organizations. Yet, when they fail to 
attract a high number of beneficiaries, they neither pose a big threat for the competitors, 
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nor can sustain their quality level given the decline in their revenues, becoming obsolete 
in the market. 
c) Includer: This type of social enterprises includes a high ratio of the most disadvantaged 
individuals among their beneficiaries. In a mixed-form market, the least disadvantage 
beneficiaries are typically excluded by profit-maximizers as they do not provide profit 
opportunity. Among the social enterprises, the knowledge generators and quality 
enforcers also accept them in principle. However, the knowledge generators have very 
limited capacity and serve to a few least disadvantaged beneficiaries when they find extra 
funds; e.g. sponsors for each of these beneficiaries. Quality enforcers, on the other hand, 
subsidize the cost of some least disadvantaged beneficiaries through the surplus from the 
less disadvantaged beneficiaries, hence they need to balance their ratio. Like quality 
enforcers, the includer type may apply a flexible pricing strategy. Yet, the prices are 
significantly lower on average, with also a high ratio of free services. While they are also 
keen on catching a certain quality in their services, they invest in the development of 
quality when they catch specific opportunities; e.g., a donor wishing to build a new better 
facility, or part of it. Includers offer some amount of services at higher quality by their 
professionals, but also benefit from volunteers or apprentices to provide them extra free 
services. Their business model needs to be backed by external funds as well as a well-
managed pool of volunteers. Therefore, they need a very high level of legitimacy, which 
usually comes with a not-for-profit status, as exemplified by Mercury in the sample. 
As they get far away from these typologies, the social enterprises in this study 
suffered higher financial problems, as well as decreasing social impacts. The organizations 
do not necessarily stick to the characteristics of one type strictly, but can integrate some 
practices of other types into their operating model. However, while they benefit from a 
limited borrowing from another type, an increased borrowing may be difficult to achieve 
and/or detrimental to success. For example, Mars is a quality enforcer, but can also benefit 
from volunteers in some of its extra services, thanks to the additional legitimacy the founder 
brings with him. It benefits from the volunteers for the social activities they perform with the 
disabled children such as going to cinema. Mercury, an includer, on the other hand, can also 
find volunteer teachers for, e.g., music and dance classes. Mars also successfully benefits 
from the apprentices in its daily care center. Yet, if it increases their ratio, its quality may 
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decline, causing it to lose its competitive power against the profit-maximizers. In addition, 
while a type of social enterprise can embrace some practices of another type, not all acts are 
compatible. For example, Earth and Venus, with their attention on excellence in quality, 
cannot get use of the apprentices in their services, but only train them. 
When judging the role of the organization, one cannot compare the social enterprises 
in a field directly with the other, but needs to consider regional characteristics. More 
specifically, one social enterprise may be a quality enhancer in one region, but may be 
obsolete in terms of social impact, and/or financially not sustainable in another region. 
Saturn, for example, would be obsolete had it served with its the same quality in the regions 
served by Mars. Because, in the higher socioeconomic regions, the existence of conscious 
and wealthier families forces the organizations to increase their quality to some extent, rather 
than accepting or requesting personal benefits for registering their child. Mars, with its higher 
quality and continuous investments, is a treat for the profit-maximizers in the region, pushing 
them to increase the quality of their services. Yet, the actual quality of Saturn may be even 
less than some profit-maximizers in those regions. Similarly, Mars would not be successful, 
had it attempted to operate with the same price and quality in Saturn’s region. This is because, 
most of the potential beneficiaries would not want to or be able to pay for the expensive extra 
classes, which enable Mars to survive by creating additional revenues. 
 The mainstream strategy literature is not readily applicable to social enterprises, as it 
is based on the notion of wealth creation and capture. The aim of social enterprises is to create 
positive social impact, accompanied by the goal of being financially sustainable, or in some 
cases, distributing limited profits to their shareholders. Thus, while they need to compete 
with others for resources, the other enterprises in the sector are not rivals to beat but are actors 
who can potentially serve to create a larger social impact. In contrast to the typologies of 
Porter (1980) those focus on the profitability of firm, and in contrast to the RBV (Barney, 
1991) that focuses on sustained competitive advantage and acquiring non-imitable resources, 
the typologies emerging out of this research focus on creating a high social impact (by direct 
services, quality enforcing mechanism, the knowledge spillovers, and inclusiveness) while 
being financially sustainable. 
The roles of the social enterprises were not clearly separated before marketization, as 
they were the few organizations trying to answer a high demand with munificent resources 
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and limited competition. The findings of this research indicate that, reactions of social 
enterprises to the pressures exerted by the market are influenced by particular characteristics 
at the individual (founder/board of directors) and organizational levels, as well as its location, 
which shape the cognitions of the decision makers and constrain or enable the availability of 
particular resources. First, a larger vision of the Board of Directors enables the social 
enterprises to be able to more responsive to the pressures, moderated by their cohesion. The 
imprinted elements on the organization, founders pro-social values, entrepreneurial 
character, escalation of commitment, level of engagement, and the frame of reference effect 
their inclination to choose particular actions. The legitimacy of the organization, as well as 
the socioeconomic situation of the region, on the other hand, effect the availability of 
resources, thus the feasible set of strategic actions.  
5.1.3 Mission drift  
This research also reveals important findings regarding the concept of mission drift, 
both on its conceptualization and its antecedents. First, many organizations included in this 
study embraced business-like practices, but did not suffer mission drift. Embracing a more 
corporatized structure enabled them to better control their quality, decrease work load and 
stress on the founders, and aided the continuity of projects in the long run. Mission drift also 
did not rise because of relying more on commercial resources for income.  
On the other hand, mission drift occurred because of these factors: a) the aim of both 
profit and social value at founding, compared a purer aim of creating social value through 
commercial activities b) change in the reference points of managers and shareholders as they 
become embedded into the network of profit-maximizers c) a stratified ownership structure 
with differing backgrounds and priorities d) the pressure on the main shareholder (in this case 
by his family) to stay in the business, coupled with an expectation of income from small 
shareholders despite decreasing profit opportunity. The in-depth analysis in this study also 
revealed that a misconception of mission drift is prevalent in most of the few empirical 
studies on the topic. Specifically; there a need to separate inability from intention and to 
distinguish between mission drift and mission change, as well as a better conceptualization 
of social enterprises themselves. 
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 Drift vs inability to achieve mission: While the mission of many organizations in this 
study did not drift, in the sense that they did not focus on profits to the neglect of the social 
good, their ability to serve with high quality declined under the market pressures. Their 
poorer financial situation did not allow them to buy new teaching materials and invest in new 
teaching methods, as well as limiting the ratio of free services they could offer to the poor 
beneficiaries. The rising time constraints and psychological pressures after marketization 
also directed their attention away from service quality as well as limiting their time for 
organizing social activities and family trainings. Their missions were unchanged, and they 
were aware that they could not serve with the high quality they deemed necessary as well as 
the decreasing ratio of free services. Rather, their social impact declined in the field. 
 Drift vs change in mission: A rise in the price level and serving more to the higher 
income beneficiaries does not necessarily indicate a mission drift, but may be the result of a 
deliberate mission change, which may help create a larger social impact under the changing 
environmental conditions. In the case of Venus, for example, the managers of the foundation 
discussed what their role should be given the new circumstances, deciding to serve as a model 
for other organization as well as aiming self-sustainability of the enterprise for its long term 
survival. Therefore, its role in the field changed from serving several beneficiaries with 
moderate quality to disseminating knowledge through their applications in their center which 
serves only few beneficiaries. By still serving some lower income beneficiaries, it also posed 
a competitive treat for the organizations in its region, forcing them to raise their quality. 
 Drift vs not being a “true” social enterprise: The reasons why the organizations were 
established at the first place vary across the organizations in this study, to form three 
categories: a) founded with only social motives and the founders do not gain any financial 
benefits, b) (stated to have been) founded for creating social value, while the founders are 
distributed a small amount of, c) founded for both creating social value and making profits. 
Yet, all three categories can be included in the wide conceptualization of social enterprise, 
as they aim at achieving social missions by engaging in commercial activities, and not aim 
at maximizing their profits. Even Neptune, which suffered mission drift by eliminating heavy 
disabled beneficiaries, can still bu labeled as social enterprice as it does not do the sevreral 
unethical acts the profit-maximizers in the field do. However, perhaps it is an ethical 
organization which also wants to create high value, so that it can capture a higher value, and 
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simply decreases the value created as the value capture declines. Even if we get a more 
conservative conceptualization; for example that of Mair and Mair (2006), which adds that 
socil enterprises prioritize social objectives over financial ones, it is still not possible 
distinguish between an ethical organization operating in a social field from a social 
enterprise. Again, even Neptune, which eliminated heavy disabled, prioritizes social 
objectives over financial ones. For example, they organize conferences for the families and 
train them on how they can help the development of their children, even if the families do 
not value this, only %5 attending the seminars.  
To my knowledge, none of the articles on social enterprises clearly report on their level 
of profits and profit distribution, at best stating whether they distribute profits or not. I 
selected the participants of this study from the old organizations in the field that were founded 
by either the families of the disabled, by academics in the field, by specialists, or at least by 
the partnership of a specialist. However, there is no such concern in the stream of research 
on social enterprises, as long as they operate in a social sector. For example, researchers 
consider all work integration enterprises as social enterprises. Yet, this study shows that, 
operating in an inherently social field does not indicate that those organizations pursue social 
goals at the first place, as most of the organizations operating in the field of supplementary 
education of the disabled in Turkey are profit-maximizers. Moreover, given the rising interest 
on social enterprises, there is an inclination in the organizations to label them as social 
enterprise, as well as an inclination in the researchers to package their work under the popular 
social enterprises category. Even organic chocolate producers are conceptualized as social 
enterprises by some scholars.  
While it is difficult to distinguish the c category from an ethical organization in the 
field, it is even difficult to differentiate between an organization that cannot make profits 
(e.g. due to inefficiency) and an organization which does not make profits intentionally. 
Moreover, it is nearly impossible to know whether an enterprise is investing back in the 
business with an expectation of higher profits in the future, or because of serving best to the 
mission. In sum, the definition of a social enterprise is itself problematic, making it hard to 
explain and assess mission drift. More clearly defining the profit distribution aspect can help 
form a more robust base for the study of social enterprises, which even determines the 
maximum wage level the social entrepreneur can pay him/herself.  
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5.1 Contribution to Practice  
 The findings of this research have implications for the social and economic policy 
makers, as well as the social entrepreneurs, and the managers in the social enterprises, and 
the institutions supporting social ventures. 
5.2.1 For policy makers  
• This research firstly provides a deeper understanding of the dynamics in a social sector after 
its marketization. Reading this study, policy makers can better understand the mechanisms 
that either decrease quality, increase corruption, or exclude the most disadvantaged and can 
devise and implement appropriate regulations.  
• Second, policy makers can consider the roles of the social enterprises in a mixed-form market 
as knowledge generators and spillers, quality enforcers, and includers of the most 
disadvantaged. Clearly seeing how they differentiate from the other organizations and have 
unique roles in the ecosystem, they can consider providing some privileges such as tax 
exemptions, as well as financial support mechanisms, especially for the ones in firm status 
lacking access to grant options. While providing support to social enterprises, state can 
encourage their distribution in different regions, rather than accumulation in some districts 
while some districts lack them. This may, in fact, ensure that they fulfill their roles in the 
mixed-form market more effectively.  
• In addition, state can consider supporting the social enterprises that serve the most 
disadvantaged by making more payments for the heavy cases considering their transportation 
costs, need of more personnel, the cash needed for the construction of convenient physical 
settings for them…etc. In fact, making payments based on the disability level of the 
beneficiaries to all enterprises in the field may also seem a good strategy to prevent the 
exclusion of the most disadvantaged. However, given the dynamics in the field explained in 
this study, the expected could be that the profit-maximizers will this time seek the heavy 
cases that they exclude in current situation. And, with the lack of a well-functioning 
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inspection and quality control system, they can reimburse to the state without providing them 
a proper education, partly distributing it to some families as personal benefits. 
5.2.2 For social entrepreneurs  
• Social enterprises need to make sure that they are producing the social value defined by their 
mission while also ensuring their survival through a sustainable income stream. This study 
indicates that, they may become obsolete in changing circumstances if they do not 
continuously screen their environment and adjust their business models and strategic 
positions. Pluto, for example, became obsolete in the market as its quality declined with 
decreasing revenues, which later caused it to lose even more students. It was not able to get 
out of this vicious circle by neither promoting the center, if not actively seeking students, nor 
by creating alternative resources to compensate its financial losses. Mars, on the other hand, 
was able to promote itself by its commercial capabilities, invested in quality even in 
financially difficult times with a large vision, and also created alternative resources, thereby 
rising as a quality enforcer for its competitors. Screening its environment and modifying its 
mission to become a model organization, Venus shifted to the position of knowledge 
generator after marketization. In line with its new goal, it also changed its revenue structure 
for becoming more self-sustainable, while taking acts to enlarge its revenue base from 
donations.  
• The cases in this study show some interesting failures in terms of managing the financial 
resources of the organization, from which social entrepreneurs can take lessons. Pluto, for 
example, donated all of its surplus from the SERC to a public school for the disabled, at times 
when it could have some. While doing good in the short-run, by not investing the surplus in 
quality, it prepared its end in the mixed-form market. Despite its advantage that conscious 
families were inclined to prefer it due to foundation status, not being able to increase its 
quality level, its beneficiary base decreased. Jupiter, on the other hand, invested extensively 
in quality, which was perhaps “too much,” such that it did not have any slack resources and 
had to use bank loans, incurring interest expenses.  
• This study also stresses the importance commercial knowledge as well as a commercial 
mindset. In a mixed-form market, social enterprises should accept that they are in a 
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competitive environment even if they do not have competitive orientation. When they see 
seeking beneficiaries as unethical, they may lose their beneficiaries to other enterprises which 
serve them with less quality, e.g. the case of Mercury and Saturn. They may refrain from 
doing the same acts with the profit-maximizers to find beneficiaries, yet they may employ 
innovative tactics (See the case of Mars) which both create social impact and increase the 
visibility of their enterprise. 
• None of the corporatizated social enterprises suffered a mission drift in this study. Moreover, 
they were able to establish better quality management systems, performed better public 
relations that turned back as donations, as well as their founders suffering less of 
psychological burnout. Furthermore, how entrepreneurial and successful can a social 
entrepreneur be, if there are no established work delegation mechanisms and associated 
professionals in the organization, the organization starts to stagnate as its founder disengaged 
to some extent after a period of time. In a similar vein, an aging Board of Directors causes 
inertia in the organization, making it hard to keep up with the developments in its 
environment. However, if the organization can establish a corporatized structure and employ 
young professionals, it can combine the experience of the aging BoD with the dynamism of 
the young employees. While having a corporatized structure is important for success, so is to 
have a family-like atmosphere, from which many organizations in the sample benefitted by 
being able to retain their employees in the tight market, even with below-market wages. 
Therefore, social enterprises need to be keen on not losing the family-like identity when 
embracing business-like practices. 
• This research also provides some guidelines for the social enterprises to increase their 
resources in competitive environments (See the strategic actions of the cases). The findings 
demonstrate that the organizations which took a reactive stance by only decreasing their costs 
were limited in their ability to fulfill their missions at the end, by suffering financial problems 
and decreasing pool of beneficiaries. The ones who both focused on decreasing some costs 
and at the same time increasing their resources were more successful in the competitive 
environment. Not compromising from the quality investments during cost reduction enabled 
the social enterprises to eventually catch a desired number of beneficiaries, while the ones 
compromising from it suffered bigger losses. On the other hand, another take-away from the 
findings is not to be over-proactive to make investments building on market expectations. 
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For example, Uranus, which opened full-time private schools for the disabled upon hearing 
that the state may start making payments suffered huge financial losses. 
• Last but not the least, social enterprises seeking capital need to be careful when selecting 
investors. This is particularly important given the increased attention to impact investing both 
from social entrepreneurs and investors. It should be kept in mind that, the mission drift in 
one organization in this study did not occur because of the attitude of the main shareholder, 
but through the small shareholders who expected returns at financially difficult times. 
5.2 Limitations 
 There are some limitations of this study which are inherent to case study research. 
Firstly, it cannot assess how much the variables affect the outcome (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
However, as my aim was to build theory to explain the changing sector dynamics and the 
behaviors of social enterprises after marketization, I do not see this limitation as an important 
treat for my study. Based on the findings of this research, follow up studies may be designed 
to test the importance of the variables on the outcomes. Second, case methodology is subject 
to critiques regarding the potential subjectivity of the researcher. A well-designed and 
systematically performed study, on the other hand, can overcome this treat to validity. As I 
discussed in detail in the methods chapter, I believe that I have sufficiently eliminated this 
potential bias. However, despite using several techniques in light of the literature, such as 
triangulation of data and coding the text multiple times after some time intervals, I was not 
able to have the interview texts coded by other coders. While having multiple coders for at 
least some of the interviews could further eliminate the treat of subjectivity, I could not find 
a volunteer to dedicate to this task given the high number of codes to be dealt with. 
 Case studies are approached with suspect in terms of generalizability of the theory to 
different organizations. The use of multiple case studies and making both within-case 
analysis and cross-case comparisons; however, improves generalizability (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
I believe that my case selection techniques based on a diverse set of characteristics of social 
enterprises in terms of e.g., location, size, age, and ownership, makes the findings applicable 
to many organizations. However, there still remains some limitations of the study on 
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generalizing the findings to other mixed-form markets for two reasons; country factors and 
the nature of the service in this research.  
 First, the Turkish context is characterized by weak institutional infrastructure.  
Although I included this as a moderator in the framework, stating that it effects the level of 
degeneration after marketization of the social sectors, further in-depth research needs to be 
done in the countries with better developed infrastructures to compare the market forces and 
the reactions of social enterprises. Other than the weak infrastructure, Turkey is characterized 
by low level of education as well as moderate income per capita. The market dynamics may 
differ in high education and high income societies. However, by selecting the cases from 
districts with both high and low socioeconomic situations, I integrated this variance and its 
effects in the frameworks I developed. Yet, there may still be cultural differences to make 
people in different regions around the world act differently in a mixed-form market. For 
instance, the Japanese people with a face culture may be less inclined to engage in corruption 
or unethical acts mentioned in this context. 
 Second, the context for this study is the education of the disabled, a service that the 
beneficiaries can hardly assess the quality, and they cannot know it before trying for a long 
time period. Moreover, as each disabled individual is considered a unique case, the parents 
of the disabled cannot easily compare their child’s development to others for judging the 
quality of services. The sectors in which the services have more easily measurable outcomes 
as well as the sectors with tangible products may differ in their vulnerability to degeneration 
after marketization.  
5.3 Future Research Directions  
 First of all, following the above mentioned potential limitations for generalizing the 
findings of this study can be seen as promising avenues for future research. Studies 
replicating this research in other developing countries may help build more robust theory. In 
addition, replicating this study in the developed countries and in other social sectors both in 
developed and developing country contexts may test the generalizability of the findings and 
help enrich theory by adding contingencies. Another interesting contingency factor to test 
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may be the impact of the speed of marketization. The context of this study saw the sudden 
entrance of large numbers of profit-maximizers following regulatory changes, which 
provided me natural experiment to compare the before and after situation. Yet, a slow shift 
rather than a rapid shift to a mixed-form market may entail different dynamics; e.g., the labor 
market may not be tight and the wages may not see such an artificial rise 
Second, the outputs of this study, especially regarding the multiplicity of the strategies 
of social enterprises in a mixed-market form, may be used as inputs by other fields such as 
welfare economists, to enrich their assumptions and economic models. Moreover, by 
integrating the findings of this study, the welfare governance scholars can develop a tool to 
measure the level of degeneration across different social sectors. 
Another emerging question from this research is that how the profit-maximizers are 
affected from the existence of social enterprises, in the same district, city... etc. While this 
study partly mentions the phenomenon, I do not base the discussion on this topic directly to 
the declarations of profit-maximizers, but to other actors. Further research including the 
profit-maximizers can bring additional insights, as well as with the families to clarify the 
mechanisms and bounding conditions. For example, under which configurations are profit-
maximizers more pushed to increase quality or decrease their prices, thus increasing the 
social welfare created. Moreover, how can the knowledge spillovers occur from the social 
enterprises to other social enterprises and organizations in the field in an effective way?  
158 
 
REFERENCES 
Akçamete, G. ve Kaner, S. (1999). Cumhuriyetin 75 yılında çocuğa yönelik özel eğitim 
çalışmaları. 2. Ulusal Çocuk Kültürü Kongresi: Cumhuriyet ve Çocuk, Ankara: Ankara 
Üniversitesi Çocuk Kültürü Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Yayınları, No: 2, 395-405. 
Alexander, J. (1999). The impact of devolution on nonprofits. Nonprofit Management & 
Leadership, 10, 57-70. 
Alexander, J. (2000). Adaptive strategies of nonprofit human service organizations in an era 
of devolution and new public management. Nonprofit management and leadership, 10(3), 
287-303.  
Alter, K. (2004). Social enterprise typology. Washington, DC: Virtue Ventures LLC. 
Astley, W. G., & Van de Ven, A. H. (1983). Central perspectives and debates in organization 
theory. Administrative science quarterly, 245-273. 
Auerbach, C.F., & Silverstein, L. B. (2003). Qualitative data: An introduction to coding and 
analysis. New York: New York University Press. 
Aupperle, K. E., Carroll, A. B., & Hatfield, J. D. (1985). An empirical examination of the 
relationship between corporate social responsibility and profitability. Academy of 
management Journal, 28(2), 446-463.  
Arreman, I. E., & Holm, A. S. (2011). Privatisation of public education? The emergence of 
independent upper secondary schools in Sweden. Journal of Education Policy, 26(2), 225-
243. 
Arrow, K.J., (1963). Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care. American 
Economic Review. 53, 941–973. 
Balarin, M. (2014). The Changing Governance of Education: A Comparative Political 
Economy Perspective on Hybridity. American Behavioral Scientist, 58(11), 1446-1463. 
Ball, S. J. (2003). The teacher's soul and the terrors of performativity. Journal of Education 
Policy, 18(2), 215-228. 
Barman, E. A. (2002). Asserting difference: The strategic response of nonprofit organizations 
to competition. Social Forces, 80(4), 1191-1222.  
Barney, J. (1991). Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of 
management, 17(1), 99-120. 
Bartlett, L., Frederick, M., Gulbrandsen, T., & Murillo, E. (2002). The marketization of 
education: Public schools for private ends. Anthropology & Education Quarterly, 5-29. 
159 
 
Battilana, J., & Dorado, S. (2010). Building sustainable hybrid organizations: The case of 
commercial microfinance organizations. Academy of Management Journal, 6, 1419-1440. 
Battilana, J., Lee, M., Walker, J., & Dorsey, C. (2012). In search of the hybrid ideal. Stanford 
Social Innovation Review, 10(3), 51-55.  
Battilana, J., & Lee, M. (2014). Advancing research on hybrid organizing–Insights from the 
study of social enterprises. The Academy of Management Annals, 8(1), 397-441.  
Besharov, M. L., & Smith, W. K. (2014). Multiple institutional logics in organizations: 
Explaining their varied nature and implications. Academy of Management Review, 39(3), 
364-381. 
Bielefeld, W. (1992). Funding uncertainty and nonprofit strategies in the 1980s. Nonprofit 
Management and Leadership, 2(4), 381-401. 
Bielefeld, W. (1994). What affects nonprofit survival? Nonprofit Management and 
Leadership, 5(1), 19-36. 
Brandsen, T., & Karré, P. M. (2011). Hybrid organizations: No cause for 
concern? International Journal of Public Administration, 34(13), 827-836. 
Brown WA, Iverson JO. (2004). Exploring strategy and board structure in nonprofit 
organizations. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 33(3), 377–400. 
Brown, H. S. (2005). Nonprofit and For-Profit Competition with Public Alternatives in an 
Urban Setting with Congestion. International Regional Science Review, 28(3), 347-372.  
Brown, E., and Slivinski, A. (2006). Nonprofit organizations and the market. In Walter W. 
Powell and Richard Steinberg eds., The nonprofit sector: a research handbook. New Haven: 
Yale University Press 
Chambers, L. (2014). Growing a hybrid venture: Toward a theory of mission drift in social 
entrepreneurship (Doctoral dissertation, University of St. Gallen). 
Chandler, A. D. (1962). Strategy and structure: Chapters in the history of the American 
enterprise. Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge. 
Charmaz, K. (2006). Constructing grounded theory: A practical guide through qualitative 
analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Chew, C., & Osborne, S. P. (2009). Identifying the factors that influence positioning strategy 
in UK charitable organizations that provide public services: Toward an integrating 
model. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 38(1), 29-50. 
Child, J. (1972). Organizational structure, environment and performance: The role of 
strategic choice. Sociology, 6(1), 1-22.  
160 
 
Clarke, A. E. (2005). Situational analysis: Grounded theory after the postmodern turn. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Copestake, J. (2007). Mainstreaming microfinance: Social performance management or 
mission drift? World Development, 35(10), 1721-1738. 
Covin, J. G., & Slevin, D. P. (1989). Strategic management of small firms in hostile and 
benign environments. Strategic management journal, 10(1), 75-87. 
Dacin, P. A., Dacin, M. T., & Matear, M. (2010). Social entrepreneurship: Why we don't 
need a new theory and how we move forward from here. The academy of management 
perspectives, 24(3), 37-57.  
Dart, R. (2004). Being “business-like” in a nonprofit organization: A grounded and inductive 
typology. Nonprofit and voluntary sector quarterly, 33(2), 290-310. 
D'Aunno, T., Sutton, R. I., & Price, R. H. (1991). Isomorphism and external support in 
conflicting institutional environments: A study of drug abuse treatment units. Academy of 
Management Journal, 34(3), 636-661. 
Dees, J. G. (1998). Enterprising nonprofits. Harvard Business Review, 76(1), 55-66. 
Dees, J. G. (2012). A tale of two cultures: Charity, problem solving, and the future of social 
entrepreneurship. Journal of business ethics, 111(3), 321-334.  
Dees, J. G., & Anderson, B. B. (2003). Sector-bending: Blurring lines between nonprofit and 
for-profit. Society, 40(4), 16-27. 
Dees, J. G., Anderson, B. B. (2006). “Framing a Theory of Social Entrepreneurship: Building 
on Two Schools of Practice and Thought,” Research on Social Entrepreneurship: 
Understanding and Contributing to an Emerging Field, Association for Research on 
Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action (ARNOVA), 2006. 
Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1994). Handbook of qualitative research. Thousand Oaks 
& London: Sage. 
Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü (2002). Türkiye Özürlüler Araştırması. Retrieved on 03.12.2013 
from http://www.eyh.gov.tr/tr/8245/Turkiye-Ozurluler-Arastirmasi-Temel-Gostergeleri 
Defourny, J. (2001). From Third Sector to Social Enterprise. In Borzaga, C. & J. Defourny, 
eds., The Emergence of Social Enterprise, London and New York, Routledge, 1-18. 
Defourny, J., & Nyssens, M. (2010). Conceptions of social enterprise and social 
entrepreneurship in Europe and the United States: Convergences and divergences. Journal 
of social entrepreneurship, 1(1), 32-53. 
161 
 
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism 
and collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48(2), 147–
160. 
DiMaggio, P. J., & Anheier, H. K. (1990). The sociology of nonprofit organizations and 
sectors. Annual Review of Sociology, 16, 137–159. 
Ebrahim, A., Battilana, J., & Mair, J. (2014). The governance of social enterprises: Mission 
drift and accountability challenges in hybrid organizations. Research in Organizational 
Behavior, 34, 81-100. 
Edmondson, A. C., & McManus, S. E. (2007). Methodological fit in management field 
research. Academy of management review, 32(4), 1246-1264. 
Eikenberry, Angela M. and Jodie D. Kluver (2004), “The Marketization of the Nonprofit 
Sector: Civil Society at Risk,” Public Administration Review, 64 (2), 132–40. 
Eisenhardt, K. (1989). “Building Theories from Case Study Research”, Academy of 
Management Review, 14(4): 532-550. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1991). Better stories and better constructs: The case for rigor and 
comparative logic. Academy of Management review, 16(3), 620-627. 
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Graebner, M. E. (2007). Theory building from cases: Opportunities and 
challenges. Academy of management journal, 50(1), 25.  
Enç, M. (1972). Görme özürlüler. Gelişim uyum ve eğitimleri. Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası. 
Enç, M.; Çağlar, D., and Özsoy, Y. (1987). Özel eğitime giriş. Ankara Üniversitesi Eğitim 
Bilimleri Fakültesi Yayınları, Ankara. 
Epstein, M. J., & Yuthas, K. (2010). Mission impossible: diffusion and drift in the 
microfinance industry. Sustainability Accounting, Management and Policy Journal, 1(2), 
201-221. 
Epstein, M. J., & Yuthas, K. (2011). The critical role of trust in microfinance success: 
Identifying problems and solutions. Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship, 16(04), 
477-497. 
Fredriksson, A. (2009). On the consequences of the marketisation of public education in 
Sweden: For-profit charter schools and the emergence of the ‘market-oriented 
teacher’. European Educational Research Journal, 8(2), 299-310. 
Fowler, A. (2000). NGDOs as a moment in history: beyond aid to social entrepreneurship or 
civic innovation? Third World Quarterly, 21(4), 637-654. 
162 
 
Friedland, R. and Alford, R. (1991). Bringing Society Back. In: Symbols, Practices, and 
Institutional Contradictions. In Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio eds., The New 
Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Frumkin P, Andre-Clark A. (2000). When mission, markets, and politics collide: values and 
strategy in the nonproﬁt human services. Nonproﬁt and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 29(1), 
141-163. 
Garrow, E., & Hasenfeld, Y. (2012). Managing conflicting institutional logics: Social 
services versus market. In B. Gidron & Y. Hasenfeld (Eds.), Social enterprises: An 
organizational perspective (pp. 121-143). New York, NY: Palgrave McMillan. 
Gibbert, M., Ruigrok, W., & Wicki, B. (2008). What passes as a rigorous case study? 
Strategic management journal, 29(13), 1465-1474. 
Glaser, B. G. and Strauss, A. L. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory: strategies for 
qualitative research. New York: Aldine Transaction. 
Glynn, M. A. (2000). When cymbals become symbols: Conflict over organizational identity 
within a symphony orchestra. Organization science,11(3), 285-298. 
Golden, B. R. (1992). Research notes. The past is the past—or is it? The use of retrospective 
accounts as indicators of past strategy. Academy of Management journal, 35(4), 848-860. 
Gorard, S. (2009). What are academies the answer to? Journal of Education Policy, 24(1), 
101-103. 
Gray, B. H., & Schlesinger, M. (2002). Health. In L. M. Salamon (Ed.), The state of nonprofit 
America (pp. 65-106). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
Greenwood, R., Raynard, M., Kodeih, F., Micelotta, E. R., & Lounsbury, M. (2011). 
Institutional complexity and organizational responses. The Academy of Management 
Annals, 5(1), 317-371. 
Grohs, S. (2014). Hybrid Organizations in Social Service Delivery in Quasimarkets: The 
Case of Germany. American Behavioral Scientist, 58(11), 1425-1445. 
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1981). Effective evaluation: Improving the usefulness of 
evaluation results through responsive and naturalistic approaches. Jossey-Bass. 
Hall, P. D. (2006). A historical overview of philanthropy, voluntary associations, and 
nonprofit organizations in the United States, 1600–2000. In W.W. Powell & R.S. Steinberg 
eds., The nonprofit sector: a research handbook. New Haven: Yale University Press 
Hall, K., Alcock, P., & Millar, R. (2012). Start up and sustainability: marketisation and the 
social enterprise investment fund in England. Journal of Social Policy, 41(4), 733-749. 
163 
 
Hammersley, M., &Atkinson, P. (1995). Ethnography: Principles in practice (2nd ed.). 
London: Routledge. 
Hansmann, H., (1980). The role of nonprofit enterprise. Yale Law Journal, 89, 835–901. 
Harding, R. (2004). Social enterprise: The new economic engine? Business Strategy Review, 
15(4), 39–43. 
Hirth, R. A. (1999). Consumer information and competition between nonprofit and for-profit 
nursing homes. Journal of Health Economics, 18(2), 219-240.  
Hsu, G. (2006). Jakes of all trades and masters of none: Audiences’ reactions of spanning 
genres in feature film industry. Administrative Science Quarterly, 51, 420-450.   
Hsu, G., Hannan, M. T., & Koçak, Ö. (2009). Multiple category memberships in markets: 
An integrative theory and two empirical tests. American Sociological Review, 74, 150- 169. 
Huber, G. P., & Power, D. J. (1985). Retrospective reports of strategic‐level managers: 
Guidelines for increasing their accuracy. Strategic management journal, 6(2), 171-180. 
Jaquette, O. (2013). Why do colleges become universities? Mission drift and the enrollment 
economy. Research in higher education, 54(5), 514-543. 
James, E.  (1983).  How nonprofits grow: A model. Journal of Public Policy Analysis and 
Management, 2, 350-365. 
Jessop, B. (1999). The changing governance of welfare: recent trends in its primary functions, 
scale, and modes of coordination. Social Policy & Administration, 33(4), 348-359. 
Johnson, R. B. (1997). Examining the validity structure of qualitative 
research. Education, 118(2), 282. 
Kaboolian, L. (1998). "The New Public Management: Challenging the Boundaries of the 
Management vs. Administration Debate." Public Administration Review ,58(3),189-19. 
Kerlin, J. A. (2006). Social enterprise in the United States and Europe: Understanding and 
learning from the differences. Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit 
Organizations, 17(3), 246-262. 
Kirk, J., & Miller, M. L. (1986). Reliability and validity in qualitative research. Newbury 
Park, CA: Sage. 
Klees, S. J. (2008). A quarter century of neoliberal thinking in education: Misleading 
analyses and failed policies. Globalisation, Societies and Education, 6(4), 311-348. 
Kohli, A. K., & Jaworski, B. J. (1990). Market orientation: the construct, research 
propositions, and managerial implications. The Journal of Marketing, 1-18. 
164 
 
Kopel, M., & Brand, B. (2012). Socially responsible firms and endogenous choice of 
strategic incentives. Economic Modelling, 29(3), 982-989.  
Kraatz, M. S., & Zajac, E. J. (1996). Exploring the limits of the new institutionalism: The 
causes and consequences of illegitimate organizational change. American sociological 
review, 61(5), 812-836. 
Kraatz, M. S., & Block, E. S. (2008). Organizational implications of institutional pluralism. 
In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin-Andersson & R. Suddaby (Eds.), The Sage handbook 
of organizational institutionalism. London: Sage.  
Kraatz, M. S., Ventresca, M. J., & Deng, L. N. (2010). Precarious values and mundane 
innovations: Enrollment management in American liberal arts colleges. Academy of 
Management Journal, 53(6), 1521–1545. 
Kuttner, R. (1996). Columbia/HCA and the resurgence of the for-profit hospital 
business. New England Journal of Medicine, 335(5), 362-368.  
Kwiek, M. (2010). Creeping marketization: Where Polish private and public higher education 
sectors meet. In: Brown, R. (ed.) Higher Education and the Market, pp. 135–45. New York: 
Routledge. 
Lawrence, S., & Sharma, U. (2002). Commodification of education and academic labour—
using the balanced scorecard in a university setting. Critical perspectives on 
accounting, 13(5), 661-677. 
Lee, M., & Battilana, J. (2013). How the zebra got its stripes: Imprinting of individuals and 
hybrid social ventures. Harvard Business School Organizational Behavior Unit Working 
Paper, (14-005). 
Lee, M., & Jay, J. (2015). Strategic responses to hybrid social ventures. California 
Management Review, 57(3), 126-148. 
Lim, L., & Tan, J. (1999). The marketization of education in Singapore: Prospects for 
inclusive education. International Journal of Inclusive Education, 3(4), 339-351. 
Liu, G., Takeda, S., & Ko, W. W. (2012). Strategic orientation and social enterprise 
performance. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 43(3), 480-501. 
Lofland, J., & Lofland, L. H. (1995). Analyzing social settings: A guide to qualitative 
observations and analysis (3rd ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
Lumpkin, G.T. & Dess, G.G. (1996). Clarifying the entrepreneurial orientation construct and 
linking it to performance. Academy of Management Review, 21, 135–172. 
Mael, F. (1988). 'Organizational identification: Construct redefinition and afield application 
with organizational alumni'. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Wayne State University, 
Detroit. 
165 
 
Mair, J., & Schoen, O. (2007). Successful social entrepreneurial business models in the 
context of developing economies: An explorative study. International Journal of Emerging 
Markets, 2(1), 54-68.  
Mair, J., Battilana, J., & Cardenas, J. (2012). Organizing for society: A typology of social 
entrepreneuring models. Journal of Business Ethics,111(3), 353-373. 
Mair, J., Mayer, J., & Lutz, E. (2015). Navigating institutional plurality: Organizational 
governance in hybrid organizations. Organization Studies,36(6), 713-739. 
Mark, T. L. (1996). Psychiatric hospital ownership and performance: Do nonprofit 
organizations offer advantages in markets characterized by asymmetric information? Journal 
of Human Resources, 631-649. 
Martin, R. L., & Osberg, S. (2007). Social entrepreneurship: The case for definition. Stanford 
social innovation review, 5(2), 28-39.  
Marwell, N. P., & McInerney, P. B. (2005). The nonprofit/for-profit continuum: Theorizing 
the dynamics of mixed-form markets. Nonprofit and voluntary sector quarterly, 34(1), 7-28.  
Maxwell, J. (1992). Understanding and validity in qualitative research. Harvard educational 
review, 62(3), 279-301. 
McMurtry, S. L., Netting, F. N., and Kettner, P. M. “How Nonproﬁts Adapt to a Stringent 
Environment.” Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 1991, 1 (3), 235–252. 
Mersland, R., & Strøm, R. Ø. (2010). Microfinance mission drift? World 
Development, 38(1), 28-36.  
Mersland, R., & Strøm, R. Ø. (2008). Performance and trade‐offs in Microfinance 
Organisations—Does ownership matter? Journal of International Development, 20(5), 598-
612. 
Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth 
and ceremony. American journal of sociology, 340-363.  
Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (1984). Qualitative data analysis: A sourcebook of new 
methods. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications. 
Miles, R. E., Snow, C. C., Meyer, A. D., & Coleman, H. J. (1978). Organizational strategy, 
structure, and process. Academy of management review, 3(3), 546-562.  
Minkoff, D. C. (2002). The emergence of hybrid organizational forms: Combining identity-
based service provision and political action. Nonprofit and voluntary sector quarterly, 31(3), 
377-401. 
Moore, M. H. (2000). Managing for value: Organizational strategy in for-profit, nonprofit, 
and governmental organizations. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 29, 183-208.  
166 
 
Moulaert, F., & Ailenei, O. (2005). Social economy, third sector and solidarity relations: a 
conceptual synthesis from history to present. Urban studies,42(11), 2037-2053. 
Murray, F. (2010). The oncomouse that roared: hybrid exchange strategies as a source of 
distinction at the boundary of overlapping institutions. American Journal of 
sociology, 116(2), 341-388. 
Nag, R., Hambrick, D. C., & Chen, M. J. (2007). What is strategic management, really? 
Inductive derivation of a consensus definition of the field. Strategic management 
journal, 28(9), 935-955.  
Narver, J. C., & Slater, S. F. (1990). The effect of a market orientation on business 
profitability. The Journal of marketing, 20-35. 
Nicholls, A. (ed.) (2006) Social Entrepreneurship, New Models of Sustainable Social 
Change, Oxford University Press. 
OECD (1999). Social Enterprises. Paris: OECD. 
Oldham, G. R., & Hackman, J. R. (1981). Relationships between organizational structure and 
employee reactions: Comparing alternative frameworks. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
66-83.  
Olivares-Ploanco, F. (2007). Commercializing Microfinance and Deepening Outreach? 
Empirical Evidence from Latin America. Journal of Microfinance. 7(2), 47-69. 
Oliver, C. (1991). Strategic responses to institutional processes. Academy of management 
review, 16(1), 145-179.  
Ölçen, M. (2005). Özürlüler Yokuşu, Ajans Türk, Ankara. 
Özsoy, Y. (1990). Türkiye’de özel eğitim. Eğitim Bilimleri I. Ulusal Kongresi. Ankara: 24-
28 Eylül. Ankara Üniversitesi Eğitim Bilimleri Fakültesi Yayınları, Ankara. 
Pache, A. C., & Santos, F. (2010). When worlds collide: The internal dynamics of 
organizational responses to conflicting institutional demands. Academy of management 
review, 35(3), 455-476. 
Pache, A. C., & Santos, F. (2013). Inside the hybrid organization: Selective coupling as a 
response to competing institutional logics. Academy of Management Journal, 56(4), 972-
1001. 
Palmer, I. (1996). Arts management cutback strategies: A cross‐sector analysis. Nonprofit 
Management and Leadership, 7(3), 271-290.  
Pettigrew, A. (1988) Longitudinal field research on change: Theory and practice. Paper 
presented at the National Science Foundation Conference on Longitudinal Research Methods 
in Organizations, Austin. 
167 
 
Phillips, L. W. (1981). Assessing measurement error in key informant reports: A 
methodological note on organizational analysis in marketing. Journal of Marketing 
Research, 395-415. 
Porter, M. E. (1980). Competitive strategy: techniques for analyzing industries and 
competitors. New York: Free Press. 
Porter, M. E. (1985). Competitive advantage: creating and sustaining superior 
performance. New York: Free Press. 
Pratt, M. G., & Foreman, P. O. (2000). Classifying managerial responses to multiple 
organizational identities. Academy of Management Review, 25(1), 18-42. 
Ramus, T., & Vaccaro, A. (2014). Stakeholders matter: How social enterprises address 
mission drift. Journal of Business Ethics, 1-16. 
Reay, T., & Hinings, C. R. (2009). Managing the rivalry of competing institutional 
logics. Organization studies, 30(6), 629-652. 
Robertson, S. L. (2009). Globalization, education governance, and citizenship regimes: New 
democratic deficits and social injustices. In W. Ayers, T. Quinn, & D. Stovall (Eds.), 
Handbook of social justice in education (pp. 542-553). New York: Routledge. 
Salamon, L.M. (1995). Partners in public service. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
Salamon, L.M. (1997). Holding the Center: America’s Nonprofit Sector at a Crossroads. 
New York: Nathan Cummings Foundation.  
Saldana, J. (2009). The coding manual for qualitative researchers. Los Angeles, CA: SAGE. 
Santos, F. M. (2012). A positive theory of social entrepreneurship. Journal of business 
ethics, 111(3), 335-351.  
Santos, F., Pache, A. C., & Birkholz, C. (2015). Making Hybrids Work. California 
Management Review, 57(3), 36-58. 
Schlesinger, M., Dorwart, R., Hoover, C., & Epstein, S. (1997). Competition, ownership, and 
access to hospital services: evidence from psychiatric hospitals. Medical Care, 35(9), 974-
992.  
Schneider, B., White, S. S., & Paul, M. C. (1998). Linking service climate and customer 
perceptions of service quality: Tests of a causal model. Journal of applied Psychology, 83(2), 
150. 
Scott, W. R. (2000). Institutional change and healthcare organizations: From professional 
dominance to managed care. University of Chicago Press. 
168 
 
Scott, W. R.  (2008), Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interests, Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage. 
Selznick, P. (1948). Foundations of the Theory of Organization. American sociological 
review, 13(1), 25-35. 
Sharir, M., & Lerner, M. (2006). Gauging the success of social ventures initiated by 
individual social entrepreneurs. Journal of world business, 41(1), 6-20. 
Shoham, A., Ruvio, A., Vigoda-Gadot, E., & Schwabsky, N. (2006). Market orientations in 
the nonprofit and voluntary sector: A meta-analysis of their relationships with organizational 
performance. Nonprofit and voluntary sector quarterly, 35(3), 453-476. 
Short, J. C., Moss, T. W., & Lumpkin, G. T. (2009). Research in social entrepreneurship: 
Past contributions and future opportunities. Strategic entrepreneurship journal, 3(2), 161-
194. 
Sloan, F. A., Picone, G. A., Taylor, D. H., & Chou, S. Y. (2001). Hospital ownership and 
cost and quality of care: is there a dime’s worth of difference? Journal of health 
economics, 20(1), 1-21. 
Siggelkow, N. (2007). Persuasion with case Studies. Academy of Management Journal, 
50(1), 20–24. 
Smallbone, D., M. Evans, I. Ekanem, and Butters, S.  (2001). Researching social enterprise. 
Final Report to the small business service. Centre for Enterprise and Economic Development 
Research, Middlesex University. 
Smith, S. R. (2002). Social services. In L. M. Salamon (Ed.), The state of nonprofit America 
(pp. 149-186). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
Smith, W. K., Gonin, M., & Besharov, M. L. (2013). Managing social-business tensions: A 
review and research agenda for social enterprise. Business Ethics Quarterly, 23(03), 407-
442. 
Steinberg, R. (1987). Nonprofit Organizations and the Market p. 118-40 in The Nonprofit 
Sector: A Research Handbook, In Walter W. Powell ed. Yale University Press. 
Stevens, R., Moray, N., Bruneel, J., & Clarysse, B. (2015). Attention allocation to multiple 
goals: The case of for‐profit social enterprises. Strategic Management Journal, 36(7), 1006-
1016. 
Stewart, D. M., Kane, P. R., & Scruggs, L. (2002). Education and training. In L. M. Salamon 
(ed.), The state of nonprofit America (pp. 107-148). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 
Press. 
169 
 
Stone, M. M., Bigelow, B., & Crittenden, W. (1999). Research on strategic management in 
nonprofit organizations synthesis, analysis, and future directions. Administration & 
Society, 31(3), 378-423. 
Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1998). Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and procedures 
for developing grounded theory (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional 
approaches. Academy of management review, 20(3), 571-610.  
Suda, Y., & Guo, B. (2011). Dynamics between nonprofit and for-profit providers operating 
under the long-term care insurance system in Japan. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly, 40(1), 79-106. 
Suddaby, R. (2006). From the editors: What grounded theory is not. Academy of management 
journal, 49(4), 633-642. 
Swanson, L. A., & Di Zhang, D. (2010). The social entrepreneurship zone. Journal of 
Nonprofit & Public Sector Marketing, 22(2), 71-88.  
T.C Aile ve Sosyal Politikalar Bakanlığı Engelli ve Yaşlı Hizmetleri Müdürlüğü (2014). 
Destek Özel Eğitim Hizmetlerinin Verimliliğini Araştırma Projesi Raporu. 
TC. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Denetleme Kurulu (2009). Denetleme Raporu, 27/08/ 2009, 
No: 2009 /5. 
Thompson, J. L. (2002). The world of the social entrepreneur. International journal of public 
sector management, 15(5), 412-431.  
Thornton, P. H., & Ocasio, W. (1999). Institutional logics and the historical contingency of 
power in organizations: Executive succession in the higher education publishing industry, 
1958–1990. American journal of Sociology,105(3), 801-843. 
Tuckman, H. P. (1998). Competition, commercialization, and the evolution of nonprofit 
organizational structures. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 17(2), 175-194. 
T.C. Başbakanlık Özürlüler İdaresi Başkanlığı (2001). Özürlüler için ülke raporu, 1995-
2000. Ankara 
Van Maanen, J. (1999). Case Studies: why now, more than ever, cases are important. In A.-
Y. Chen & J. Van Maanen (Eds) The Reflective Spin (pp. 25-45). Singapore: World 
Scientific.  
Yin, R. K. (1984). Case study research. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. 
Yin, R. K. (2003). Case study research: Design and methods (3rd ed.). SAGE Publications 
170 
 
Young, D. R. (1998). Commercialism in nonprofit social service associations: Its character, 
significance, and rationale. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 17(2), 278-297. 
Young, D. R., Jung, T., & Aranson, R. (2010). Mission—market tensions and nonprofit 
pricing. The American Review of Public Administration, 40(2), 153-169. 
York, A., & Zychlinski, E. (1996). Competing nonprofit organizations also collaborate. 
Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 7(1), 15-27.  
Yunus, M. (2006). Statement by Professor Muhammad Yunus. ITU World Information 
Society Award Ceremony. Retrieved from 
http://www.itu.int/wisd/2006/award/statements/yunus.html on 31.05.2016. 
Wagenaar, K. (2012). Institutional transformation and mission drift in microfinance. Centre 
of Development Studies, University of Cambridge.  
Wallace, S. L. (1999). Social entrepreneurship: The role of social purpose enterprises in 
facilitating community economic development. Journal of developmental 
entrepreneurship, 4(2), 153.  
Weerawardena, J., & Mort, G. S. (2012). Competitive strategy in socially entrepreneurial 
nonprofit organizations: Innovation and differentiation. Journal of Public Policy & 
Marketing, 31(1), 91-101. 
Weisbrod, B. (1977). The voluntary sector: An economic analysis. Lexington, MA: 
Lexington Books. 
Weisbrod, B. (1998a). Guest editor’s introduction: The nonprofit mission and its financing. 
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 17(2), 165-174. 
Weisbrod, B. A. (1998b). To profit or not to profit. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Willmott, H. (1995). Managing the academics: Commodification and control in the 
development of university education in the UK. Human Relations, 48(9), 993-1027. 
Wood, V. R., Bhuian, S., & Kiecker, P. (2000). Market orientation and organizational 
performance in not-for-profit hospitals. Journal of Business Research, 48(3), 213-226. 
Wooten, M., & Hoffman, A. J. (2008). Organizational fields: Past, present and future. In R. 
Greenwood, C. Oliver, R. Suddaby & K. Sahlin (eds.), The Sage Handbook of Organizational 
Institutionalism (pp. 130-147). 
Zucker, L. G. (1991). The role of institutionalization in cultural persistence. In W. W. Powell 
& P. J. DiMaggio (Eds.) The new institutionalism in organizational analysis (pp. 83–107). 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Zuckerman, E. (1999). The categorical imperative: Securities analysts and the illegitimacy 
discount. American Journal of Sociology, 104(5), 1398–1438.
171 
 
APPENDICES 
Interview Questions for Managers (Translated to English) 
1. How long have you been working here? 
2. When you look at the historical development of the field of special education and 
rehabilitation in Turkey, what kinds of changes do you observe? 
3. (If not mentioned in the answer to the above question): 
How do you interpret the legislative changes in 1996 and 2006? What were their 
causes? 
When we look at the history of your organization… 
4. How was it founded? When, where, by whom, with which specific aim? 
5. How did the activities change over time? E.g., new activities, change in the 
importance given to some activities, the disabled groups you serve… What were the 
reasons for the changes? 
6. Have there been any modifications in the mission (either written or unwritten)? 
7. Organizational identity means: "Who we are, what do we do, what are the core 
values, which adjectives define the organization- what is distinctive about it?" How 
would you define your organizational identity? 
8. Do you depict any changes in the way the public/stakeholders see you over time? If 
so, what do you think are the reasons? 
9. Did you experience any changes in the amount of donations you collect, and the 
number of volunteers you attract? If so, why do you think this happened? 
Now, I have some questions regarding the management of the organization… 
10. What is effectiveness for this organization? (When would you deem it as successful?) 
11. Do you have a defined long term strategy? 
12. Do you have measurable goals at organization level? Do you track and report your 
performance? 
13. According to what criteria do you select your employees? 
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14. Do you track the performance of the employees? What are the main criteria? 
15. Did the strategy, goals, and performance criteria change over time? How? 
16. If you were to cluster the organizations in special education and rehabilitation field, 
what would those clusters consist of, according to which criteria? 
17. How were the clusters before those changes in the field? 
18. How is your organization positioned with respect to others on: the content of 
education, quality, prices, characteristics of beneficiaries (Severity of the disability, 
education/income of the family…) 
19. Were there changes in your organization on those dimensions over time? How, why? 
20. Do you have relationships with other education centers? What kind of relationships? 
21. Who are your benchmarks? 
22. Is there competition in the field? Who competes with whom, on what? Who are your 
competitors? 
23. What percent of the revenues come from the government?  
24. Which additional services do you provide above what the government pays? With 
fee, or free? How do you determine the fees? 
25. (If the SERC is operated by a foundation)  
a) What are the sources of income for the foundation? How did your income portfolio 
change over time? 
b) Can the SERC sustain financially and create funds for the foundation, or do you 
transfer funds from the foundation? How did this situation change? What is the 
target in long run? 
26. As a social enterprise, you have both social and financial goals. Do you experience 
competing demands by those goals? Can you give examples? How do you balance 
them?  
27. Lastly, could you tell me about your future plans? E.g. growth, scope of activities, 
financial issues? 
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Interview Questions for Managers (in Turkish) 
1. Kaç yıldır burada çalışıyorsunuz? 
2. Türkiye'de özel eğitim ve rehabilitasyon alanının geçmişine baktığınızda, zaman 
içinde ne gibi değişiklikler gözlemlemek mümkün? 
3. (Önceki soruya cevap olarak değinmedi ise) 1996 ve 2006’daki kanun değişikliklerini 
nasıl yorumluyorsunuz? Ne gibi sonuçlara yol açtı? 
Kurumunuzun tarihçesine baktığımızda… 
4. Nasıl kuruldu? Kimler tarafından, hangi özgün amaç ile? 
5. Bugüne geldiğimizde, faaliyetlerde ne gibi değişiklikler oldu? Örneğin yeni 
faaliyetler, iptal edilenler, önem artması/azalması, içerilen engelli grupları… 
Değişikliklerin sebepleri nelerdi? 
6. Misyonunuzda, yazılı veya yazılı olmayan, değişiklikler oldu mu? 
7. Örgütsel kimlik kavramı şudur: "biz kimiz, ne yaparız, temel değerlerimiz nelerdir, 
hangi sıfatlar kurumu tanımlar- onu diğerlerinden ayıran nelerdir?" Kurumun 
örgütsel kimliğinizi nasıl tanımlarsınız? 
8. Sizce zaman içinde toplumun/paydaşların size bakışında değişiklikler oldu mu? Oldu 
ise, bu neden olabilir? 
9. Zaman içinde topladığınız bağışlarda, veya gönüllü sayısında değişiklikler saptadınız 
mı? Bu neden olabilir? 
Şimdi kurumun yönetimi ile ilgili bazı sorularım var… 
10. Bu kurum için "etkin olmak" nedir? (neleri yapabilirse başarılı olmuş sayılır?) 
11. Tanımlı bir uzun vadeli stratejiniz var mı? 
12. Örgüt seviyesinde ölçülebilir hedefleriniz var mı? Performansınızı takip edip 
raporluyor musunuz? 
13. Çalışanlarınızı hangi kriterlere göre seçiyorsunuz? 
14. Çalışanlarınızın performansını izliyor musunuz? Ana kriterler nedir? 
15. Zaman içinde strateji, hedefler ve performans kriterlerinde değişiklikler oldu mu? Ne 
gibi? 
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16. Özel eğitim ve rehabilitasyon alanında faaliyet gösteren örgütleri kümelemenizi 
istesem, bu kümeler ne olurdu, hangi kritere göre? 
17. Alanda bu değişiklikler olmadan önce bu kümeler nasıldı? 
18. Diğerlerine göre kurumunuz nasıl konumlanmış durumda? Eğitim içeriği, kalitesi, 
fiyat, faydalanıcıların özellikleri (engelin derecesi, ailenin eğitimi/geliri...) 
19. Bu boyutlarda kurumunuz zaman içinde değişti mi? Nasıl, neden? 
20. Diğer özel eğitim ve rehabilitasyon merkezleriyle ilişkileriniz var mı? Nasıl ilişkiler? 
21. Örnek aldığınız kurumlar kimler? 
22. Bu alanda rekabet var mı? Kim kimle rekabet ediyor? Ne için? Sizin rakipleriniz 
kimler? 
23. Gelirlerinin ne kadarı devletten geliyor?  
24. Devletin ödediğinin üzerine ek olarak nasıl hizmetler sunuyor? Ücretli, ücretsiz? 
Ücretleri nasıl belirliyorsunuz? 
25. (Eğer bir vakıfa bağlı merkez ise)  
a) Vakfın gelir kaynakları neler? Zaman içinde gelir portföyü nasıl değişti?  
b) Özel eğitim ve rehabilitasyon merkezi kendini kurtarıp vakfa gelir yaratabiliyor mu? 
Yoksa vakıftan mı fon aktarımı var? Bu zamanla nasıl değişti? Hedef nedir? 
26. Bir sosyal girişim olarak, hem sosyal hem finansal hedefleriniz var. Bu hedefler 
üzerinizde birbiriyle çelişen baskılar yaratıyor mu? Örnek verebilir misiniz? Nasıl 
başa çıktınız bu durumlarla? 
27. Son olarak gelecek planlarınız neler? Büyüme, faaliyetlerin kapsamı, finansal 
konular...? 
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Interview Questions for Founders and Board Members (Translated to English) 
1. When you look at the historical development of the field of special education and 
rehabilitation in Turkey, what kinds of changes do you observe? (e.g., number of 
schools, quality of education, accessibility, price, number of available teachers...) 
2. (If not mentioned in the answer to the above question): How do you interpret the 
legislative changes in 1996 and 2006? What were their causes? 
3. Is there much competition in the field? Who competes with whom? For what?  
4. If you were to cluster the organizations in special education and rehabilitation field, what 
would those clusters consist of, according to which criteria? 
5. What kind of clusters were there in the filed before the changes? 
6. How do you think the changes effect the organizations in the field? How did they respond 
to the changes? 
When we look at the history of your organization… 
7. How was it founded? By whom, with which specific aim? 
8. Which activities did the organization perform in the initial years? Were there any 
changes across time in the scope of activities?  
9. Did the relative importance of some activities increase/decrease over time? (e.g., 
education, seminars, research, commercial activities...) 
Could we now talk a little bit about the management of the organization…? 
10. What is the mission of the organization? Have there been any modifications in the 
mission (either written or unwritten)? Why? 
11. What is effectiveness for this organization? When would you deem it as successful? 
12. Do you have specific strategic goals? What are they? 
13. Did the organizational goals change over time? How? 
14. Organizational identity means: "Who we are, what do we do, what are the core values, 
which adjectives define the organization- what is distinctive about it?" With which 
adjectives would you define your organizational identity? 
15. Do you think there have been changes in organizational identity over time? If so, why?  
16. What is the level of bureaucracy in the organization? Do you have many written rules 
and procedures? 
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17. Do you have relationships with other SERCs? What kind of relationships? 
18. Who are your competitions?  
19. Who are your benchmarks? 
20. May I want you to rate your organization on following aspects: 
a)   Education quality (1-low, 5-high) (compared to others in the field) 
b) Originality of the education methods (1- not different, 5- much different) 
c) Intensity of extra services offered (theatre, music, trips, workshops...etc.) 
d) Price level (1- low, 5- high) 
e) The disability level of beneficiaries (1-relatively light, 5-heavy cases) 
21. Can we talk more about their details? 
a) How do you maintain quality in education? 
b) How do you provide the differentiation of education methods? 
c) What kinds of extra services do you offer? Which of the are paid services? 
d) What portion of the revenues come from the state? What is the hourly rate for extra 
classes? How do you determine these rates? 
e) Do you consider the level of disability when recording the students? 
22. Is this positioning your preference? What factors make you position like this? 
23. How was your organization positioned in those dimensions before the changes in the 
field? How did the changes affect your organization? 
24. Did you take any precautions in order to survive? What were they? 
25. Can the organization make profits? How did the profitability change over time? 
26. (If operated by a foundation)  
a) What are the revenue sources of the foundation? How did they change in time? 
b) Can the SERC sustain and create funds for the foundation, or do you transfer funds 
from the foundation? How did this situation change? What is the target in long run? 
27. As a social enterprise, you have both social and financial goals. Do you experience 
competing demands by those goals? Can you give examples? How do you balance 
them?  
28. Lastly, could you tell me about your future plans?
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Interview Questions for Founders and Board Members (Turkish) 
1. Türkiye'de özel eğitim ve rehabilitasyon alanının geçmişine baktığınızda, zaman içinde 
ne gibi değişiklikler gözlemlemek mümkün? (örn: kurum sayısı, eğitim seviyesi, 
erişebilirlik, fiyat, öğretmen sayısı...) 
2. (Önceki sorunun cevabında değinmedi ise) 1996 ve 2006’daki kanun değişikliklerini 
nasıl yorumluyorsunuz? Ne gibi sonuçlara yol açtı? 
3. Alandaki kurumlar arasında rekabet çok mu? Kim kiminle ne için rekabet ediyor? 
4. Özel eğitim ve rehabilitasyon alanında faaliyet gösteren örgütleri kümelemenizi 
istesem, bu kümeler ne olurdu, hangi kritere göre? 
5. Alandaki değişiklik öncesi nasıl kümeler vardı? 
6. Sizce alandaki değişiklikler genel olarak eski kurumları ne yönde etkiledi? Ve 
değişikliğe nasıl tepkiler verdiler? 
Sizin kurumunuza bakacak olursak... 
7. Nasıl kuruldu? Kimler tarafından, hangi özgün amaç ile? 
8. Kuruluş yıllarında hangi faaliyetler vardı, zaman içinde değişiklik oldu mu?  
9. Önemi artan/azalan faaliyetler oldu mu? (örn; eğitim, seminer, araştırma, ticari...) 
Şimdi, kurumun yönetimi ile ilgili birkaç soru soracağım 
10. Kurumun misyonu nedir? Misyonunuzda, yazılı veya yazılı olmayan, değişiklikler oldu 
mu? Neden? 
11. Bu kurum için "etkin olmak" nedir? (Neleri yapabilirse başarılı olmuş sayılır?) 
12. Belirli stratejik hedefleriniz var mı? Varsa bunlar neler? 
13. Zaman içinde örgütsel hedeflerde değişiklikler oldu mu? Ne gibi değişiklikler? 
14. Örgütsel kimlik kavramı şudur: "biz kimiz? Ne yaparız, temel değerler nelerdir, bizi 
diğerlerinden ayıran nelerdir?" Kurumunuzun örgütsel kimliğinizi tanımlamanızı 
istesem, hangi sıfatlarla tanımlarsınız? 
15. Sizce örgütsel kimliğinizde zaman içinde değişiklikler oldu mu? Öyleyse neden? 
16. Kurumda bürokrasi ne seviyede? (çok sayıda yazılı kural ve prosedür var mı?) Bu 
zaman içinde değişti mi? Neden? 
17. Diğer özel eğitim ve rehabilitasyon merkezleriyle ilişkileriniz var mı? Ne tip? 
18. Rakipleriniz kimler?  
19. Örnek aldığınız kurumlar kimler? 
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20. Kurumunuzu şu konularda 5 üzerinden notlamanızı istesem 
a)  Verilen eğitimin kalitesi (1-düşük, 5-yüksek) (alandak diğer kurumlara göre) 
b) Eğitim yöntemlerinin diğer kurumlardan farklılığı (1- farklı değil, 5-çok farklı) 
c) Farklı ek hizmetler sunulması (tiyatro, müzik, gezi, atölye çalışmaları...vb) 
d) Fiyat seviyesi (1- düşük, 5- yüksek) 
e) Faydalanıcıların engel derecesi (1-göreceli olarak hafif, 5-ağır engelli) 
21. Bunların detayına bakarsak... 
a) Eğitimde kaliteyi nasıl sağlıyorsunuz? 
b) Eğitim yönteminde farklılaşmayı nasıl sağlıyorsunuz? 
c) Hangi farklı hizmetleriniz var? Bunlardan hangileri ücretli? 
d) Gelirlerinin ne kadarı devletten geliyor? Devletin ödediği dışında verilen derslerin 
ücreti ne kadar? Ücretleri nasıl belirliyorsunuz? 
e) Öğrenci kabul ederken engelin ağırlık derecesine de bakıyor musunuz?  
22. Bu şekilde konumlanmak özel bir tercih mi?  Hangi unsurlar böyle konumlanmanıza 
yol açıyor? 
23. Alandaki değişiklik öncesi bu boyutlarda kurumunuz nasıldı? Değişiklikler 
kurumunuzu bu boyutlarda nasıl etkiledi?  
24. Kurumun hayatta kalması için stratejik önlemler aldınız mı? Bunlar neler? 
25. Kurum kar edebiliyor mu? Karlılık zaman içinde nasıl değişti? 
26. (Vakıf ise)  
a) Vakfın gelir kaynakları neler? Zaman içinde gelir portföyü nasıl değişti? 
b) Kurum kendini kurtarıp vakfa gelir yaratabiliyor mu? Yoksa vakıftan mı fon aktarımı 
var? Bu zamanla nasıl değişti? Hedef nedir?  
27. Bu alanda bir kurum olarak, hem sosyal hem finansal hedefleriniz var. Bu hedefler 
üzerinizde birbiriyle çelişen baskılar yaratıyor mu? Örnek verebilir misiniz? Nasıl başa 
çıktınız bu durumlarla? 
28. Son olarak gelecek planlarınız ve hedefleriniz neler? 
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Dataset Requested from the Organizations (English) 
(The data was requested for years 2006, 2010 and 2014) 
Total number of branches: 
(Please answer below questions by considering all branches) 
Total number of paid workers: 
Total number of volunteer workers: 
Total student capacity (as stated in MoE’s approval): 
Total number of students: 
Total number of teachers: 
Number of teachers with double majors: 
Number of teachers with a graduate degree: 
Average years of experience of teachers (in years): 
Mark the groups of disability the organizations served 
Mental disability 
Pervasive developmental disorder 
Hearing impairment 
Visual impairment 
Special learning difficulty 
Physically disabled 
Cerebral palsy 
Speech and language difficulties 
Attention deficit and hyperactivity 
Other (please indicate) 
Allocation of employees (write numbers in the boxes)  
Special education teacher 
Mentally disabled teacher 
Hearing impairment teacher 
Visual impairment teacher 
Class teacher 
Class teacher with certificate 
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Child development and education teacher  
Physiotherapist 
Psychologist 
Psychological consultant/ Guidance teacher 
Speech and language difficulties specialist 
Speech and language therapist 
Speech and language pathologist 
Audiology and speech difficulties specialist 
Educational audiologist 
Preschool teacher 
Social services specialist 
Ergo therapist (Occupational therapist) 
Doctor 
Nurse/ Assistant health personnel 
Social services specialist/ Social worker 
Physical education teacher 
Music teacher 
Art teacher 
Education programmer 
Other  
Please mark the activities other than education 
Art workshops 
Theatre 
Music activities 
Sports activities 
Dance activities 
Other (please indicate) 
On average, how many hours of education do you provide for a student in a month, except the 
mandatory hours? 
Please note the hourly price for the mandatory hours if you charge more than what the state pays: 
What is the average hourly fee for the extra hours of education provided? 
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Allocation of the revenues of the special education and rehabilitation center (in percentages) 
Education revenues invoiced to the state 
Education revenues not invoiced to the state (extra classes, art therapy etc.)  
Commercial revenues unrelated to education (other services and products) 
Direct donations to the special education and rehabilitation center, sponsorships 
(If run by a foundation) Funds transferred by the foundation 
Extra services that support special education and rehabilitation 
Application of measurement tools aiming at diagnosis 
Application of various tests to the children and families 
Application of educational diagnosis tools 
Keeping records of and following up the students’ health 
Providing psychological consultancy and guidance services to the families 
Application of systematic family education programs 
Providing systematic in-service training for the employees 
Maintenance of the orthoses, prosthesis, and tools the students use 
Application of first aid in cases or emergency 
Other....... 
Number of students which get services for free from your organization: 
Percentage of the students which come from other districts: 
Is school bus offered?  
If school bus offered, is it a paid service? 
Number of in-service trainings organized in the organization (per year) 
Seminars organized out of the organization (per year) 
A teacher of the organization has on average been sent to a conference/training in another country 
for …. days. 
A teacher of the organization has on average been sent to conference/training within the country 
for …. days. 
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Dataset Requested from the Organizations (Turkish) 
The data was requested for years 2006, 2010 and 2014 
Toplam şube sayısı: 
(Lütfen aşağıdaki soruları tüm şubeleri göz önüne alarak yanıtlayınız) 
Toplam ücretli çalışan sayısı: 
Toplam gönüllü çalışan sayısı: 
Toplam öğrenci kapasitesi (MEBin onayda belirttiği): 
Toplam öğrenci sayısı: 
Toplam öğretmen sayısı: 
Çift anadal yapmış öğretmen sayısı: 
Lisansüstü derecesi olan öğretmen sayısı: 
Öğretmenlerin ortalama iş tecrübesi (yıl olarak): 
Hizmet verilen engel gruplarını işaretleyiniz 
Zihin Engelli 
Yaygın Gelişimsel Bozukluk 
İşitme Engelli 
Görme Engelli 
Özel Öğrenme Güçlüğü 
Bedensel Engelli 
SerebralPalsi 
Dil Konuşma Güçlüğü 
Duygu ve Davranış Bozukluğu 
Dikkat Eksikliği ve Hiperaktivite 
Diğer (belirtiniz) 
Çalışanların dağılımı (kutulara sayı yazınız)  
Özel Eğitim Öğretmeni 
Zihin Engelliler Öğretmeni 
İşitme Engelliler Öğretmeni 
Görme Engelliler Öğretmeni 
Sınıf Öğretmeni 
183 
 
Sertifikalı Sınıf Öğretmeni 
Çocuk Gelişimi Ve Eğitimi Öğretmeni  
Fizyoterapist 
Psikolog 
Psikolojik Danışman/Rehber Öğretmen 
Dil ve Konuşma Bozuklukları Uzmanı 
Dil ve Konuşma Terapisti 
Dil ve Konuşma Patoloğu 
Odyoloji ve Konuşma Bozuklukları Uzmanı 
Eğitim Odyoloğu 
Okul Öncesi Öğretmeni 
Sosyal Hizmet Uzmanı 
Ergoterapist (İş-Uğraşı Terapisti) 
Hekim 
Hemşire/Yardımcı Sağlık Personeli 
Sosyal Hizmet Uzmanı / Sosyal Çalışmacı 
Beden Eğitimi Öğretmeni 
Müzik Öğretmeni 
Resim Öğretmeni 
Eğitim Programcısı 
Diğer  
Eğitim dışı aktiviteleri işaretleyiniz 
Resim atölyesi 
Tiyatro 
Müzik faaliyetleri 
Spor faaliyetleri 
Dans faaliyetleri 
Diğer (lütfen belirtiniz) 
Zorunlu saatler dışında bir öğrenciye ayda ortalama ne kadar eğitim veriyorsunuz? 
Zorunlu saatler için devletin ödediğinin üzerinde bir ücret alıyorsanız saat ücretini belirtiniz: 
Verilen ek eğitim saatleri için talep edilen ortalama saat ücreti nedir? 
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Özel eğitim ve rehabilitasyon merkezinin gelir kaynaklarının dağılımı (% olarak belirtiniz) 
Devlete fatura edilen eğitim gelirleri 
Devlete fatura edilmeyen eğitim gelirleri (ek ders, sanat terapisi vb.)  
Eğitim ile ilgili olmayan ticari gelirler (dışarıya ürün ve hizmet satışı) 
Özel eğitim ve rehabilitasyon merkezine direkt bağışlar, sponsorluklar 
(Vakıf okulu ise) Vakıfça aktarılan fonlar 
Özel eğitim ve rehabilitasyon hizmetlerini destekleyici ek hizmetler 
Tanılamaya yönelik ölçme araçlarının uygulanması 
Çocuğa ve aileye yönelik çeşitli testlerin uygulanması 
Eğitsel tanılama araçlarının uygulanması 
Çocukların sağlığıyla ilgili kişisel kayıtların tutulması ve takibi 
Ailelere psikolojik danışma ve rehberlik hizmetlerinin sunulması 
Sistemli aile eğitimi programlarının uygulanması 
Personelin sistemli hizmetiçi eğitimden geçirilmesi 
Öğrencilerin kullandığı ortez, protez ve cihazların bakımı 
Acil durumlarda ilkyardım uygulamalarının yapılması 
Diğer....... 
Kurumunuzdan ücretsiz yararlanan öğrenci sayısı: 
Kuruma ilçe dışından gelen öğrencilerin yüzdesi: 
Servis mevcut mu?  
Servis mevcut ise, ücretli mi? 
Kurumda düzenlenen hizmet içi öğrenme seminerleri sayısı (yılda) 
Kurumun düzenlediği kurum dışı seminer sayısı (yılda) 
Kurumda çalışan bir öğretmen, kurumca ortalama .... gün yurtdışı eğitim/seminere gönderilmiştir 
Kurumda çalışan bir öğretmen, kurumca ortalama .... gün yurtiçi eğitim/seminere gönderilmiştir 
 
 
 
 
 
185 
 
Employee Survey Questions (English) 
Please forward the survey to the employees who work as a teacher, psychologist or 
manager in your organization. 
Your age: 
Education level: High school/University/Master’s degree/PhD 
The department you graduated from at university: 
Your total experience in the field of special education (years): 
How long have you been working for this organization? 
Your position in the organization: 
Teacher/therapist/psychologist 
Manager/assistant manager 
Other (please indicate) 
Are you the owner or a shareholder of the organization? Yes/no 
The organizational identity construct, answers questions such as "who are we?", "what 
does this organization do", "what are its core values?”, "what distinguishes from the 
others?". Please write 3-5 adjectives to define the identity of your organization. 
Please rate the statements below between 1 and 5. (1-I totally disagree, 5-I totally 
agree) 
The organization has a very large number of written rules and procedures except the 
requirements of the Ministry of Education. 
The organization has a very large number of written rules and procedures 
The rules and procedures of the organization are accessible to everyone. 
There are written job descriptions for most jobs in this organization.  
The organization keeps a written record of nearly everyone's job performance.  
There is a formal orientation program for the new members of the organization.  
Please rate the statements below between 1 and 5. (1-I totally disagree, 5-I totally 
agree) 
This organization's successes are my successes. 
When someone praises this organization, it feels like a personal compliment. 
If a story in the media criticized this organization, I would feel embarrassed. 
I am very interested in what others think about this organization. 
When I talk about this organization, I usually say 'we' rather than 'they'. 
When someone criticizes this organization, it feels like a personal insult. 
Please rate the statements below between 1 and 5. (1-I totally disagree, 5-I totally 
agree) 
Our business objectives are driven by student and family satisfaction. 
Our competitive advantage is based on understanding student and family needs. 
We are committed to serving student and family needs. 
Business strategies are driven by the goal of increasing value for students and families. 
We frequently measure customer satisfaction. 
We pay close attention to our service quality after we register the students. 
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Please rate the statements below between 1 and 5. (1-I totally disagree, 5-I totally 
agree) 
This organization addresses an opportunity to make money. 
I am personally working in this organization in order to make money. 
The shareholders provide financial capital to this organization in order to make money. 
Employees work for this organization in order to make money. 
The students to be accepted to the organization are selected based on financial gains. 
The service providers work with the organization in order to make money. 
This organization addresses an opportunity to positively impact society. 
I am personally working in this organization in positively impact society. 
The shareholders provide financial capital to this organization in order to positively 
impact society. 
Employees work for this organization in order to positively impact society. 
The students to be accepted to the organization are selected based on the potential benefit 
they can get from here. 
The service providers work with the organization in order to positively impact society. 
Please rate your organization on below statements between 1 and 5. (1-I totally 
disagree, 5-I totally agree) 
The job knowledge and skills of employees to deliver superior quality work and service. 
Efforts of the management to measure and track the quality of the work and service. 
The recognition and rewards employees receive for the delivery of superior work and 
service 
The overall quality of service provided by your organization. 
The leadership shown by management in supporting the service quality effort. 
The effectiveness of the communications efforts (to both employees and customers) 
Adequacy of the tools, technology, and other resources provided to employees to support 
the delivery of superior quality work and service? 
How is your organization positioned with respect to the average of other 
organizations in the field on below issues? 
Quality of education (1-low, 5-high) 
Differentiation of education techniques from other organizations (1- not different, 5- very 
different) 
Variety and intensity of services other than education (theatre, music, trips, 
workshops…etc.) (1-few, 5- much) 
Average price of education in the organization (1- low, 5- high) 
Average disability level of the students in the organization (1-relatively light, 5-heavy 
disabled) 
You stated that you have been working in this organization for more than 9 years. 
We now solicit you to think of the organization in 2006 and the previous years.  
How was your organization positioned with respect to the average of other 
organizations in the field on below issues in those years? 
Quality of education (1-low, 5-high) 
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Differentiation of education techniques from other organizations (1- not different, 5- very 
different) 
Variety and intensity of services other than education (theatre, music, trips, 
workshops…etc.) (1-few, 5- much) 
Average price of education in the organization (1- low, 5- high) 
Average disability level of the students in the organization (1-relatively light, 5-heavy 
disabled) 
Thinking of their relative importance in your organizations, please allocate 10 
points to each group of four items. (You can assign zero as well) 
-It is important to our organization that: 
legal responsibilities are seriously fulfilled. 
long-term return on investment is maximized. 
we have the possibility to participate in activities that address social issues. 
when securing new business, promises are not made which aren’t intended to be fulfilled. 
-Our organization is successful when: 
it is consistently profitable. 
it fulfills its legal obligations. 
it fulfills its ethical and moral responsibilities. 
it fulfills its philanthropic and charitable responsibilities. 
-It is important that the organization is committed to: 
being as profitable as possible. 
addressing societal problems. 
abiding by laws and regulations. 
moral and ethical behavior. 
-It is important to: 
allocate resources on their ability to improve long-term profitability. 
comply with new laws. 
examine regularly new opportunities and programs which can result in an increase in 
value for society. 
recognize and respect new or evolving ethical/moral norms adopted by society. 
Please rate below item from 1 to 7, such that 1 means the statement on the left is 
most accurate, 7 means the statement on the right is most accurate. 
 
Our organization... 
Is very seldom the pioneer organization to 
introduce new products or services, 
administrative techniques, operating 
technologies, etc. 
Is very often the pioneer organization to 
introduce new products or services, 
administrative techniques, operating 
technologies, etc. 
Typically responds to actions which 
competitors initiate 
  Typically initiates actions to which 
competitors then respond   
Is mostly inclined to follow the 
competitors and the leader when marketing 
new products and ideas. 
Is inclined to be ahead of the competitors 
and being the pioneer when marketing new 
products and ideas. 
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In the past 3 years …  
Changes in product or service lines have 
been mostly of minor nature 
Changes in product or service have usually 
been quite dramatic   
The organization marketed no new lines of 
products or services 
The organization marketed many new lines 
of products or services   
Top management has preferred 
emphasizing the marketing of tried and 
true products or services 
Top management has preferred 
emphasizing R&D, technological 
leadership, and innovations   
In our organization, top management… 
Has a strong proclivity for low risk 
projects (with normal and certain rates of 
return) 
Has a strong proclivity for high risk 
projects (with chances of very high returns)   
Believes that, owing to the nature of the 
environment, it is best to proceed via timid, 
incremental behavior.  
Believes that, owing to the nature of the 
environment, bold, long-term oriented acts 
are necessary 
Typically seeks to avoid competitive 
clashes preferring a "live-and-let live" 
posture when making decisions in 
uncertain environments, in order to reduce 
the potential loss. 
Typically adopts a brave and aggressive 
posture when making decisions in 
uncertain environments, in order to reduce 
the potential loss. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
189 
 
Employee Survey Questions (Turkish) 
Lütfen anketi eğitimci, psikolog veya yönetici konumundaki çalışanlara 
yönlendiriniz. 
Yaşınız: 
Öğrenim durumunuz: Lise/Üniversite/Yüksek Lisans/Doktora 
Üniversiteden mezun olduğunuz bölüm: 
Özel eğitim ve rehabilitasyon alanındaki toplam tecrübeniz: 
Kaç yıldır bu kurumda çalışıyorsunuz? 
Kurumdaki göreviniz? 
Öğretmen/terapist/psikolog 
Müdür/müdür yardımcısı 
Diğer (belirtiniz) 
Kurumun sahibi veya ortağı mısınız? Evet/hayır 
Örgütsel kimlik kavramı, "biz kimiz?", "bu kurum ne yapar", "temel değerleri nelerdir", 
"onu diğerlerinden ayıran nelerdir?" gibi soruları yanıtlar. Lütfen çalıştığınız 
kurumun örgütsel kimliğini tanımlayacak sıfatlar yazınız (3-5 tane) 
Aşağıdaki ifadeleri 1 ile 5 arasında değerlendiriniz. (1-hiç katılmıyorum, 5-
tamamen katılıyorum) 
Kurumun, Milli Eğitim Bakanlığının getirdiği gereklilikler dışında, çok sayıda yazılı 
kuralı ve prosedürü vardır.  
Kurumun çok sayıda yazılı kuralı ve prosedürü vardır.  
Kurumun yönetmelikleri ve kuralları herkesin erişimindedir.  
Kurumdaki pozisyonların çoğu için yazılı görev tanımları vardır.  
Çalışanların çoğunun (ya da hepsinin) performansı yazılı olarak kaydedilir.  
İşe yeni başlayanlar için hazırlanmış bir oryantasyon programı vardır.  
Aşağıdaki ifadeleri 1 ile 5 arasında değerlendiriniz. (1-hiç katılmıyorum, 5-
tamamen katılıyorum) 
Çalıştığım kurumun başarısını kendi başarım gibi görürüm. 
Herhangi bir kişi çalıştığım kurumu övdüğünde, bunu kendime yapılmış bir övgü gibi 
hissederim. 
Medyada çalıştığım kurum ilgili kötü bir haber çıksa üzüntü duyarım. 
Başkalarının çalıştığım kurum hakkındaki düşünceleri benim için önemlidir. 
Çalıştığım kurumdan bahsederken, “onlar” değil, “biz” diye konuşurum. 
Herhangi bir kişi çalıştığım kurumu eleştirdiğinde üzüntü duyarım. 
Aşağıdaki ifadeleri 1 ile 5 arasında değerlendiriniz. (1-hiç katılmıyorum, 5-
tamamen katılıyorum) 
Kurumumuzun temel hedefi öğrenci ve aile memnuniyetidir. 
Rekabet stratejilerimizin temel hedefi öğrenci ve aile ihtiyaçlarını anlamaktır.  
Öğrenci ve aile ihtiyaçlarına hizmet etmeye, kurum olarak kendimizi adamış 
durumdayız. 
Stratejilerimizi belirlerken, öğrenciler ve aileler için daha değerli hizmetler sunmaya 
odaklanırız. 
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Öğrencilerin veya ailelerin bizden ne kadar memnun olduklarını sürekli ve sistematik 
olarak ölçeriz. 
Öğrencinin kayıt işlemi yapıldıktan sonraki süreçte, hizmet kalitemize çok dikkat ederiz. 
Aşağıdaki ifadeleri 1 ile 5 arasında değerlendiriniz. (1-hiç katılmıyorum, 5-
tamamen katılıyorum) 
Bu kurum, bir maddi kazanç firsatini degerlendirme çabasıdır. 
Bu kurumda para kazanmak için çalışıyorum. 
Kurumun ortak/ortakları bu işe para kazanmak için yatırım yapmaktadır. 
Çalışanlar bu kurumda para kazanmak için çalışmaktadır. 
Kuruma kabul edilecek öğrenciler, maddi getirileri göz önünde bulundurularak seçilir. 
Kurumun hizmet aldığı paydaşlar, para kazanmak için bu kuruluş ile çalışmaktadır. 
Bu kurulus, bir sosyal fayda yaratma fırsatını değerlendirme çabasıdır. 
Bu kuruluşta, topluma iyi yönde katkıda bulunmak için çalışıyorum. 
Kurumun ortak/ortakları bu işe topluma iyi yönde katkıda bulunmak için yatırım 
yapmaktadır. 
Çalışanlar bu kurumda topluma iyi yönde katkıda bulunmak için çalışmaktadır. 
Kuruma kabul edilecek öğrenciler, kurumun onlara sağlayabileceği fayda göz önünde 
bulundurularak seçilir. 
Kurumun hizmet aldığı paydaşlar topluma iyi yönde katkıda bulunmak için bu kuruluş 
ile çalışmaktadır. 
Kurumunuzu aşağıdaki konularda, 1 ile 5 arasında notlandırınız. (1-zayıf, 5 - 
mükemmel) 
Çalışanların, yüksek kalitede hizmet sunmak için gerekli olan bilgi ve beceri seviyeleri 
Yönetimin, verilen hizmetin kalitesini ölçme ve takip etme çabaları 
Çalışanların, üstün hizmet sağladıklarında aldıkları takdir ve ödüller 
Kurumun faydalanıcılarına sağladığı hizmetin genel kalitesi 
Üst yönetimin, hizmet kalitesi çabalarını desteklemede gösterdiği liderlik 
Kurumdaki iletişim çabalarının etkinliği (hem çalışanlar hem faydalanıcılar için) 
Çalışanlara, iyi kalitede hizmet üretebilmeleri için sağlanan araçlar, teknolojiler ve diğer 
kaynakların yeterliliği 
Kurumunuz aşağıdaki konularda, alandaki diğer kurumların ortalamasına göre 
nasıl konumlanmıştır? 
Verilen eğitimin kalite seviyesi (1-düşük, 5-yüksek) 
Eğitim tekniklerinin diğer kurumlardan farklılaştırılmış oluşu (1-farklı değil, 5-çok 
farklı) 
Eğitim dışı hizmetlerin çeşitliliği ve yoğunluğu (tiyatro, müzik, gezi, atölye 
çalışmaları...vb) (1-az, 5- çok) 
Kurumdaki derslerin ortalama ücreti (1- düşük, 5- yüksek) 
Kuruma devam eden öğrencilerin ortalama engel derecesi (1-göreceli olarak hafif, 5-ağır 
engelli) 
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Bu kurumda 9 yıldan fazla süredir çalıştığınızı belirttiniz. Şimdi sizden, 1 dakika 
için, 2006 yılı ve önceki yıllarda kurumu düşünmenizi rica ediyoruz. O yıllarda 
kurumunuz, aşağıdaki konularda, alandaki diğer kurumların ortalamasına göre 
nasıl konumlanmıştı? 5 üzerinden notlandırınız. 
Verilen eğitimin kalite seviyesi (1-düşük, 5-yüksek) 
Eğitim tekniklerinin diğer kurumlardan farklılaştırılmış oluşu (1- farklı değil, 5-çok 
farklı) 
Eğitim dışı hizmetlerin çeşitliliği ve yoğunluğu (tiyatro, müzik, gezi, atölye 
çalışmaları...vb) (1-az, 5- çok) 
Kurumdaki derslerin ortalama ücreti (1- düşük, 5- yüksek) 
Kuruma devam eden öğrencilerin ortalama engel derecesi (1-göreceli olarak hafif, 5-ağır 
engelli) 
 
Aşağıdaki maddelerin çalıştığınız kurum için göreceli önemlerini düşünerek, her 
dört maddelik gruba toplam 10ar puan olacak şekilde, maddelere puanları 
paylaştırınız. (maddelere sıfır da verebilirsiniz) 
Kurum için şunlar önemlidir: 
Yasal yükümlülüklerin ciddiyetle yerine getirilmesi 
Yapılan yatırımın uzun vadeli ekonomik getirisinin arttırılması 
Sosyal sorunlara yönelik faaliyetlere dahil olma imkanımızın olması 
Kurumun yeni bir anlaşma yaparken, yerine getirmeyi düşünmediği sözler vermemesi 
Kurum, şunları yapabilirse başarılı olarak görülür: 
İstikrarlı olarak kar edebilirse 
Yasal yükümlülüklerini yerine getirebilirse 
Etik ve ahlaki sorumluluklarını yerine getirebilirse 
Hayırseverlik ve yardımseverlik sorumluluklarını yerine getirebilirse 
Kurumun, şunlara bağlı kalması önemlidir: 
Mümkün olduğunca karlı olmak 
Sosyal sorunlara hitap etmek 
Kanun ve yönetmeliklere uymak 
Ahlaklı ve etik davranışlar 
Kurumda şu hususlar önemlidir: 
Kaynakları, uzun vadeli karlılığı arttıracak şekilde dağıtmak 
Yeni kanunlara uyum sağlamak 
Sosyal değer yaratabilecek yeni fırsatları ve projeleri incelemek 
Toplumca benimsenen yeni ahlaki/etik normları anlamak ve saygı göstermek 
Aşağıdaki maddelerde, sol taraftaki ifade en doğru ise 1, sağ taraftaki ifade en 
doğru ise 7 olacak şekilde, 1 ile 7 arasında puan veriniz 
 
Kurumumuz... 
Çok nadir olarak, yeni ürün/hizmetlerin ve 
idari/teknik yeniliklerin pazara 
sunulmasında öncü kurum rolünü üstlenir. 
Çok sık olarak, yeni ürün/hizmetlerin ve 
idari/teknik yeniliklerin pazara 
sunulmasında öncü kurum rolünü üstlenir. 
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Genel olarak rakipleri takip eder ve onların 
hamlelerine cevap verir. 
Genel olarak rakiplerin daha sonra takip 
edeceği, yeni ve öncü uygulamaları 
başlatır.  
Yeni hizmet ve fikirlerin pazara 
sunumunda, büyük oranda rakipleri ve 
“lideri” takip etme eğilimindedir. 
Yeni hizmet ve fikirlerin pazara 
sunumunda, büyük oranda rakiplerin 
önünde, öncü olma eğilimindedir.  
 
Geçmiş üç yılda kurumumuzda…  
Ürün/hizmet bazındaki değişiklikler daha 
çok ufak çaplı iyileştirmeler şeklinde 
olmuştur. 
Ürün/hizmet bazındaki değişiklikler 
genellikle büyük çaplı değişimler şeklinde 
olmuştur.  
Hiç yeni ürün/hizmet sunumuna 
başlanmamıştır. 
Çok fazla yeni ürün/hizmet sunumuna 
başlanmıştır.  
Üst yönetim, denenmiş ve başarılı olmuş 
ürün ve hizmetleri sağlamayı tercih 
etmiştir. 
Üst yönetim, araştırma-geliştirme 
faaliyetlerine, teknik liderliğe ve 
yenilikçiliğe önem vermeyi tercih etmiştir.  
 
Kurumumuzda… 
Üst yönetimin düşük riskli (getirisi normal 
düzeyde ve kesin olan) projelere güçlü bir 
yatkınlığı vardır. 
Üst yönetimin, yüksek riskli (yüksek getiri 
oranlarını yakalama şansı bulunan) 
projelere güçlü bir yatkınlığı vardır. 
Üst yönetim, en iyi davranış biçiminin 
faaliyet gösterdiğimiz çevreyle de ilişkili 
olarak, küçük ve yavaş adımlarla ilerlemek 
olduğuna inanır.  
Üst yönetim, kurum hedeflerine ulaşmak 
için, faaliyet gösterdiğimiz çevreyle de 
ilişkili olarak, gözüpek ve uzun vadeli 
davranışların gerektiğine inanır.  
Belirsizlik içeren durumlarda karar 
verilirken, olası zararı en aza indirmek 
amacıyla, temkinli, “bekle ve gör” 
yaklaşımı uygulanır. 
Belirsizlik içeren durumlarda karar 
verilirken, olası yüksek getiriyi en üst 
düzeye çıkarmak amacıyla, cesur ve 
girişken bir tutum takınılır.  
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Code List - Field Level 
F_ beneficiaries_ capricious 
F_ beneficiaries_ decreased dependence to SEs 
F_ beneficiaries_ decreasing dependence to SEs_ having free alternatives 
F_ beneficiaries_ enlarged pool of beneficiaries 
F_ beneficiaries_ increased mobility 
F_ beneficiaries_ increased mobility_ having more alternatives 
F_ beneficiaries_ increased mobility_ seeking hope at different orgs 
F_ beneficiaries_ increased mobility_ seeking hope in new therapies 
F_ beneficiaries_ increased mobility_ transferred with the teachers 
F_ beneficiaries_ less conscious 
F_ beneficiaries_ less conscious_ believing in the package 
F_ beneficiaries_ less conscious_ families not willing to learn 
F_ beneficiaries_ less conscious_ lacking knowledge 
F_ beneficiaries_ less conscious_ less attentive to their kids 
F_ beneficiaries_ less ethical_ not using state's payment for the kid 
F_ beneficiaries_ less ethical_ requesting bribe from SERCs 
F_ beneficiaries_ less ethical_ seeking interest through their kids 
F_ beneficiaries_ less willing to contribute_ less appreciating the SE 
F_ beneficiaries_ less willing to contribute_ less willing to pay/donate 
F_ beneficiaries_ less willing to contribute_ less willing to volunteer 
F_ beneficiaries_ less willing to contribute_ seeing as public service 
F_ beneficiaries_ more expectations from foundations 
F_ beneficiaries_ more trust to foundations 
F_ beneficiaries_ rich ones choosing luxury centers 
F_ corruption_ bribing officers 
F_ corruption_ fake disabled reports 
F_ corruption_ invoicing without providing service 
F_ corruption_ officials as hidden partners 
F_ degeneration 
F_ degeneration_ abusing the beneficiaries 
F_ degeneration_ disputes among the orgs 
F_ degeneration_ low legitimacy_ decreased respect by officials 
F_ degeneration_ low legitimacy_ decreased respect by public 
F_ degeneration_ low legitimacy_ decreased trust by the state 
F_ degeneration_ low quality_ quality decreasing 
F_ degeneration_ low quality_ quality not improving 
F_ degeneration_ low quality_ students' info not transferred with them 
F_ degeneration_ no profit opportunity for ethical 
F_ degeneration_ unable to unite for solving problems 
F_ degeneration_ unfair competition 
F_ fierce sales&marketing_ doing families' legal tasks 
F_ fierce sales&marketing_ emphasizing additional therapies 
F_ fierce sales&marketing_ employing sales people 
F_ fierce sales&marketing_ free school bus 
F_ fierce sales&marketing_ offering different activities 
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F_ fierce sales&marketing_ tea and cookies to families 
F_ increasing number of orgs 
F_ moderator_ corruption common in poor districts 
F_ moderator_ educated families keen on quality 
F_ moderator_ weak institutional infrastructure 
F_ orgs_ big and ambitious orgs 
F_ orgs_ boutique orgs 
F_ orgs_ competitors except SERCs_ health centers 
F_ orgs_ competitors except SERCs_ independent centers 
F_ orgs_ good orgs_ competing with quality 
F_ orgs_ good orgs_ elite foundations_ corporatized 
F_ orgs_ good orgs_ elite foundations_ elite board 
F_ orgs_ good orgs_ elite foundations_ keen on PR 
F_ orgs_ good orgs_ elite foundations_ luxury 
F_ orgs_ good orgs_ elite foundations_ powerful networks 
F_ orgs_ good orgs_ elite foundations_ resourceful 
F_ orgs_ good orgs_ elite foundations_ serve few kids 
F_ orgs_ good orgs_ ethical 
F_ orgs_ good orgs_ few in number 
F_ orgs_ good orgs_ good quality 
F_ orgs_ good orgs_ loving the profession 
F_ orgs_ good orgs_ social service centered 
F_ orgs_ good orgs_ some creating &/transferring knowledge 
F_ orgs_ good orgs_ some lacking managerial capabilities 
F_ pressures_ costs of mimicked acts 
F_ pressures_ decoupling to tailor education 
F_ pressures_ have to mimic some sales&marketing acts 
F_ pressures_ uncertainty 
F_ profit maximizers entering 
F_ profit maximizers_ excessive student per teacher 
F_ profit maximizers_ founders lacking knowledge 
F_ profit maximizers_ founders unrelated to the field 
F_ profit maximizers_ low quality 
F_ profit maximizers_ many founders unethical 
F_ profit maximizers_ non-qualified employees 
F_ profit maximizers_ not caring about impact 
F_ profit maximizers_ not competing on quality 
F_ profit maximizers_ not investing in quality 
F_ profit maximizers_ not proctoring the employees 
F_ profit maximizers_ seeing the disabled as commodity 
F_ profit maximizers_ some engaged in corruption 
F_ profit maximizers_ some weakly managed 
F_ SEs financially troubled 
F_ unethical attacks to competitors_ approaching to students of other SERCs 
F_ unethical attacks to competitors_ causing legal trouble for the competitors 
F_ unethical attacks to competitors_ not deleting records to prevent transfer 
F_ unethical attacks to competitors_ transferring teachers for their students 
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F_ unethical cost reduction_ heavy cases not accepted 
F_ unethical cost reduction_ merging classes to reduce cost 
F_ unethical cost reduction_ paying less employee tax 
F_ unethical sales acts_ bribing families 
F_ unethical sales acts_ lying to the families 
F_ unethical sales acts_ making deals with doctors 
F_ unethical sales acts_ offering more hours (with no quality) 
F_ unethical sales acts_ salesforce waiting at hospitals & schools 
F_ workforce_ decreased idealism 
F_ workforce_ decreased idealism_ individuals with improper traits joining 
F_ workforce_ decreased idealism_ money main concern 
F_ workforce_ decreased idealism_ unwilling to add more value 
F_ workforce_ decreased idealism_ unwilling to learn more 
F_ workforce_ decreased idealism_ unwilling to put effort 
F_ workforce_ increased mobility 
F_ workforce_ increased mobility_ enlarged pool of employers 
F_ workforce_ increased mobility_ themselves opening SERCs 
F_ workforce_ increased mobility_ transferred to SERCs paying slightly more 
F_ workforce_ increased mobility_ transfers to state schools 
F_ workforce_ increased mobility_ unwilling to sign special contracts 
F_ workforce_ job becoming popular 
F_ workforce_ job becoming popular_ increased scarcity of specialists 
F_ workforce_ job becoming popular_ increasing wages 
Macro_ country getting poorer 
Macro_ donations becoming success based 
Macro_ funds more based on projects 
Macro_ general poor management of the country 
Macro_ increase in the number of NGOs 
Macro_ increased acceptance of the disabled in society 
Macro_ people becoming less sensitive 
Macro_ technological developments 
Macro_ unethical NGOs reducing others' legitimacy 
state_ "deterrence policy" 
state_ being abused 
state_ decreasing payments per hour 
state_ delaying payments 
state_ excluding the SEs 
State_ fast changing regulations 
state_ GRCs and hospitals functioning poorly 
state_ hard physical standards 
state_ increasing bureaucracy 
state_ inspections not effective 
state_ irrational new inspections 
state_ making unfair cuts 
State_ new authorities less responsive 
state_ not favoring SEs over merchants 
state_ poor mentality regarding disabled 
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state_ poor planning on raising teachers 
state_ regulations limiting SEs discretion 
state_ unfair pricing (serc vs health center) 
 
 
Code List- Organizational Level  
O_ Activity_ awareness raising activities 
O_ Activity_ contributing to scientific studies 
O_ Activity_ defending rights 
O_ Activity_ developing education methods & devices 
O_ Activity_ education & rehabilitation to families 
O_ Activity_ financial aid to the public school 
O_ Activity_ fundraising through concerts, kermes 
O_ Activity_ influencing lawmakers 
O_ Activity_ inspection of kids by SERC's doctors 
O_ Activity_ mobilizing state with new projects 
O_ Activity_ no social activities (intentional) 
O_ Activity_ organizing conferences 
O_ Activity_ publications 
O_ Activity_ raising teachers to the field 
O_ Activity_ social activities for the students 
O_ Activity_ teaching work skills to the disabled 
O_ Activity_ transferring its knowledge to other actors 
O_ Activity_ transferring knowledge from abroad 
O_ belief_ "people want to exploit us" 
O_ belief_ "state is exploiting us" 
O_ belief_ concern for control 
O_ belief_ not feasible to invest 
O_ belief_ we help to whoever "comes and asks for" 
O_ belief_ we should have better quality than FPs 
O_ belief_ you cannot corporatize in this field 
O_ beneficiaries_ many heavy cases 
O_ beneficiaries_ poor 
O_ BoD_ disabled families not wanted 
O_ BoD_ from HNW individuals 
O_ BoD_ from low-ego people 
O_ BoD_ not willing to step back 
O_ BoD_ seeing their position as a rank 
O_ BoD_ willing to do everything themselves 
O_ change_ corporatization 
O_ change_ creating central authority 
O_ change_ emphasis to efficiency 
O_ change_ enlarging revenue stream_ commercial products 
O_ change_ increased emphasis to PR 
O_ change_ increasing prices 
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O_ change_ reserved capacity for high payers 
O_ change_ sustainability orientation 
O_ effects felt_ costs of non-mimicking unethical acts 
O_ effects felt_ decreased donations 
O_ effects felt_ decreasing profits 
O_ effects felt_ decreasing quality 
O_ effects felt_ decreasing revenues 
O_ effects felt_ decreasing students 
O_ effects felt_ increased financial concerns 
O_ effects felt_ increasing demand 
O_ effects felt_ not effected by market forces 
O_ effects felt_ poor financial situation 
O_ effects felt_ time lost on false claims 
O_ effects felt_ unable to be selective on specialists 
O_ effects felt_ unable to buy teaching material 
O_ effects felt_ unable to compete 
O_ effects felt_ unable to find specialists 
O_ effects felt_ unable to increase teacher per student 
O_ effects felt_ unable to invest in new methods 
O_ effects felt_ unable to retain employees 
O_ effects_ other_ time lost on red-tape 
O_ founders_ altruistic 
O_ founders_ ambitious 
O_ founders_ catching opportunities 
O_ founders_ decreased engagement of BoD 
O_ founders_ decreased engagement_ engaging in other business 
O_ founders_ decreased engagement_ seeking different role in the system 
O_ founders_ emotion_ anger to degeneration 
O_ founders_ emotion_ hopeless 
O_ founders_ emotion_ resentment 
O_ founders_ emotion_ stressed 
O_ founders_ emotion_ tired 
O_ founders_ escalation of commitment 
O_ founders_ having secured their kids 
O_ founders_ leader 
O_ founders_ limited time new projects 
O_ founders_ loving kids 
O_ founders_ no managerial work delegation 
O_ founders_ no skill in other business 
O_ founders_ professional orientation 
O_ founders_ putting realistic goals 
O_ founders_ respect for the profession 
O_ founders_ risk taker 
O_ founders_ sacrifice and dedication of BoD 
O_ founders_ self-rehabilitation 
O_ founders_ sustained engagement 
O_ history _operational mistakes 
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O_ history_ arbitrary acts of branches 
O_ history_ board arrangement for resources 
O_ history_ closing branch/es 
O_ history_ disputes with state during collaboration 
O_ history_ fail to do PR 
O_ history_ fail to invest in survival 
O_ history_ foreign funds 
O_ history_ founders' kids growing 
O_ history_ high quality 
O_ history_ loss from operational mistakes 
O_ history_ no managerial knowledge 
O_ history_ separating from drifted partner 
O_ history_ timely precautions 
O_ identity_ "halk cocugu" 
O_ identity_ altruism 
O_ identity_ continuous development 
O_ identity_ creating holistic solutions 
O_ identity_ democratic 
O_ identity_ developing the employees 
O_ identity_ dignity 
O_ identity_ door open to everyone 
O_ identity_ exemplar organization 
O_ identity_ family-like 
O_ identity_ hardworking 
O_ identity_ high quality education 
O_ identity_ including the poor 
O_ identity_ innovative 
O_ identity_ leader 
O_ identity_ long-suffering (cefakar) 
O_ identity_ no profit aim 
O_ identity_ pioneer 
O_ identity_ profit aim secondary 
O_ identity_ scientific orientation 
O_ identity_ secular 
O_ identity_ selective 
O_ identity_ self-sustainable 
O_ identity_ specialization 
O_ identity_ strong 
O_ identity_ tender to families 
O_ identity_ tender to the kids 
O_ identity_ trusted 
O_ identity_ universalism 
O_ identity_ valuing employees 
O_ identity_ valuing families 
O_ identity_ volunteer based 
O_ mission_ being a highly reputable org 
O_ mission_ being an exemplar org 
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O_ mission_ caring for the disabled who lost parents 
O_ mission_ changing the perception of the society on mentally disabled 
O_ mission_ doing R&D 
O_ mission_ doing scientific research 
O_ mission_ enlighten families 
O_ mission_ guiding the state to solve problems 
O_ mission_ helping the kids 
O_ mission_ integrating the disabled to the society 
O_ mission_ making the students happy 
O_ mission_ preventing the occurence of disability 
O_ mission_ providing best service 
O_ mission_ providing early education 
O_ mission_ providing good service 
O_ mission_ providing jobs for the disabled 
O_ mission_ psychological support to family 
O_ mission_ raising teachers to the field 
O_ mission_ reaching the most disadvantaged 
O_ mission_ supporting scientific research 
O_ moderator_ region's economic condition 
O_ moderator_ savings of founder 
O_ price_ flexible 
O_ price_ free extra classes to the poor 
O_ price_ free full time education to the poor 
O_ price_ high 
O_ price_ low 
O_ price_ moderate 
O_ quality_ coordinating with the teachers at schools 
O_ quality_ coordination btw teachers 
O_ quality_ external evaluation 
O_ quality_ feedback from families 
O_ quality_ high 
O_ quality_ moderate 
O_ quality_ tracking performance 
O_ reaction_ adding new therapies 
O_ reaction_ cancel a therapy (no specialist) 
O_ reaction_ cutting operating expenses 
O_ reaction_ decreasing employee trainings 
O_ reaction_ decreasing free complementary therapies 
O_ reaction_ decreasing free education to the poor 
O_ reaction_ decreasing research 
O_ reaction_ decreasing social activities 
O_ reaction_ doing families' legal tasks 
O_ reaction_ eliminating heavy disabled 
O_ reaction_ employee contracts banning student transfer 
O_ reaction_ extensively using volunteers 
O_ reaction_ firm founding association 
O_ reaction_ forming collaboration groups 
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O_ reaction_ merging classes to reduce transport cost 
O_ reaction_ mission change_ being a model 
O_ reaction_ mission change_ high quality to moderate quality 
O_ reaction_ mission change_ many branches to one branch 
O_ reaction_ mission change_ no more R&D 
O_ reaction_ new fundraising tech_ project grants 
O_ reaction_ new fundraising tech_ public donation campaigns 
O_ reaction_ offering new services 
O_ reaction_ paying below market wages 
O_ reaction_ quit by bankrupt 
O_ reaction_ quit voluntarily 
O_ reaction_ recruiting employees who will do extra tasks 
O_ reaction_ seizing_ closing branch/es 
O_ reaction_ seizing_ decreasing # of employees 
O_ reaction_ stop organizing conferences 
O_ reaction_ suspending growth 
O_ Reason of birth_ earn money & social good 
O_ Reason of birth_ helping kids and families 
O_ Reason of birth_ no good place to send founder/s' kid 
O_ Reason of birth_ no place to send founder/s' kid 
O_ Reason of birth_ seeing the need 
O_ role_ example for the region 
O_ role_ leader in the region 
O_ role_ raising quality in its region 
O_ strategy_ acts to increase employee identification 
O_ strategy_ continuous development 
O_ strategy_ engaging the families 
O_ strategy_ follow ups to donors 
O_ strategy_ high quality with manageable size 
O_ strategy_ investing in employees 
O_ strategy_ no competition orientation 
O_ strategy_ selecting attentive families 
O_ strategy_ selecting employees open to feedback 
O_ strategy_ selecting idealist employees 
O_ strategy_ selecting presentable employees 
O_ strategy_ selecting qualified employees 
O_ strctr_ control mechanisms for branches 
O_ strctr_ corporatized 
O_ strctr_ internal regulations 
O_ strctr_ no internal regulations 
O_ strctr_ no professional staff 
O_ strctr_ not corporatized 
O_ strctr_ professional management 
O_ strength_ ability to find sponsors for social activities 
O_ strength_ collecting donations without permission 
O_ strength_ differentiated methods 
O_ strength_ excess demand 
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O_ strength_ expertise 
O_ strength_ extensive socialization for students 
O_ strength_ founders as example to the employees 
O_ strength_ good hearted employees 
O_ strength_ good reputation 
O_ strength_ having commercial knowledge 
O_ strength_ high attention to kids 
O_ strength_ high teacher/student ratio 
O_ strength_ low employee turnover 
O_ strength_ preferred over other employers 
O_ strength_ superior facilities 
O_ strength_ teachers going home when necessary 
O_ strength_ technical knowledge 
O_ strength_ trusted by employees 
O_ strength_ wide vision 
O_ unable to realize new projects 
O_ weakness_ aging BoD 
O_ weakness_ disputes within the board 
O_ weakness_ inertia 
O_ weakness_ late for precautions 
O_ weakness_ no commercial knowledge 
O_ weakness_ no effective communication to donors 
O_ weakness_ no grants due to firm status 
O_ weakness_ no tax exemption status 
O_ weakness_ no tight connections to HNW people 
O_ weakness_ no transport offered 
O_ weakness_ non-idealist employees 
O_ weakness_ retiring into itself 
O_ weakness_ supporters losing economic power 
O_ weakness_ unable to catch technology 
O_ weakness_ unable to raise funds 
O_ weakness_ unfaithful employees 
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Coding Example 
Sub-codes of the higher-order code named “decreased idealism” 
The Code Code Definition Example Quotations 
Unwilling to put effort 
Statements declaring that the 
employees refrain from 
putting effort during work. 
"I know so many people, who locate the kid to a (practice) tool, open their laptop, then facebook" 
"Deterioration of human quality...The desire of the worforce to earn money without putting effort" 
"Now, the precious ones are very few; they are like students. They pass to another room during their 
class hour, playing with their phones, gossips..."  
Unwilling to add more 
value 
Statements declaring that 
employees are less willing to 
do a task in the best way. 
"You need to do this to them (the teachers); there should always be someone proctoring them, directing 
them, telling them "do this like that, do that like that"" 
"There was an excitement as perhaps "I should do the best." Now, it is not like that. Now, there are so 
many organizations that, they (employees) think like "if they don't want me here, I can go find a job 
wherever I want tomorrow."" 
Unwilling to learn 
more 
Statements about the 
decreased willingness of 
employees on professional 
development.  
"We used to organize summer schools. The apprentices did not go in the summer and worked with us. 
“Let’s work there, be with more number of students, learn some things.” This was their concern. We 
used work with them in the summer, with the youth, wth the students. I mean, the ideals were different; 
they were more ambitious, more willing to develop themselves. 
Money main concern 
Statements on the increased 
importance of financial gain to 
the workforce, rather than the 
altruistic or professional 
motivations 
"Teachers started to transfer to whoever pays more. You start with a teacher, you work for 3 months, 
after 3 months another center pays mmore, and the teacher can leave within 3 months. S/he does not 
care; there is no such thing as “I have responsibility here.” There has been such a reflection.” 
“I get angry on the phone; s/he asks “how much will you pay me?” yet on the phone. I ask “did you ever 
heard of our organization?”. S/he says “No, I didn’t.” S/he makes a job application, but has not done 
any inquiry about the organization. His/her only concern is how much it pays. 
Individuals with 
improper traits joining 
Statements on the entrance of 
individuals to the field with 
personal characteristics 
incompatible with the job 
Firstly, working with disabled people is a special thing. I mean it requires some personality traits. As 
there is scarcity of specialists in Turkey, and as those specialists find jobs easily, some university 
students (candidates) show a high demand for it. I mean they enter the departments with high scores etc. 
Because, there is no problem of unemployment. For that reason, sometimes their characteristics do not 
match (with the job). When I entered this field years ago, the people with more compatible 
characteristics used to prefer it.  Because it was not a field with much job opportunity.  
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